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Abstract 
In 1998 Indonesia was on the verge of huge political changes. The economy was in 
crisis and President Suharto's thirty-two year New Order government was coming to an 
end. Violence, largely directed against the ethnic Chinese in a number of cities on the 
archipelago, accompanied the political and economic crises. The changes which 
unfolded led to peaceful elections in 1999, which were judged by international 
observers to be fair and democratic. These elections placed a new administration in 
power and with it the hopes of the people that reformasi (reform) would ensue. 
Immediately after Suharto stepped down things began to change for the ethnic Chinese 
who had never been fully accepted as Indonesian within Indonesian national discourses. 
Indeed the presence of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was constructed as a problem; the 
"Chinese problem" (inasalah Cina). During the New Order, policy towards Chinese 
Indonesians was particularly harsh. They were not permitted to celebrate any aspect of 
their Chinese heritage and official policy dictated that they should assimilate into 
Indonesian society. This changed after 1998 and the debate about how Chinese 
Indonesians should behave, and how they should be treated, emerged once again. This 
thesis investigates a number of Chinese Indonesian organisations which were 
established or re-established after May 1998. I am particularly interested in how they 
are articulating both their Chinese and their Indonesian identities in this new climate. I 
argue that as a result of Indonesian national discourses which construct Chinese 
Indonesians as "outsiders", it may not be possible for the groups to achieve their joint 
aims of overcoming anti-Chinese stereotypes and having their Chinese heritage 
accepted within Indonesia. During the New Order years many ethnic Chinese were 
reluctant to declare themselves Chinese publicly, or speak about their experiences, 
which has led to a dearth of empirical material relating to how Chinese Indonesians 
themselves understand their identities. Therefore, this research is a particularly useful 
addition to the study of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. 
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Note on Style 
The spelling of words in Bahasa Indonesia changed in 1972. In this thesis I have used 
this new form of spelling, except for quotations or titles of books and articles which use 
the old spelling. Particularly worth noting is that the old spelling uses "Soeharto", while 
the new spelling uses "Suharto". 
I have used pinyin to romanise the Chinese-language words, rather than the older 
Wade-Giles system, again except for quotations or titles of books and articles. 
However, some of the Chinese Indonesian media are not consistent in their use of 
these two methods. Therefore, sometimes a combination of both pinyin and Wade- 
Giles romanisation appears. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Methodology 
The Chinese in Indonesia 
According to the 2000 census, Indonesia, with 205.8 million people, has the fouth 
largest population in the world, after China, India and the United States of 
America (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 1). The same census places the 
number of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia at 3.087 million or 1.5 percent of the 
population. ' 
The census of 2000 was the first since 1930 to include a section on ethnic 
classification. Up to that year the numbers of ethnic Chinese were estimates from 
the 1930 data. The number of those who declared themselves to be Chinese in the 
2000 census was actually much lower than was generally thought among writers 
on the subject. In fact the numbers of ethnic Chinese were shown to be a lower 
percentage of the population than they had been in 1930.2 Up to 2000 estimates of 
the numbers of ethnic Chinese were between 2.5 and 5 percent of the population, 
which would have made them the fouth largest ethnic group in Indonesia, next to 
1 Suryadinata Arifin and Ananta have used data published by Indonesia's Central Board of 
Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik). This data contains information about the 8 largest ethnic 
groups in each province. The ethnic Chinese come inside the top 8 in 11 provinces, covering 
68.45 percent of the total Indonesian population. However, there is no published data on the 
ethnic Chinese in 19 provinces and therefore the authors must estimate the numbers of ethnic 
Chinese in these 19 provinces (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 76). 
2 The number of Chinese in Indonesia according to the 1930 census was 2.92 million people 
or 2.03 percent of the population (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 79). The 2000 
census distinguishes between ethnic Chinese with Indonesian citizenship and those with 
foreign citizenship. In 1930 there were no "Indonesian citizens". Rather, the census included 
four categories; Native, Europeans, Chinese and Arab (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta. 2003: 
75). 
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the Javanese, Sundanese and Madurese (see Jacobsen, 2003: 16: Lee, 1999; 
Coppel, 1983; Pan 1998 and others). 
Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta suggest a number of explanations for the drop in 
the percentage of the population since 1930 declaring themselves to be ethnic 
Chinese. Firstly, the incomplete data which the authors worked with is a factor 
(see note 1). Secondly, the authors suggest that since self-identification was used, 
if an ethnic Chinese person did not consider themselves to be Chinese, despite 
being considered so by other Indonesians, then the census would record that 
person as non-Chinese (Suryadinata et al, 2003: 74). Thirdly, the writers suggest 
that since the violence of 1998, which was largely targeted at ethnic Chinese, 
some people may have felt fearful about identifying themselves as Chinese 
(Suryadinata et al, 2003: 75). Fourthly, the authors point out that the fertility of 
the ethnic Chinese is relatively much lower than the rest of the population 
(Suryadinata et al, 2003: 79). Finally, they suggest that during periods of violence 
against them over the previous 70 years, large numbers of Chinese Indonesians 
may have left Indonesia. However, the authors believe that the numbers leaving 
Indonesia as a result of violence are not high. 
Most Chinese in Indonesia are citizens of that country. Suryadinata, Arifin and 
Ananta estimate the numbers of those who are not citizens at 93,717 or 0.05 
percent of the total population of Indonesia. They live mostly in West Java and 
Banten. The writers suggest that these may be poor ethnic Chinese who cannot 
afford to pay the cost of Indonesian citizenship, or people who simply do not care 
enough about issues of citizenship to change (Suryadinata et al, 2003: 76). 
Citizenship for ethnic Chinese people has proved a contentious issue in Indonesia, 
with the rules governing procedures changing at various political junctures. I will 
return to this topic in more detail in chapters four and five. 
Chinese people have been arriving on the archipelago of what is now the Republic 
of Indonesia since as early as the fifth century. The level of communication 
between China and Southeast Asia very much depended on the attitude of the 
Emperor who was in power at any particular time. For example, for much of the 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644) creating links with places outside China Evas not 
considered a priority, however, the Yongle Emperor (1403-1424) was more 
3 
enthusiastic, sending official missions to Southeast Asia and posting 
commissioners in various ports in the region to supervise mercantile 
manouverings. As well as officially sanctioned trading ventures south, Chinese 
also went as labourers to work in the tea plantations and tin mines of Indonesia 
and other parts of Southeast Asia. 
Those early Chinese migrants tended to be viewed as traitors and deserters by the 
authorities in China because in leaving home they "left their filial duties undone 
- their parents unattended, their forefathers' graves unswept, their ancestral 
sacrifices unoffered", and went in search of profits and trade (Zhuang, 1999: 98). 
Only those who had official duties away from home, those who were taken away 
to do forced labour, or those who left to study, were considered by the Chinese 
authorities to be legitimate; and it was understood, by the Chinese government 
and by their families, that they would all eventually return home if they could 
(Wang, 1998b: 16). In 1727, the Yongzheng Emperor decreed that "the majority of 
those who go overseas are undesirable elements. If they are allowed to go as they 
wish without any time limit, they will become more undesirable, and will 
encourage more people to follow suit" (Zhuang, 1999: 98). Although people 
continued to leave China for Southeast Asia, this attitude did not change until 
1893 when the Qing state lifted the ban on emigration (Duara, 1997: 43). 
In the late nineteenth century the introduction of steamships made it easier to 
bring wives and families to Southeast Asia and facilitated return travel to China. 
This permitted ethnic Chinese migrants to maintain a Chinese cultural identity 
which led to a distinction between these new migrants and earlier generations of 
migrants who tended to integrate into the local populations. In Indonesia the term 
peranakan is still used to refer to those of ethnic Chinese heritage, most of whom 
have tended to be of Hokkien origin, who have intermarried with the local 
population and who display Indonesian cultural influences (Pan, 1998: 157). Totok 
is the term used to describe newer immigrants who speak a Chinese language in 
the home and orient themselves more towards Chinese cultural expression. As 
well as Hokkien, Hakka are also numerous among the Totok (Pan, 1998: 157). 
Mely Tan has pointed out that the usefulness of a continued distinction between 
totok and peranakan in Indonesia is questionable, since 1966, when Chinese 
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language schools were closed. In 1967 the government also issued regulations 
prohibiting the use of Chinese characters and the outward expression of Chinese 
culture in public places (Tan, 1997: 42). All the people I interviewed for this 
research are peranakan who have lost the knowledge of which part of China their 
families left, except for one man, Nurdin Purnomo, who is a totok of Hakka 
origin. 
The stock market crash of 1932 had a detrimental effect on the economies of 
Southeast Asia and their need for immigrant labour began to wane. After 
Indonesian independence was declared in 1945 and after the communists won 
victory in China in 1949, emmigration from China had more-or-less dried up. This 
has created a difference between Chinese emmigration to Europe and America, 
which continues to this day, and emmigration to Southeast Asia. With no new 
waves of immigrants the Chinese in Southeast Asia have tended to integrate into 
their chosen societies. I will return to this theme in chapter three when I analyse 
the literature on "overseas Chinese". 
Although the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have integrated into that society, this 
has not tended to lead to their becoming Muslim. According to Leo Suryadinata 
Chinese Indonesians tend to be Christians, Buddhists, Taoists and Confucianists. 
He also mentions the eclectic mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism 
called Tridharma or Sann Kauw (the Three Religions). 3 Suryadinata, Arifin and 
Ananta do not provide the numbers of Chinese Muslims or Christians in their 
survey of the 2000 census. In 1997 Suryadinata asked Chinese Indonesian 
exponent of Islam, Junus Jahya, how many ethnic Chinese Muslims there were. 
Although there are no statistics Jahya suggested that between 0.5 and 1 percent of 
the ethnic Chinese population were Muslim. Based on the 2000 census that would 
3 The peranakan writer Kwee Tek Hoa (1886-1951) spread the idea of Sam Kauv. and 
established the organisation Sam Kauwti" Hwee (Three Religions Organisation) in 1934 stating 
that "[a]ctually, the beliefs of most Chinese are a mixture or conglomerate of these three 
religions" (Suryadinata, 1997: 149). There has been debate over the extent to which these 
religions can be united doctrinally, however, I found lingering evidence of "the Three 
Religions" in temples I visited in Jakarta where statues of Confucius sat alongside Buddha 
and other Taoist deities within the one temple. 
5 
put the number at between 14,924 and 29,847 Chinese 'Muslims.; The number of 
Buddhists was stated in the census as 1,694,682 or 0.84 percent of the total 
population, though not all of them can be presumed to be ethnic Chinese. Since 
1979 Confucianism has not been recognised as an official religion in Indonesia. 
The 1971 census indicated that there were 972,133 Confucians, making up 0.82 
percent of the total population, scattered all over the archipelago (Suryadinata, 
Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 130). There was no category for Confucianism in the 
2000 census. Although Abdurrahman Wahid recognised Confucianism as a valid 
religion after he came to power in 1999, those who consider themselves 
Confucian in 2000 had to tick the box marked "others" on the census 
(Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003: 131). However, at 411,629, the number of 
"Others" in 2000 was less than half the number of Confucians in 1971. 
Indonesian National Identity and the "Chinese Problem" 
Although Chinese people have been arriving in, assimilating into and influencing 
Indonesia centuries before the Dutch colonials began arriving in the sixteenth 
century, however, from colonial times to present day Indonesian politics the ethnic 
Chinese have never been fully included in official discourses within the nation- 
state. They have been perceived as outsiders, and therefore, not genuinely 
Indonesian. This has tended to be portrayed as a problem: the "Chinese problem" 
(masalah Ci, ia). 
As the Dutch gained control of the archipelago, they began to differentiate 
between "foreign orientals" and "indigenous people". Different laws and dress 
codes were enforced for "foreign orientals" and their residential areas were 
separate from the rest of the population. Despite the distinctions enforced by the 
colonials, when Indonesia declared independence in 1945, suku Tionghoa 
(Chinese Indonesian ethnic group) was included by President Sukarno as one of 
the official ethnic groups of the new nation. While Sukarno was in power (1950- 
1965) the ethnic Chinese were permitted to organise themselves into cultural and 
political groups and were visible in many sectors within Indonesian society. 
'I have based this figure on the numbers of Chinese Indonesian citizens and have not 
included the numbers of ethnic Chinese with foreign citizenship. 
6 
However, a distinction continued to be made within Indonesian national 
discourses between the ethnic Chinese, non-pribumi (non-indigenous) who are 
perceived as originally arriving in Indonesia from outside the archipelago, and 
"indigenous", pribuini Indonesians, who are believed to be primordially 
Indonesian. 
During the thirty-two years of Suharto's New Order regime (1966-1998). anti- 
Chinese policies became more institutionalised than they had been during the 
Sukarno era. Suharto's policy towards the ethnic Chinese was one of assimilation. 
This was in reality a practice of discrimination since other ethnic groups, those 
which were considered to be indigenous, were celebrated as part of Indonesian 
national identity. It was not permitted to celebrate Chinese culture publicly, 
Chinese Indonesians were strongly encouraged to change their Chinese names to 
Indonesian-sounding ones and Chinese language materials and Chinese medicines 
were banned. Indeed, these language materials and medicines were included along 
with drugs, firearms and pornography as banned substances on the customs 
declaration form. 
Despite these assimilatory policies, however, Chinese identity was never quite 
eradicated. A code on the national identification cards allowed officials to know 
who was ethnic Chinese, even if they had changed their names. Chinese 
Indonesians had to apply for citizenship, even if they were born in the country to 
parents who were Indonesian citizens. ' A distinction was maintained between 
pribumi and non pribumi, which was evident in public discourse and official 
documentation throughout the New Order period. 
In 1998, after widespread violence directed largely at the ethnic Chinese, and with 
the demise of the Suharto regime, a period of reforinasi (reform) was instigated. 
Peaceful democratic elections were held in 1999 and a social space seemed to 
become available in which the ethnic Chinese could express their Chineseness 
5 When a Chinese Indonesian is born they are registered on their father's citzenship papers, 
and when they reach seventeen they have to apply to the government for their own 
citizenship papers. These papers are needed in order to receive a passport and other official 
documentation. 
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more openly. A number of the discriminatory laws were repealed and some 
Chinese Indonesians started to demand a political and cultural voice. 
Discourses surrounding Chineseness have manifested themselves in a series of 
stereotypes which Charles Coppel has drawn together. They are worth quoting in 
their entirety because they summarise succinctly the way the ethnic Chinese are 
still perceived by "indigenous" Indonesians. 
The Chinese are clannish, they keep aloof socially and prefer to live in 
separate areas. They cling persistently to the culture of their ancestral 
homeland. Their loyalty to Indonesia is dubious at best; at worst they 
are down right hostile to Indonesia. Chinese who apparently identify 
with Indonesia are not genuine; they are only pretending to do so for 
opportunistic reasons, rather than from a true sense of identification 
with the country and its people. This opportunism is characteristic of a 
people concerned with money, trade and business. They are not, like 
Indonesians, dedicated to ideals. Having been given a favoured 
position by the Dutch, the Chinese dominate the Indonesian economy, 
oppressing the Indonesian masses and preventing the rise of a national 
(i. e. indigenous) entrepreneurial class. Not content with their dominant 
position, they also engage in economic subversion, since they are 
expert in bribery and smuggling (Coppel, 1983: 5). 
Stereotypes are a common way in which people differentiate between ethnic 
groups in Indonesia. However, all the stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians seem to 
be negative, whereas for other ethnic groups the stereotypes are more positive. For 
example, the Bugis, according to Lee Khoon Choy, are known for "their fierce 
character and sense of honour" (Choy, 1999: 311). The Javanese are refined and 
self-controlled (Choy, 1999: 45) while the Sundanese, who also live on Java, are 
more easy-going and enlightened than their neighbours (Choy, 1999: 158). 
Framework of this Study 
This thesis will investigate how Chinese Indonesians are articulating their 
national and ethnic identities in the post-Suharto environment and how these 
expressions fit with the dominant societal discourses. In order to explore this 
question I will analyse a number of ethnic Chinese political, cultural and religious 
groups, which were established or re-established, after the fall of the authoritarian 
New Order regime, in May 1998. I chose to study these groups because they are 
the first in thirty-two years to be organised by Chinese Indonesians who openly 
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declare themselves to be ethnic Chinese and who are dealing with issues directly 
relating to Chinese Indonesians. Also, in the weeks and months after the fall of the 
New Order, the leaders of these groups took it upon themselves to act as 
mouthpieces for the Chinese in Indonesia. 
As well as being multi-ethnic and multi-religious, Indonesia is also a relatively 
new nation and has struggled to develop a sense of national identity to match the 
deeply-held regional ethnic identities. This thesis questions the sense in which the 
"imagined community" of the nation is an homogenous space, either culturally or 
ethnically. In particular I will explore how nationalism in Indonesia has coped 
with diversity and what changes, if any, have been made since 1998. This will 
provide an understanding about whether a genuine space has opened in a more 
democratic Indonesia for Chinese Indonesians to play a part. 
Up to now both ethnic and national discourses have been incorporated into a sense 
of Indonesian-ness. The national identity tends to be a political identity, whereas 
ethnic identities provide a cultural heritage to be celebrated. This has caused 
problems for Chinese Indonesians who during the New Order at least, have not 
been permitted to express Chinese cultural practices. Within Indonesian national 
discourses the way to solve the "Chinese problem" has been discussed in terms of 
either assimilation (asimilasi) or integration (integrasi). During the New Order 
period the government policy was assimilation and no deviation from this was 
possible. In the post-1998 climate the debate has surfaced again. The groups 
discussed in this research began to insist that Chinese Indonesian culture should 
be celebrated as a genuinely Indonesian culture. This thesis will explore what this 
means for both Chinese and Indonesian identity in the post-Suharto period. 
The study of national identity in post-Suharto Indonesia, undertaken in this thesis, 
has wider implications than just an understanding of the position of Chinese 
Indonesians. After the fall of Suharto, national identity and national cohesion 
became pertinent issues not just for Chinese Indonesians, but also for groups who 
have been considered primordially part of Indonesia. Separatist violence broke out 
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in Aceh and in West Papua', and heavy-handed responses from the Indonesian 
government have not quelled the demands of these regions. Other violent attacks 
took place in Central Sulawesi, where Muslims and Christians clashed leaving 
542 people dead in 1998 (Cohen, 2003: 48). In Western Kalimantan the Christian 
Dayak ethnic group unleashed a "rampage of violence" against the Muslim 
Madurese who have been moving into the region in search of work since the 
1920s, fleeing the poverty of their native Madura (Young, 2001: 223). ' Tension 
had been rising in Kalimantan since 1997 with the worst outpouring of violence in 
2001 when 500 Madurese were killed (Elegant, 2001: 14-18). Questions were 
raised in the media, and in the outpouring of academic literature published after 
the 1998 riots, about whether post-Suharto Indonesia would manage to stay intact. 
This post-1998 rush to publish has dried up to a certain extent, or perhaps has 
been overtaken by events since then, such as, the War on Terror, and Muslim 
militancy in Southeast Asia. Therefore, although this study concentrates 
particularly on the position of the ethnic Chinese an understanding of some of the 
difficulties and challenges in maintaining national cohesion is also provided. 
It is important to point out at this stage that the ethnic Chinese have a unique 
position in Indonesia. The national discourses have never succeeded in 
accommodating the presence of this minority, in other words, the Chinese in 
Indonesia have a particular position as outsiders to the nationalist discourses 
which other ethnic groups, who are considered "indigenous"8 to Indonesia, do not 
suffer. Chinese Indonesians also differ from other ethnic groups because all 
indigenous groups are regionally based, whereas the ethnic Chinese are scattered 
6 West Papua was formerly called Irian Jaya. However, when Abdurrachman Wahid visited 
the province in January 2000 he announced that the province was to be renamed Papua. This 
is the name favoured by many people in the region as Irian Jaya had been the name favoured 
by supporters of integration into the Republic of Indonesia (Chauvel, 2001: 202). 
7 Young points out that although immigration of Madurese into Kalimantan began during the 
1920s, numbers remained relatively small. The flow of migrants accelerated in the 1980s 
which coincided with the intensification of large-scale logging and plantations where many 
of the migrants found work. One of the claims made against the Madurese by the Dayaks was 
that they logged forest considered sacred by the Dayaks (Elegant, 2001: 19). 
8I will question the use of the term "indigenous" to describe Indonesian ethnic groups in 
chapter three. Throughout the thesis the word should be read as if it is within quotation 
marks. 
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throughout the archipelago. The ethnic groups are primordiall\' attached to their 
regional homelands and the extent to which this differentiates the ethnic Chinese, 
and marks them as outsiders, is difficult to overemphasise. It is also important to 
state that I do not claim that the groups investigated here represent all Chinese 
Indonesian opinion on ethnic and national identity at this time. Chinese 
Indonesians are heterogenous in their social, cultural and Chinese sub-ethnic 
backgrounds. They are also diverse in their outlooks and in their beliefs about 
how to solve the "Chinese problem" in Indonesia. I chose to focus on these groups 
because they were vocal in the media after 1998 and because such groups are a 
new phenomenon in Indonesia. 
The thesis has been divided into three sections: literature review, historical 
framework and empirical research. The literature review has been divided into two 
chapters because in carrying out this research I found it necessary to cover various 
approaches from a number of different disciplines as it was difficult to locate an 
approach into which this topic neatly fits. 
Therefore, chapter two will review literature on nationalism. After providing an 
outline of the nationalism debate in the academic literature I will investigate the 
usefulness of the concepts of "civic" and "ethnic" nations for my study of 
Indonesia. Fred Halliday has appealed for research in this area which provides 
more interaction between the general theories and the development of discourses 
of national identity within individual nations (Halliday, 1997: 27). This suggestion 
has guided me in my analysis of this very large body of literature. 
Chapter three begins with an exploration of two fields of study, multiculturalism 
and diaspora, which question the homogenous nature of nations and voice some of 
the concerns of minority groups within the nation-state. The ethnic Chinese 
outside China tend to be considered part of a "Chinese diaspora" and I question 
the usefulness and appropriateness of this for the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. 
Other questions raised in this chapter relate to what makes somebody Chinese and 
why people with no links to China and no Chinese language skills are still 
considered Chinese, either in Indonesia or elsewhere. 
This thesis investigates theory on nationalism in more detail than theory on ethnicity 
because my main interest is in understanding how the ethnic Chinese groups are 
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attempting to find a place for themselves within Indonesian national discourses. Their 
desire to be accepted as fully Indonesian is not easily manifested within the discourses 
of nationalism in Indonesia, and I am interested in exploring whether theory on 
nationalism helps in understanding the activities of the ethnic Chinese organisations. 
Also, this thesis is concerned with the ways the groups articulate their identities. 
Ultimately it is an "emic" rather than an "etic" study. ' In Indonesia ethnic identity 
tends to be understoond as a natural, primordial identity. Ariel Heryanto writes that 
among Indonesia's academic elite, "ethnicity" is "widely accepted (that is 
`constructed') as existentially `given' and conceptually unproblematic" (Heryanto, 
1998: 95). Another Indonesian academic, Professor Parsudi Suparlan, describes 
Indonesian ethnic groups (suku bangsa) as "special kinds of social groups which are 
ascriptive in the same way as one's age or sex" (Suparlan, 1999: 153). Since the group 
members do not question their ethnicity, I have spent less time in this thesis exploring 
theory on ethnicity. 
Chapters four and five provide a historical framework for the thesis. Chapter four 
discusses national and ethnic discourses from the colonial period up to the end of 
the New Order. Chapter five explores the background to the fall of the Suharto 
regime and the violence of 1998. I left Indonesia just as Abdurrachman Wahid was 
ousted from office, therefore, my analysis covers the tenure of B. J. Habibie, 
Suharto's successor up to the elections of 1999, and Wahid who was removed 
from power in July 2001. 
Chapters six, seven and eight provide an analysis of my empirical material. 
Chapter six introduces the eleven groups which are the basis of my research. In 
chapter seven I investigate the ways the groups are trying to overcome the anti- 
Chinese stereotypes and the paradoxes which emerge out of their activities and 
demands. Chapter eight discusses the ways the groups are articulating their 
Chinese and Indonesian identities and how their explanations correspond both 
with Indonesian national discourses and with the academic writing discussed in 
chapters two and three. 
9 "Emic" refers to "the native's point of view" and "etic" refers to the analyst's concepts and 
analyses (see, Eriksen. 1993: 11). 
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This empirical research is a particularly useful addition to the study of the ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia. During the New Order years many ethnic Chinese were 
reluctant to declare themselves Chinese publicly, or speak about their experiences, 
which has led to a dearth of empirical material relating to how Chinese 
Indonesians themselves understand their identities. In relation to post-Suharto 
Indonesia more generally, much has been written about the economic and political 
changes which have been taking place, but issues relating to how individuals and 
groups have reacted to these immense changes have not been tackled to the same 
extent. 
Methodology 
I chose to carry out my empirical research in Jakarta because that is where the 
organisations and the people who established them are based. Having stayed for 
seven months during 2000 and 2001 I gathered three types of empirical data - 
interviews; manifestos and other documents published by the groups; and Chinese 
Indonesian media. 
Interviews 
The main aim of the interviews was to allow me to learn about the organisations 
set up by the ethnic Chinese after 1998, and also to facilitate an investigation of 
themes relating to how these people saw themselves within Indonesian national 
discourses. In order to do this I used a qualitative analytical method to carry out 
semi-structured interviews. In the book Theory and Methods in Political Science 
Fiona Devine argues that qualitative methods "are most appropriately employed 
where the aim of research is to explore people's subjective experiences and the 
meanings they attach to those experiences" (Devine: 1995: 138). In my research I 
am trying to understand how my interviewees and their organisations portray 
themselves and the meanings they give to the world in which they live, therefore, 
I found qualitative research methods to be most appropriate. 
During interviews I asked questions in three categories - information about the 
organisations, thoughts on Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian identities, and 
future prospects for Chinese Indonesians. The interviews did not always follow 
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the same trajectory, with individuals expanding on issues which were important to 
them. However, broadly speaking all the interviews dealt with similar questions 
and the questions I used as a guide are provided in the appendix. 
Although this was quite a controversial subject, and I was informed by academics 
before I went to Indonesia that people may be unwilling to speak about these 
issues, I found the group members very willing to speak to me. In fact, they 
seemed to appreciate the opportunity to express themselves after being silent for 
so long. Also, since these people had established organisations in order to deal in 
an open manner with Chinese Indonesian issues, they were willing to speak out. I 
might have had a different experience if I had been trying to engage with non- 
members about these kinds of issues. 
Manifestos and Other Publications of the Organisations 
All the groups produced manifestos in order to explain the aims of the 
organisations. My second method of analysis was examining the language and 
symbols used in these manifestos. All the manifestos I studied have a similar 
content. They provide a mission statement of each of the organisations, aims and 
obligations, organisational structure and an explanation of the symbols used. 
The manifestos have been produced for members of the organisations who tend to 
be ethnic Chinese, however, all but one of the groups invite non-Chinese to join. 
Therefore, the manifestos have been written with both Chinese and non-Chinese 
readers in mind. 10 This material is important for my investigation of how the 
groups are articulating their ethnic and national identities because it provides an 
understanding of how the groups wish themselves to be understood by other 
Indonesians. 
Print Media 
The same is true for my third set of data, Chinese Indonesian media. I examined 
Chinese Indonesian published magazines spanning from November 2000 to the 
10 The one organisation which is only open to ethnic Chinese is Paguyuban Sosial Afai i 
Tionghoa Indonesia (PSMTI, The Indonesian Chinese Social Association). Close family 
members who are non-Chinese may also become members. 
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dismissal of Abdurrachman Wahid as President in July that year. The two principal 
magazines published by Chinese Indonesians post-Suharto are Mandarin Pos and 
Sinergi. Mandarin Pos is published in both Indonesian and Chinese. Sinergi is 
published in Indonesian. Both magazines are distributed throughout the 
archipelago. I also analysed articles published by group members in the national 
press between 1998 and 2001. 
Analysis of Data 
In order to analyse the data and determine how these groups are expressing their 
Chinese and their Indonesian identities I have used concepts relating to discourse 
analysis. Discourse analysis is appropriate to the analysis of the interviews, 
manifestos and media I have gathered because I argue that national and ethnic 
identities manifest themselves discursively. 
In an explanation of discourse based on the ideas of the theorists Laclau and 
Mouffe, David Howarth articulately explains: 
[F]or things and activities to be meaningful, they must be part of 
particular discourses... The social meaning of words, speeches, actions 
and institutions are all understood in relation to the overall context of 
which they form a part. Each meaning is understood in relation to the 
overall practice which is taking place, and each practice in relation to a 
particular discourse. Hence we are only able to understand, explain and 
evaluate a process if we can describe the practice, and the discourse 
within which it is occurring (Howarth, 1995: 119). 
Stuart Hall writes specifically about national identities writing that such identities 
are not things we are born with, rather they are "formed and transformed within 
and in relation to representation" (Hall, 1992: 292). Using the example of 
Englishness, Hall suggests that we come to know what it means to be English 
through the meanings produced within the nation. He considers national culture to 
be a "discourse" which produces meaning about the nation through stories, 
memories, and symbols associated with it (Hall, 1992: 292-293). Hall illustrates 
ways in which the discourses of the nation are represented - through the stories 
told in national histories, literature and the media. 
Discourse refers to "[t]he multiplicity of acts that are performed through 
language" (Chilton and Schäffner, 1997: 212). Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan 
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Potter view discourse as "meanings, conversations, narratives, explanations, 
accounts and anecdotes" (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 2-3). Van Dijk states that 
discourse consists of three main aspects; "language use, " "communication of 
beliefs" (cognition) and "interaction in social situations" (van Dijk, 1997a: 2). All 
these analysts emphasise the interactional aspect of discourses, in other words, 
there is a dialectical relationship between discourses and practices of people in the 
society in which they are found. Teun van Dijk emphasises that both spoken and 
written texts are included in the concept of discourse. He points out that although 
talk is easily understood as a form of interaction, for example, everyday 
conversations or parliamentary debates, the written word is not so obviously 
interactive. Readers for example, seem to be more passive in their interaction than 
people sitting listening to a lecture who have the opportunity to question the 
speaker directly. However, van Dijk concedes that there are enough similarities 
between written and spoken texts to warrant inclusion of both in the notion of 
discourse (van Dijk, 1997a: 3). Norman Fairclough also emphasises the 
interactional nature of both written and spoken discourse. He states that 
"`discourse' is used... to refer to extended samples of either spoken or written 
language... this sense of `discourse' emphasizes interaction between speaker and 
addressee or between writer and reader, and therefore processes of producing and 
interpreting speech and writing, as well as the situational context of language use" 
(Fairclough, 1992: 3). 
The modern study of discourse developed in the 1960s in the humanities and 
social sciences (van Dijk, 1997a: 25). Robert de Beaugrande considers discourse 
analysis to be in part a reaction to the tendency in linguistics to disconnect the 
syntax of language from the social and cultural environment in which the 
language develops (Beaugrande, 1997: 39-40). Discourse analysts "emphatically 
define language as a system integrated with speakers 'knowledge of the world and 
society" (Beaugrande, 1997: 40 [italics in text]). 
Discourse analysts use the concept of "triangulation" to validate their work. This 
refers to "[the] endeavour to work interdisciplinarily, multimethodically and on 
the basis of a variety of different emirical data as well as background information" 
(Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 35). This thesis uses a variety of empirical data as 
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outlined above. The historical background presented in chapters four and five is 
also important for my analysis of the national and ethnic discourses. Discourse is 
studied as a "constitutive part" of local and global contexts. Therefore, "context 
structures" are an important part of any discourse analysis. 'Margaret Wetherell 
and Jonathan Potter use the term "situated use" to explain the importance of the 
context of discourse. They state that "the sense of texts or talk is not seen as 
derived from their abstract meaning or organization but from their situated use" 
(Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 90). The historical background is also important for 
another reason. Norman Fairclough states that "meaning-making depends upon 
not only what is explicit in a text but also what is implicit - what is assumed" 
(Fairclough, 2003: 11). The analysis of my empirical data is in part based on 
making assumptions according to an understanding of national and ethnic 
discourses in Indonesia. 
I will argue that the ethnic Chinese groups investigated in this research are trying 
to find a place for themselves within Indonesian society. Although they seem to be 
falling into Chinese Indonesian stereotypes, by acting in an exclusive manner and 
harking back to the culture of their Chinese ancestors, within the discourses of 
Indonesian national identity, in which both national and an ethnic identities have a 
role, their activities make sense. 
I was drawn to research the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia after the violence which 
they suffered in 1998. I was motivated by a question which Ten Ang also 
highlights in a recent paper. She suggests that, "[o]ne of the most urgent 
predicaments of our time can be described in deceptively simple terms: how are 
we to live together in this new century [? ]" (Ang, 2003: 141). I could have 
explored this question in the place of my birth, Ireland, or any place on earth for 
that matter. However, Indonesia in 1999, after the first free elections in over thirty 
years, was a very exciting place for me to make a start. 
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Chapter 2 
Nations and Nationalism 
According to Bhikhu Parekh nationalism cannot help but offer "a homogenized, 
reified, and ideologically biased abridgement of a rich, complex, and fluid way of 
life" (Parekh, 1999b: 324). 1 will begin this chapter with an outline of the 
difficulties faced by the Indonesian leaders on winning independence and their 
attempts to inculcate a sense of Indonesian national identity in the population. 
Having set out the case in Indonesia I will then turn to the academic debate on 
nationalism and nations. I will begin with an outline of how the debate is 
structured followed by an explanation of some of the definitions of key terms. The 
main part of my discussion of nationalism will focus on the concepts of "civic" 
and "ethnic" nations and where Indonesia fits into this debate. This distinction is 
frequently made in the literature and raises questions about how different types of 
nations treat minorities. At the end of the chapter I will offer some conclusions 
explaining how this literature helps to understand nationalism in Indonesia. 
Nation Building in Indonesia 
The Need to Manage Ethnic Diversity 
The multi-ethnic makeup of Indonesia has meant that the state has had to struggle 
to try to develop a common national culture which could compete for people's 
loyalty with the existing cultures of the various ethnic groups (suku bangsa) on 
the archipelago. The need to deal with the diversity has been part of Indonesian 
nationalist thinking since a Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) was compiled at the 
Second Youth Congress of Indonesia in Jakarta in 1928. The pledge is still 
affirmed by people (including the Chinese Indonesian groups I interviewed) when 
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they wish to sum up the essence of Indonesian nationalism. According to Leo 
Suryadinata, the oath of 1928 is the "hallmark of Indonesian nationhood" 
(Suryadinata, 1992: 12). Sumpah Pemuda emphasises the desire to unify 
Indonesians into one culture. The pledge asserts that: 
We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, recognize one motherland - 
Indonesia... one nation - the Indonesian nation [and] hold in high 
esteem a unifying language (bahasa persatoean) - the Indonesian 
language; after passing this resolution, the congress has recommended 
that those principles be used by all Indonesian nationalist associations 
and that unity be strengthened by paying attention to a unifying 
foundation: [common] desire, history, language, customary law [and] 
education (Suryadinata, 1998a: 59). 
When Sukarno became leader of an independent Indonesia in 1950, he insisted 
that the new nation should comprise all of the Dutch East Indies. The acquisition 
of Irian Jaya (West Papua) in 1962, which the Dutch had refused to concede, 
extended his rule over the entire territory (Steinberg, 1987: 424). Writers have 
reacted both positively and negatively to this. Hugh Seton-Watson suggests that 
this success could be "variously interpreted as a triumph for Indonesian unity or 
for Javanese imperialism" (Seton-Watson, 1977: 308). It may have seemed like 
Javanese imperialism at the time that Seton-Watson was writing, however, as 
Herry Priyono has pointed out, the nationalist movement in Indonesia was not an 
attempt to take over sultanates or kingdoms, nor was it an attempt by one ethnic 
group to subjugate another. Rather, it was a project to take over the running of the 
colonial state (negara kolonial) (Priyono, 1999: 191). 
Pancasila 
In an attempt to reconcile champions of both a secular and a non-secular state, 
Sukarno encouraged the leaders to accept the five principles of Pancasila as the 
"philosophical basis" of the new Indonesian nation; principles which he believed 
embraced elements which were common to all Indonesian ethnic groups 
(Suryadinata, 2000: 48). In a speech made on 1 June 1945 Sukarno introduced the 
concept of Pancasila (Ramage, 1995: 11). Michael Leifer has pointed out that the 
nationalist leaders of Indonesia were moved by a desire not to alienate any of the 
ethnic groups within the archipelago. Therefore, the necessity to deal with cultural 
and religious diversity was central to the concept of Pancasila (Leifer, 2000: 159). 
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The first principle of Pancasila is "belief in one supreme God" (ketuhanan Yang 
maha esa). This principle avoids the problem of deciding what should be the 
official religion in a multi-faith society by declaring that Indonesia is a religious 
state but not based on any particular faith (Ramage, 1995: 12). The second tenet is 
"humanity that is just and civilised" (kemanusiaan rang adil dan beradab) (Horn, 
2000). According to Joannes Riberu this principle obliges Indonesians to treat all 
other citizens with "mutual tolerance, respect and understanding" (Riberu, 1990: 
169). 
The third principle of Pancasila is "Indonesian union" (persatuan Indonesia) and 
it is this principle which is particularly pertinent to my investigation of ethnic 
Chinese identities in Indonesia. " According to George Kahin this principle can 
simply be termed "nationalism" (Kahin, 1952: 123). Mark Berger suggests that 
writers on post-independence Indonesia, including George Kahin, hoped, and even 
expected that "ethnic loyalties and so-called primordial sentiments would fade, 
and new loyalties to the modern nation of Indonesia would become the central 
aspect of every citizen's identity" (Berger, 1997: 323). Speeches from the early 
nationalist leaders suggest that they too hoped that a national Indonesian culture 
would replace the many regional ethnic group (suku bangsa) identities, which 
were acknowledged as being deeply felt by the population. For example, the 
Minister of Basic Education and Culture, Professor Prijono, stated in 1959 that: 
As long as our consciousness of suku is strong and constitutes a solid 
moral foundation, our national consciousness will remain relatively 
weak. Therefore, we must, if possible, abolish suku-consciousness and 
raise men's consciousness to the level of the nation... National 
consciousness must become stronger than consciousness of any other 
kind, stronger than consciousness of suku (Prijono, in Feith and 
Castles, 1970: 326-327). 
In the "Birth of Pancasila" speech, Sukarno was vague about this tenet. He 
declared that the Indonesian people were one, however, he is not specific about 
how this unity ought to be expressed. Sukarno stated that: 
[T]he Indonesian Nation is the totality of all the human beings who, 
according to geopolitics ordained by God Almighty, live throughout the 
" This was initially the first principle, but Muslim leaders in 1945 insisted that belief in God 
should be number one. 
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unity of the entire Indonesian archipelago from the northern tip of 
Sumatra to Irian... Because amongst these seventy million human 
beings le desir d 'etre ensemble already exists; there is already 
Charaktergemneinschaft. The Indonesian Nation, the Indonesian People, 
the people of Indonesia total seventy million persons, but seventy 
million who have already become one, one, once again one (Sukarno, 
1945: 42-43)! 12 
An interpretative difference has remained among writers on Indonesia which 
highlights that up to now there is still uncertainty about how to handle the ethnic 
and religious diversity. The writer Froly Horn asserts that union is reached by 
"celebrating all the differences in ethnicity, culture and belief' (Horn, 2000). 
However, Donald Weatherbee argues that this tenet requires the "submergence of 
regional and ethnic loyalties to an allegiance to the Indonesian state" (cited in 
Ramage, 1995: 13). 
The fourth principle of Pancasila is translated as "people's democracy guided by 
wisdom in the unanimity arising from consultation and consensus through 
representation" (kerakyatan yang dipbnpln oleh hikinah kebijaksanaan dalam 
permtrsvvai, waratan/perwakilan) (Ramage, 1995: 205 note 9). Froly Horn suggests 
that this simply means "democracy", but it was interpreted in numerous ways by 
both Sukarno and his successor, Suharto. According to Joannes Riberu this tenet 
refers to the traditional method of decision making which is "not conducted in a 
spirit of political adversity, but in a spirit of communal brotherhood, 
togetherness... and co-operation" (Riberu, 1990: 179). The final principle of 
Pancasila is "social justice" (keadilan sosial) (Ramage, 1995: 13). This refers to 
social and economic egalitarianism. 
The tenets of Pancasila remain the guiding principles of the Indonesian nation up 
to today. In chapter four I will explain in more detail how they were used during 
the Sukarno and Suharto administrations. It is sufficient to say for now that 
Pancasila was an attempt by leaders at the time of independence to forge a path 
12 "Le desir d 'etre ensemble" is taken from Ernest Renan's definition of a nation. In order be 
a nation the people must have the desire to be together. "Charaktergemeinschaft" 
is a quote 
from Otto Bauer who wrote in his 1907 book Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie 
[The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy] that "Eine Notion ist eine aus 
Schicksalsgemeinschaft ent'achsene Charaktergemeinschaft" [A nation is a community of 
character which has grown out of a community of shared experience]. 
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for Indonesia which took account of the diversity while inculcating a sense of 
national identity in the population. 
The Ethnic Chinese at the Time of Independence 
Anthony Reid makes the interesting point that during the national struggles in 
Southeast Asia, Indian mythology, Buddhism, Islam, and Christian ideas were very 
influential in shaping national identities. Chinese influences, however, were 
generally not evident because "Chinese cultural icons were being assertively 
mobilised at this time in the service of the competing overseas Chinese identity" 
(Reid, 1997: 55). Another problem for the ethnic Chinese was that they were 
perceived as Dutch sympathisers who had profited under colonial rule. According 
to Michael Leifer, Indonesian nationalism "was defined with reference to external 
foes and their domestic sympathisers" (Leifer, 2000: 157). Therefore, 
"Chineseness became one of the most important `others' against which the new 
national identities defined themselves" (Reid, 1997: 55). Ariel Heryanto has also 
highlighted how the "othering" of the ethnic Chinese, has been central to the 
construction of an authentic, national, native, self in Indonesia (Heryanto, 1998: 
100). Following this line of argument it is clear that the concepts surrounding 
"Chineseness" in Indonesia are closely linked to how national ideologies were 
formulated. 
Although as outlined above, the nationalist leaders were conscious of the 
difficulties posed by ethnic and regional diversity for national unity, the ethnic 
Chinese were hardly mentioned in speeches and manifestos relating to these 
issues. Instead, those speeches deal with "indigenous" diversity (Feith and 
Castles, 1970: 340). Herbert Feith and Lance Castles point out that at the time of 
independence there was a sharp distinction in Indonesian political thinking 
between diversity within the bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian people or nation) on 
the one hand, and the relationship between the bangsa Indonesia and "minorities 
of foreign descent" (orang orang bangsa lain) on the other. The ethnic Chinese 
were considered a separate bangsa, bangsa Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesian people 
or nation). Charles Coppel has mentioned that few political parties in the pre-war 
period even accepted ethnic Chinese as full members (Coppel, 1983: 2-3). This is 
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despite the fact that as early as 1930 almost 66 percent of the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia were born there. Indeed, at this time more than 43 percent were already 
third-generation inhabitants. By the late 1950s about 80 percent of Chinese 
Indonesians were born in Indonesia (Coppel, 1983: 1). 
In relation to citizenship, the 1945 constitution provided that "citizens shall be 
native Indonesians (orang-orang bangsa Indonesia asli) and other races (orang- 
orang bangsa lain) who are confirmed as citizens by law" (Coppel, 1983: 3). 
Charles Coppel argues that the word asli not only meant "indigenous, native, 
original", but also "genuine, authentic". He suggests that "the wording and the 
substance of the constitution and the citizenship law therefore gave colour to the 
view that the real Indonesians were indigenous and the members of other groups 
who obtained Indonesian citizenship did so by favour of the Indonesian nation" 
(Coppel, 1983: 3). Coppel also suggests that the term "Indonesian citizen" (WNI, 
Warga Negara Indonesia) had "artificial, legalistic" connotations from the 
beginning. It is used as an abbreviation of WNI keturunan asing (Indonesian 
citizen of foreign descent) and does not tend to be used to describe an 
"indigenous" Indonesian (Coppel, 1983: 3). 
The early nationalist leaders also established a national motto: Bhinneka Tunggal 
Ika. This phrase is commonly translated as "unity in diversity", however, Thung 
Julan prefers to translate it as "plurality but unity" because rather than placing the 
emphasis on the unity, emphasis is placed on the long-established roots which the 
different ethnic groups have within Indonesia. According to Thung, since the 
ethnic Chinese have their historical roots outside Indonesia (they came from 
China some time in the past) they are not viewed as part of the Indonesian 
plurality (Thung, 1998: 13 note 5). Filomeno Aguilar also suggests that the 
perception that the ethnic Chinese originally came from outside the archipelago, 
makes them "the internal Other of the `true' Indonesian" (Aguilar, 2001: 505). 
The ideology which continues to keep the ethnic Chinese outsiders in Indonesia is 
that of nationalism. The distinction which had been used during the colonial 
period, between "indigenous" and "non-indigenous" groups, was maintained in 
Indonesian national discourses. Therefore, the ethnic Chinese remained in a 
precarious position after independence: they lived in Indonesia, were educated in 
24 
national schools and spoke the national language, but to some extent they 
remained outside the discourses of Indonesian-ness. Having outlined the 
difficulties facing Indonesia after independence and the position of the ethnic 
Chinese, I will turn now to an investigation of the academic literature on nations 
and nationalism in order to explore how relevant it is to a study of the ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia. According to Peter Alter, "`nationalism'... is one of the most 
ambiguous concepts in the present-day vocabulary of political and analytical 
thought... It can be associated with forces striving for political, social, economic 
and cultural emancipation, as well as with those whose goal is oppression" (Alter, 
1989: 4-5). This is indeed a very complex literature with little agreement among 
authors about the definitions of key terms. However, since I argue that the 
Chinese Indonesian groups are trying to find a place for themselves within 
Indonesian national discourses, it is where my investigation begins. 
Nations and Nationalism in Academic Literature 
The academic scholarship on nationalism has tended to take the form of "grand 
theories" with each scholar exploring the general concepts and presenting their 
own particular explanation of the origins and development of the nation. Despite 
the many differences between the individual "grand theories", they tend to be 
grouped together based around where and when scholars believe nations to have 
emerged. Those who espouse "modernism" argue that nations are modern 
constructs. Primordialists believe nations are natural entities, and ethno- 
symbolists argue that ancient symbols and identities are important for nationalism 
to develop. 13 
13 This general categorisation is not without criticism. Umut Özkirimli uses these divisions in 
his book Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, but then suggests that a 
distinction between `constructivists' and `essentialists' is more satisfactory (Özkirimli 2000: 
215). He contends that there is little in common among modernists other than that they 
consider nations to be recent developments. He criticises the ethno-symbolists for not taking 
into consideration the many differences between those they place in the modernist camp 
(Özkirimli, 2000: 214). David Brown (2000) divides the literature into those who view 
nations as primordialist, situationalist, and constructivist (Brown 2000: 5). Anthony Smith 
(1998) distinguishes between perennialists and primordialists. The perennialists do not view 
nations as natural, rather they are an ancient social and political order (Smith, 1998: 159). 
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Modernism 
The most common approach among recent scholars of nationalism is that nations 
are modern constructs, developing out of modern societal conditions such as 
capitalism, industrialism, urbanisation and secularism, which began to develop in 
the eighteenth century. Two of the most influential theorists who take a modernist 
approach are Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. They base their 
understandings of nationalism around social and cultural changes which have 
occurred with the arrival of modern society. Ernest Gellner focuses on the 
development of industrialism and the emergence of exo-socialisation in nineteenth 
century Europe. He argues that there is a necessity within an industrial society 
(which was not the case in a pre-industrial society) for a link between the state 
and culture. This "is what nationalism is about, and why we live in an age of 
nationalism" (Gellner, 1983: 38). Culture, in a modern society, does not divide 
different groups, as was the case in the agrarian society, it brings people together. 
"Culture is now the shared medium in which all people breathe and speak and 
produce; so it must be the same culture" (Gellner, 1983: 37-38). 
Gellner rejects criticism of nationalism as such arguing that it is not nationalism 
which imposes homogeneity. Industrial society demands homogeneity and 
nationalism provides the means to bring this about (Gellner, 1983: 46). Gellner 
goes on to assert that as well as sharing the same culture, people must also 
recognise each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, particular 
attributes (such as the same language, or, territory) which distinguish one group of 
people from another, do not create nations; what is needed is the recognition that 
people feel they belong to the same group, and benefit from rights and accept 
duties as a result (Gellner, 1983: 7). In this regard the problem which Indonesia 
has faced is that nationalism seems to demand a homogenous culture, whereas, the 
multiethnic, multireligious population there has made this task very difficult. 
There are added difficulties for the ethnic Chinese because historically there has 
been a feeling among non-Chinese Indonesians that they do not really belong to 
the nation. Of particular importance to my study of the ethnic Chinese 
in 
Indonesia is Gellner's theory of "entropy-resistant classifications". Most 
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differences between people are of little importance in a modern industrial society', 
he argues. There may be many different types of people, from different social, 
religious and ethnic groups, dispersed throughout society. In entropy-resistant 
cases, however, people with a particular characteristic will become concentrated 
in one part of a society (Gellner, 1983: 64-65). Gellner asserts that entropy'- 
resistant characteristics are a very serious problem for an industrial society. In an 
agrarian society, where there was a clear distinction between those who had power 
and those who had none, entropy-resistant characteristics were the norm. By 
contrast, modern society is much more fluid and ideally there is less distance 
between each social group (Gellner, 1983: 65-67). Gellner states that "in this kind 
of situation grave sociological obstacles, not easily removable by mere goodwill 
and legislation or by political irredentism and activism, block the way to... 
cultural homogeneity" (Gellner, 1983: 69). Chinese Indonesians, it could be 
argued, have entropy-resistant characteristics. Some differ physically from other 
Indonesians and most Chinese have different religious practices to the 
"indigenous" population. " Chinese Indonesians have also tended to be associated 
with a particular section of society - the economic sector. The Dutch colonialists 
tended to use the ethnic Chinese as trade allies and the "indigenous" people were 
given jobs in the bureaucracy. During the New Order they were kept out of most 
sectors except for the business sector. This makes it very difficult for the ethnic 
Chinese to assimilate fully into Indonesian society and also to be accepted by non- 
Chinese Indonesians. " 
Benedict Anderson, as a scholar of Southeast Asia, was aware of the particular 
difficulties facing Indonesia when he wrote his book Imagined Communities 
(1991, revised edition). Unlike Gellner, who bases his theory around 
industrialisation, Anderson links the rise of nationalism to the emerging system of 
capitalism, particularly "print-capitalism". 16 Anderson argues that the novel and 
14 Most Indonesians are Muslim whereas the ethnic Chinese tend to be either Christian, 
Buddhist or Confucian. 
15 I will explore the position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society more fully in chapters 
four and five. 
16 Anderson links the importance of both printing and capitalism to the development of 
nationalism by citing China, where printing appeared possibly 500 years prior to its 
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the newspaper, which originated in eighteenth century Europe, "provided the 
technical means of `re-presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the 
nation" (Anderson, 1991: 25). In relation to the newspaper Anderson states that 
"[t]his ceremony is performed in silent privacy yet each communicant is aware 
that the ceremony is being replicated simultaneously by others of whose existence 
he is confident" (Anderson, 1991: 33-36). 
Language as a nationalising force is central to Anderson's thesis. He cites extracts 
from books written by Jose Rizal in the Philippines and Marco Kartodikromo in 
Indonesia. Anderson also highlights the importance of writing in the vernacular. 
He argues that "from the start the nation was conceived in language, not in blood, 
and that one could be `invited into' the imagined community" (Anderson, 1991: 
145). Language is certainly a unifying tool in Indonesian nationalism. The actual 
language, according to Anderson, was not important. He suggests that if Holland 
had arrived in the nineteenth century rather than in the seventeenth, the national 
language of Indonesia could have been Dutch. He states that "[n]othing suggests 
that Ghanaian nationalism is any less real than Indonesian simply because its 
national language is English rather than Ashanti" (Anderson, 1991: 132-134). " 
Language was not the only nationalising tool, according to Anderson. In 
attempting to explain why Indonesia survived as an entity into the twentieth 
century, whereas the Spanish colonies of Central and South America did not, 
Anderson explains that in the Dutch East Indies, Batavia (Jakarta) remained the 
administrative, educational and political apex. When people from all over the 
archipelago went to Batavia they knew they were at the centre of colonial 
activities (Anderson, 1991: 132). In contrast, in South America, there were 
separate economic and administrative zones. So, for example, "creole Mexican" 
appearance in Europe. He states that it did not have such a revolutionary impact because of 
the absence of capitalism (Anderson, 1991: 44, note 21). 
17 As mentioned above, the desire to have a common Indonesian language went back to the 
Youth Oath of 1928. According to George Kahin, the Dutch felt that their prestige and 
Indonesians' feelings of inferiority could best be maintained by refusing to allow them to 
speak Dutch (Kahin, 1952: 39). Therefore, the language which became the national language 
was Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian Language) which developed out of Pasar. 1felayu (Bazaar 
Malay). This language was originally a means for the Chinese and non-Chinese to understand 
each other when carrying out business and trade (Grief. 1988: 3). 
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or "creole Chilean" administrators only served in the territories of colonial 
Mexico, or colonial Chile (Anderson, 1991: 56-58). With the arrival of print- 
capitalism these administrative zones began to be imagined as nations (Anderson, 
1991: 61). 
Other adherents of the modernist approach explain the development of 
nationalism in terms of political changes which began to occur in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Max Weber's definition of a nation as "a community of 
sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its owvn" has 
influenced scholars, such as Anthony Giddens and John Breuilly to emphasise the 
political rather than the cultural aspect of nations (Smith, 1998: 14). Giddens 
describes nationalism as "the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and 
beliefs emphasising communality among the members of a political order 
(Giddens, 1985: 116). Breuilly argues that "the departure point for an 
understanding of nationalism should be a political one" (Breuilly, 1985: 75). He 
states that to concentrate a study of nationalism on culture, identity, class or 
modernisation is to overlook the point that nationalism is primarily about politics 
and politics is about power (Breuilly, 1993: 1). 
Primordialism 
The approach which modernists have primarily battled against is that of 
primordialism. Adherents of this approach argue that nations are natural entities 
which stretch back into time immemorial. Few scholars promulgate this view, 
rather this tends to be the approach taken by those in the midst of a nationalist 
struggle. " For example, in Indonesia during the war of independence, the future 
President, Sukarno, spoke of the naturalness of the nation of Indonesia. In his 
speech announcing "The Birth of Pancasila" Sukarno criticised the writers Ernest 
' Some scholars who do take a primordialist stance are Pierre van den Berghe. 
Primordialism has also been associated with Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils. For example, 
Paul Brass has stated that Geertz accepted that ethnic groups in a society are "givens", 
"relatively fixed at birth... [and] rooted in the non-rational foundations of the human 
personality" (Brass, 1991: 267). Anthony Smith also misrepresents Geertz stating that 
"underlying cultural realities" of race, religion and custom kept ethnicity prevalent (Smith. 
1998: 151). Actually Geertz was interested in the "attribution" of significance to these 
allegedly primordial traits (Ozkirimli, 2000: 72-73). 
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Renan and Otto Bauer because in their understanding of nations they looked to the 
feelings of the people in a community, but did not emphasise the territory 
inhabited by the people. Sukarno stated that, "God Almighty made the map of the 
world, created the map of the world. If we look at [it], we can point to where the 
`unities' are. Even a child if he looks at a map of the world, can point out that the 
Indonesian archipelago forms one unity" (Sukarno, 1945: 41). 
Sukarno used to speak "with complete sincerity of the 350 years of colonialism 
that his `Indonesia' had endured" (Anderson, 1991: 11-12). He cited the two 
kingdoms of Sriwijaya and Majapahit as forerunners to the modern Indonesian 
nation. At the national monument (monumen nasional), which was built by 
Sukarno in the centre of Jakarta, and where the official story of the development 
of the Indonesian nation is displayed in glass cases, the struggle for independence 
is said to stem from the Pledge of Palapa in 1331. In that year, Gajah Mada, the 
vice-regent of the Majapahit kingdom pledged that he would not eat the fruit 
palapa until the archipelago of Indonesia (nusantara) was united. 
Ethnosymbolism 
The final category of theorists are the ethnosymbolists who position themselves 
some way between modernists and primordialists. They do not argue that nations 
are natural, nor do they assert that they are wholly modern constructs since in 
their view nations emerge out of communities which possess a pre-modern ethnic 
core. The main proponents of this approach are John Armstrong, John Hutchinson, 
and Anthony Smith. Armstrong was the first of the three to cast some doubt on the 
modernist arguments in his book Nations Before Nationalism (1982). This book 
investigated pre-modern Islamic and Christian ethnic identity formation. Anthony 
Smith argues that "attempts to explain how and why nations emerged must start 
from the ethnic ties and identities that have commonly formed their cultural basis" 
(Smith, 1991: 52). He argues that there are some examples of nations which do 
not have a deep ethnic heritage to draw on, but this is rare, usually there are 
"some dim memories and elements of culture and alleged ancestry, which it is 
hoped to revive". He goes on to state that the lack of such ethnic sentiments "is 
likely to constitute a serious impediment to `nation-building"' (Smith, 1986: 17). 
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Modernist critics of ethnosymbolism argue that it misunderstands the concept of 
"the nation". For example, Symmons-Symonolewicz propounds that the nation is 
not simply a large ethnic group, rather, an ethnic group undergoes many changes 
and absorbs many elements of other cultures and societies, before becoming a 
nation (cited in Özkirimli, 2000: 183-184). Another criticism is that 
ethnosymbolists misunderstand the differences between modern nations and 
earlier ethnic communities. John Breuilly has stated that to say these ethnic 
sentiments are the basis of modern nationalism, rather than "historical 
achievements to which nationalists choose" is misleading (Breuilly, 1993: 405- 
406). 
Definitions of Key Terms 
The different forms which nationalism has taken in the world has meant that no 
agreement has been reached in the academic literature about definitions of the key 
terms. Umut Ozkirimli argues that confusion is caused by disagreement over the 
extent to which religious, class, and ethnic identities contribute to the 
construction of a national identity. This causes some scholars to emphasise 
"objective" criteria such as religion and language, while others argue that 
"subjective" criteria, such as "self-awareness" and "solidarity", are more 
significant. This leads to disagreement between those who see the nation as "self- 
defined" and those who argue that it is "other-defined". Most scholars combine 
objective and subjective criteria (Özkirimli, 2000: 58). 
The confusion over definitions permits the meaning of nation to range from an 
ethnic group that does not constitute a state, to a state that contains more than one 
ethnic group" (Townsend, 1996: 6). This confusion leads some scholars to present 
their definitions as temporary. In Nations and Nationalism (1983) Ernest Gellner 
outlines "two very makeshift, temporary definitions of the idea of the nation" 
(Gellner, 1983: 7). 19 Two people are from the same nation, according to Gellner, if 
they "share the same culture, where culture... means a system of ideas and signs 
and associations and ways of behaving and communicating" (Gellner, 1983: 7). 
19 Again this shows the difficulty people have in defining these terms conclusively. Emphasis 
added. 
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Nationalism for Gellner "is a theory of political legitimacy which requires that 
ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones" (Gellner, 1983: 1). 20 
Like Gellner, Benedict Anderson also presents his definition with qualifications. 
He offers a "workable" definition of a nation as "an imagined community - and 
imagined as both limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991: 6, emphasis added). It 
is "imagined" because even members of the smallest nation will never know most 
of their fellow members. The nation is "limited" because even the largest nation is 
not coterminous with all the world's people, and it is a sovereign community 
because, Anderson suggests, the concept emerged during the Enlightenment, when 
the hierarchical dynastic realm was being overturned and an idea of "horizontal 
comradeship" emerged (Anderson, 1991: 6-7). Anthony Smith also offers a 
"working definition" of the nation: "the `nation' is a named population, occupying 
an historic territory, with shared myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a 
single economy and common legal rights and duties for its members" (Smith, 
1999: 30-31). 
The disagreement over terminology partly results from each scholar presenting 
their own "grand theory" of nationalism. John Breuilly criticises this method 
stating that the sheer number of different nations makes it very difficult to 
develop general principles about nationalism which everybody will agree on 
(Breuilly, 1985: 65). He attempts to deepen our understanding of the key concepts 
by assembling a typology of nationalism, instead of yet another general theory. 
Only after exploring different types of nationalism, he argues, can one attempt to 
outline general similarities between them (Breuilly, 1993: 2). What is needed, he 
suggests, is a "fruitful combination of historical analysis and theory" (Breuilly, 
1985: 66). This attempt by Breuilly, to look historically at the development of 
nations in particular places and at particular times, is admirable; anything less 
than this detailed study could be considered speculative. However, he admits that 
20 Benedict Anderson provides an example which questions whether this manifests in reality. 
Some of the people on the eastern side of Sumatra are not only very close physically to the 
population of the Straits of Malacca, they are also ethnically related, have a common 
language and religion. However, they are both members of different nations - the east 
Sumatrans are Indonesians whereas the Malays of Malacca are Malaysian (Anderson, 1991: 
120-121). 
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as a result of this "no one person can understand in detail more than a tiny 
fraction of so vast a subject" (Breuilly, 1993 ix), and so he must define his terms 
very narrowly. Nationalism for Breuilly is a strictly "political movement seeking 
or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments" 
(Breui l ly, 1993: 2). 21 
Like Breuilly, Umut Özkirimli suggests that we need to move away from the 
ambitious "grand theories" which profess to explain all nationalisms, to "partial 
theories" which concentrate on particular aspects of nationalisms (Özkirimli, 
2000: 227). Özkirimli overcomes Breuilly's problem of defining nationalism very 
narrowly, by suggesting that "what unites diverse forms of nationalism is the 
`discourse of nationalism"' ((5zkirimli, 2000: 229). This "discourse of 
nationalism" must be reproduced in everyday life in order to be effective 
((5zkirimli, 2000: 230-231). The discourse has three main characteristics: it 
demands that the interests of the nation override all other interests; it regards the 
nation as the only source of legitimacy, and it operates through "binary divisions" 
- between "us" and "them", "friends" and "foes", and so on (Özkirimli, 2000: 
230). By considering nationalism to be a discourse Özkirimli formulates an 
"umbrella definition" of nationalism as "a particular way of constructing the 
social reality we experience" (Özkirimli, 2000: 229). 22 
Anthony Smith criticises the trend away from grand theories arguing that, when 
nationalism and national identity have become so central to politics in the world 
today "all the partial `little narratives' will have to lean on, and tacitly take their 
meaning from one or other version of the existing grand narratives" (Smith, 1998: 
219). However, the ideas of Smith and those arguing against "grand theories", are 
not as divergent as they seem to think. Özkirimli encourages close investigation of 
21 Unlike other theorists such as Alfred Cobban and Gerard Chaliand, Breuilly denys that the 
American Revolution was a national movement (Chaliand, 1989: 1-2) because the leaders 
made "little reference to a distinct cultural identity to justify their claims" (Breuilly, 1993: 
5). 
22 Fred Halliday also calls for a move away from "grand theories". He argues that the debate 
on nationalism "has in some ways reached an impasse: an array of general theories is offset 
against a mass of individual accounts with relatively little interaction between the two" 
(Halliday, 1997: 26). Halliday suggests that "what is needed now is a moratorium on general 
theories, of which we have plenty, and indeed a questioning... of whether a general theory is 
either desirable or necessary" (Halliday, 1997: 27). 
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the general theories in order to formulate "partial theories", which will shed li, -, 
ht 
on a particular aspect of the phenomena, for example, the participation of various 
groups in nationalist projects (Özkirimli, 2000: 233). Fred Halliday has also 
acknowledged that there needs to be more interaction between the general theories 
and the writing about individual nations. He has called for "comparative, 
individual, histories that are both written in the light of these general theories and 
that, critically, test them against the historical record" (Halliday, 1997: 27). As I 
mentioned in the introduction, in this thesis I am guided by Halliday's suggestion. 
I am looking at the general theories in order to assess their usefulness in 
explaining Indonesian nationalism and the place which the Chinese Indonesian 
groups see themselves as having within the national discourses. 
Civic and Ethnic Nations 
Origins of the Distinction Between Civic and Ethnic Nations 
The nationalism literature which I found most useful was that on "civic" and 
"ethnic" nations. This distinction runs through the academic literature and is 
useful for my research because these kinds of nations are said to treat ethnic 
minorities in different ways. Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid argue that some 
nations, such as Germany and Russia, are based on blood and kinship. Other 
nations, such as the United States and France, are based on more civic ideas 
which, theoretically at least, allow people from outside to become part of the 
nation (Chirot, 1997: 17-18). In order to investigate whether different kinds of 
nations treat ethnic difference within the nation-state more sympathetically, I will 
now turn to an investigation of this literature. 
Leah Greenfeld acknowledges a confusion engendered by "civic" and "ethnic" 
concepts of the nation: 
The term `nation' applied to both conceals important differences... the 
two concepts under one name reflect two radically different forms of 
the phenomenon (which means both two radically different forms of 
national identity and consciousness, and two radically different types 
of national collectivities - nations) (Greenfeld, 1992: 8-9). 
According to David Brown, civic nationalism is a "shared commitment to. and 
pride in, the public institutions of state and civil society, which connect the people 
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to the territory that they occupy" (Brown, 2000: 34). The civic understanding of 
the nation stems from the French Revolution of 1789, which was heavily 
influenced by the political thinking of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) 
(Schwarzmantel, 1991: 25). Rousseau argued that people did not unite to form a 
nation simply because they resembled each other, rather, there had to be benefits 
for people to come together. Rousseau maintained that the people should be 
educated to love the nation, and that sovereignty should rest with the citizens of 
the nation (Özkirimli, 2000: 20-21). He argued that nationalism was a necessary 
accompaniment to sovereignty and modern democracy (Diamond & Plattner, 
1994: xii). For Rousseau the concept "nation" expressed "the idea of a shared, 
common, equal citizenship, the unity of the people" (Özkirimli, 2000: 21). 
Another French scholar, Ernest Renan (1823-1892), (who was cited by Sukarno 
above) also argued that ethnic ties were not necessary to form a nation. He 
published a very influential pamphlet Qu 'est-ce qtr 'une Nation" (What is a 
Nation? ) in 1882 in which he argued that, "to have common glories in the past and 
to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to 
wish to perform still more - these are the essential conditions for being a people" 
(Renan, 1990: 19). He suggests that a common race, language, material interest, 
religion, geography and military necessities are not adequate for the creation of a 
nation. Rather, the nation is "a daily plebiscite" in which there is "the clearly 
expressed desire to continue a common life" (Renan, 1990: 19). 
Another contribution to the debate on nationalism came from the German 
Romantics, who were reacting to the invasion of the German principalities by 
Napoleon's army in 1806. They rejected the Enlightenment belief that the law and 
equal citizenship were what kept a nation together, and promulgated the notion 
that it was the common ethnic characteristics of the people which created a nation 
(Ignatieff, 1994: 4). Both German Romantic thinkers, Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
(1762-1814) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) viewed the nation as "an 
organic cultural unit... a historic entity whose cultural features developed over a 
long period of time [which] determine[s] individuals and make[s] them what they 
are" (Schwarzmantel, 1991: 33). In his Addresses to the German Nation (1907), 
Fichte promulgated what Anthony Smith calls ethnocentric nationalism: "For an 
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`ethnocentric' nationalist, both `power' and `value' inhere in his cultural group" 
(Smith, 1971: 158-9). Fichte asserted the superiority of the German nation above 
all other nations, claiming that "only the Germans constituted a true Volk" 
(Schwarzmantel, 1991: 23). Herder's nationalism is what Smith calls poll-centric 
nationalism (Smith, 1971: 158-159). This type of nationalism "resembles the 
dialogue of many actors on a common stage" (Smith, 1971: 158). Herder asserted 
that each nation has its own particular culture but each contributes equally to the 
diversity of the world (Schwarzmantel, 1991: 23). 
Different Routes to Nation Formation 
Some scholars suggest that the experiences of the potential national communities 
had important implications for whether they became "civic" or "ethnic" nations. 
The colonial societies had in many cases to struggle for their independence and 
this was certainly the case for Indonesia. Nations which developed later, and in 
reaction to oppressive forces have been considered less liberal than those which 
developed earlier and already had an indigenous state structure in place. 
In The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background (1958) Hans 
Kohn outlined two different types of nationalism which correspond with "civic" 
and "ethnic" types of nations: "voluntarist nationalism", which regarded nations 
as free associations of rational human beings who entered into the nation 
voluntarily, and "organic nationalism", which viewed the nation as a fixed 
organism, stamped on its members at birth. The former he considered to be typical 
of England, France, America and Holland where "the rise of nationalism was a 
predominantly political occurrence; it was preceded by the formation of the future 
national state" (Kohn, 1958: 329). In Germany, Italy, Eastern Europe and Asia, 
"nationalism grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern" 
(Kohn, 1958: 329). Kohn argues that, "[w]hile Western nationalism was, in its 
origin, connected with the concepts of individual liberty and rational 
cosmopolitanism current in the eighteenth century, the later nationalism in Central 
and Eastern Europe and in Asia easily tended towards a contrary development" 
(Kohn, 1958: 330). 
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John Plamenatz also distinguishes between "western" and "eastern" nationalism 
(Plamenatz, 1973: 23). Like Kohn, Plamenatz argues that the type of nation which 
emerged depended on the experiences of the elites or potential elites within the 
national communities. Unlike Kohn, Plamenatz includes Germany and Italy with 
the "western" form of nationalism because although their nationalism has not 
been entirely liberal (nazism in Germany and fascism in Italy) it is nevertheless 
the nationalism of people "already united politically" (Plamenatz, 1973: 29). For 
Plamenatz, the eastern nationalism flourished among the Slavs of Eastern Europe. 
and in Africa and Asia. Like Kohn, Plamenatz argues that in eastern nations "there 
was an awareness that the skills, ideas and customs acquired from their ancestors 
were inadequate" (Plamenatz, 1973: 30). As a result, this "eastern" form of 
nationalism "is both imitative and hostile to the models it imitates, and is apt to 
be illiberal" (Plamenatz, 1973: 34). 
Anthony Smith also, surprisingly, " argues that there are various routes to nation 
formation and these lead to either a more civic or more ethnic type of nationalism. 
As an ethno-symbolist, Smith emphasises the importance of ethnic ties in the 
formation of nations. In his attempts to distinguish between different types of 
nations, Smith differentiates between "lateral" (bureaucratic incorporation) and 
"vertical" (vernacular mobilisation) types of nation formation (Smith, 1991: 52- 
53). Lateral ethnies were generally composed of aristocrats and higher clergy who 
were socially confined to the upper strata and who formed close links with the 
high status members of neighbouring ethnie. The first nations of England, 
Scotland, Holland, Sweden and France developed in this way, according to Smith 
(Smith, 1999: 32). On the other hand, in the "vertical" type of nation formation, 
the high status ethnie was spread to lower strata of the population and was centred 
around notions of a common history and traditions. Examples of this "vertical" 
type of nationalism, according to Smith, are Catholic Irish and Orthodox Serb 
nationalisms, which arose out of subjection to English and Ottoman Turk rule. 
23 Ross Poole points out that Smith's thesis that nations have an "ethnic core" is not easily 
reconcilable with the claim that there are distinctions between "ethnic" and "civic" 
nationalisms. Poole suggests that the two are compatible if you are careful to explain, which 
Smith does not, that historically, some nations have emphasised ethnic aspects more than 
others (Poole, 1999: 174, note 80). 
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Irrespective of interference by these alien states "there were internal social and 
cultural resources - local institutions, family networks, life-cycle customs, 
ballads, traditions, memories of heroes, and the like - that preserved and 
reinvigorated the popular culture of the subject ethnies" (Smith, 1999: 33). Out of 
this mobilisation of the people by a local intelligentsia emerged a type of 
nationalism in which the ethnic bond was more intense than in the "lateral" type 
of nation formation (Özkirimli, 2000: 178). This leads Smith to divide 
nationalisms into two different types: "territorial", stemming from "bureaucratic 
incorporation" and "ethnic" nationalism which develops out of "vernacular 
mobilization" (Özkirimli, 2000: 182-183). This type of "vertical" nation 
formation has also been in evidence in the Middle East, Asia and parts of Africa 
(Smith, 1998: 194). 
Ressentiment 
By the 1820s, according to Benedict Anderson, there «gas a "model" of the nation 
available for "pirating" (Anderson, 1991: 81-82): "the nation proved an invention 
on which it was impossible to secure a patent" (Anderson, 1991: 67). However, 
there were certain standards which a nation had to reach. All people within the 
territory had to be included, so serfdom and slavery had to come to an end 
(Anderson, 1991: 81-82). In the explanations of the spread of nationalism 
mentioned above, nations in the West, where the ideas first emerged, are 
considered to have developed an enlightened, civic form of nationalism. Non- 
western countries are said to harbour feelings of resentment that their culture was 
inferior to that being imitated and possibly not adequate for the successful 
appropriation of these new nationalist ideas. 
Liah Greenfeld looks in detail at these contradictory feelings which she calls 
"ressentiment". This concept relates to a "psychological state resulting from 
suppressed feelings of envy and hatred... and the impossibility of satisfying these 
feelings" (Greenfeld, 1992: 15). In some situations "ressentiment" may lead to 
what Greenfeld calls the "transvaluation of values": "the transformation of the 
value scale in a way which denigrates the originally supreme values, replacing 
them with notions which are unimportant [and] external" (Greenfeld, 1992: 16). 
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She argues that "wherever [-essentiment] existed, it fostered particularistic pride 
and xenophobia, providing emotional nourishment for the nascent national 
sentiment and sustaining it whenever it faltered" (Greenfeld, 1992: 16). 
This idea of ressentiment allows Greenfeld to distinguish between what she 
considers the original form of nationalism - in which democracy and self- 
determination were central concepts - and the later forms of nationalism which 
were more likely to be authoritarian (Greenfeld, 1992: 10-11). She even goes so 
far as suggesting that the distinction may prevent the export of democracy to 
illiberal, non-Western societies. 
Elie Kedourie argues that nationalism in Asia and Africa* is neither indigenous to 
the regions nor "an irresistible tendency of the human spirit", rather, it is an 
importation from Europe (Kedourie, 1971: 29-30). At the heart of nationalism in 
these places, according to Kedourie, was a paradox. On the one hand, those Asian 
and African leaders who led the nationalist movements in their countries tended to 
be European educated and therefore were unlikely to have faith in the "primitive 
superstition" of their homelands (Kedourie, 1971: 76-77). On the other hand, the 
discourse of nationalism encouraged that each nation be defined by its past, and 
so traditional kinds of behaviour were celebrated (Kedourie, 1971: 92-93). `4 
Partha Chaterjee highlights very clearly the confusion and resentment felt by those 
struggling for independence in post-colonial societies. In Nationalist Thought and 
the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (1986) Chaterjee propounds what he 
considers to be the central contradiction of the emergence of nationalism in 
colonial societies. This type of nationalism, he argues, 
is both imitative and hostile to the models it imitates... it is imitative in 
that it accepts the value of the standards set by an alien culture. But it 
also involves a rejection, in fact two rejections, both of them 
ambivalent: rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is 
nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and 
rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and 
yet also cherished as marks of identity (Chatterjee, 1986: 2). 
24 Kedourie gives the example of Jomo Kenyatta. He studied anthroplogv in London, but 
encouraged cliterodctomy when he returned to Kenya (Kedourie. 1971: 76-77). 
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This complex acceptance and refusal to fully embrace Western ideas is highlighted 
in an example from Indonesia. Speaking, in 1945, during a debate about the future 
of the Indonesian political system, the Javanese aristocrat Raden Supomo argued 
that the new Indonesian constitution should be based on an "integralist" state 
structure. Supomo asserted that "every state must reflect the unique cultural and 
legal heritage of its people" (Bourchier, 1997: 159-160). He "held that village 
communities all over the archipelago were characterized by their attachment to 
values of communal harmony, social solidarity, and their feeling of oneness with 
their leaders" (Bourchier, 1997: 159-160). However, the idea that a constitution 
should be based on a "master concept", such as integralism, was adopted from a 
Dutch ideology which was heavily influenced by German tradition (Bourchier, 
1997: 179 note 3). Indeed, Supomo named the European thinkers Hegel, Spinoza 
and the nineteenth century German Romantic Adam Müller, as leading theorists of 
integralism (Bourchier, 1997: 160-161). 
Criticisms of the Distinction between Civic and Ethnic Nations 
That nationalism in Asia was an import from Europe does not necessarily mean 
that it became subverted in the process. In recent years criticism of the distinction 
between "good" (civic) and "bad" (ethnic) types of nationalism have been rather 
forcefully made. Partha Chatterjee argues that nationalism is "irrational, narrow, 
hateful and destructive [and is also] one of Europe's most pernicious exports 
[being] a child of... fervent romanticism, of political messianism whose inevitable 
consequence is the annihilation of freedom" (Chatterjee, 1986: 7). A division into 
different types of nationalism was, according to Chatterjee, an attempt by "liberal- 
rationalist" thinkers to deal with a dilemma: these liberals believed that 
nationalism was an enlightened idea which emerged in Europe with industrialism 
and democracy. In order to maintain this thesis, other forms of nationalism which 
emerged outside Western Europe, and which may have been illiberal in character, 
were deemed to be an "impure, often deviant" form of the original (Chatterjee, 
1986: 3-4). 
Stefan Auer also complains about the tendency in the West to label Eastern 
nationalism as "bad". Auer disagrees with Plamenatz's suggestions that the people 
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of Central and Eastern Europe are destined to an illiberal type of nationalism. He 
complains that when illiberal forms of nationalism emerge in German- or Italy 
this is seen as an aberration, whereas, outside Western Europe it is seen as the 
norm (Auer, 2000: 223-224). 
Even those scholars who accept the distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" 
nations have become more cautious. Michael Ignatieff has pointed out that 
Enlightenment societies acted as if they were ethnically homogenous (Ignatieff. 
1994: 4). The dilemma over who was entitled to become a citizen was less 
complicated in Rousseau's time than it is today: if you were not white, male and 
propertied, you were not entitled to become a citizen, and as a result, women, 
black slaves, and aboriginal peoples were excluded from the nation (Ignatieff, 
1994: 4). 
Greenfeld concedes that most nations are a mixture of "civic" and "ethnic" 
tendencies, but, the mixtures within each nation vary significantly enough to 
justify her classification system. She argues that the "character" of a specific 
national identity was defined during the early stage of its development and "[i]ts 
effects, in the political, social, and cultural constitution of the respective nations, 
as well as their historical record, are attributable to this original definition" 
(Greenfeld, 1992: 22-23). 
Ross Poole also argues against making such clear cut distinctions between 
nations. He suggests that for people who have been discriminated against - Jews, 
Blacks, Gypsies - even the most civic of nations has an ethnic side (Poole, 1999: 
41). Poole is more willing than Greenfeld to believe that the degree to which a 
nation emphasises "civic" and "ethnic" characteristics can change. He suggests 
that "the content of various nationalisms is not determined by history, but by 
ongoing political struggles and debates. These contribute, not merely to the 
nation's sense of its present and its future, but also to the ways in which it 
interprets its past" (Poole, 1999: 42). As a result, he proposes that instead of 
seeing ethnic and civic national identities as rooted in history, we should 
"investigate the social and political circumstances in which these forms of closure 
come onto the political agenda" (Poole, 1999: 43). 
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Conclusions: The Case of Indonesia 
Indonesians were brought together initially through the desire to oust a colonial 
power and the leaders insisted that the new nation should include the whole 
territory of the Dutch East Indies. After independence, Indonesia was faced with 
nation-building in a country which was vast both in its territorial expanse and in 
its diversity and complexity. The five principles of Pancasila were formulated in 
order to create some kind of unity and fuse that unity out of the perceived 
traditions of the different ethnic groups. 
The most common assertion in the academic literature is that nations are modern 
constructs, developing out of political and societal changes which arrived with 
industrialism and modernity. This is particularly obvious in the case of Indonesia 
which has struggled to inculcate a sense of national unity among the many suku 
bangsa within its borders. Also pertinent to Indonesia's experience is that ideas of 
nationalism came from Europe and were diffused throughout the population by a 
European-educated elite. The fact that Sukarno spoke of Indonesia's glorious past 
points to the "discourse of nationalism" which, to paraphrase Özkirimli, 
constructs the social reality we experience. This "reality" stems from an 
"immemorial" past and reaches into a "limitless" future (Anderson, 1991: 132). 
Another element of the discourse of nationalism is that it tries to unite a nation 
around a common culture. As outlined above, in the case of many countries 
fighting for independence from colonial powers they did not have a common 
culture at the time of independence. These were areas cobbled together by power 
struggles and rivalry between the European masters and did not necessarily form 
historical unities. These new nations had to set about building a nation through 
the inculcation of a nationalistic ideology. Elie Kedourie has called this process "a 
method of teaching the right determination of the will" (Kedourie, 1961: 81). 
The Chinese in Indonesia were taught, along with all the other ethnic groups, 
about "the right determination of the will", however, they were still fundamentally 
excluded from the nation from its inception. Despite the treatment of the ethnic 
Chinese, Indonesia tends to be considered a "civic" nation in the academic 
literature. David Brown argues that although civic nationalism is usually 
associated with democracy, Suharto's Indonesia is an example of civic nationalism 
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which is authoritarian (Brown 2000: 56). Anthony Reid and Daniel Chirot also 
classify Indonesia as a civic nation. They argue that "Indonesian nationalists by 
virtue of having to deal with significant religious and ethnic minorities throughout 
the immense and varied territory... were obliged to create a more civic than a 
blood type of nationalism" (Chirot, 1997: 20). As a result, they argue that no 
matter how much anti-Chinese sentiment there might be, through "cultural 
conversion" on their part it is possible for the ethnic Chinese to be accepted 
(Chirot, 1997: 20). Anthony Smith argues that Indonesia created a "civic, 
territorial" nation through a "dominant ethnie" model whereby "the culture of the 
new state's core ethnic community becomes the main pillar of the new national 
political identity and community". In the case of Indonesia this core ethnic culture 
was the Javanese culture which Smith suggests shaped the identity of the political 
structures being developed (Smith, 1991: 110). Placing Indonesia in the category 
of "civic" nation contradicts much of the literature which holds that nations which 
developed later and in reaction to existing state structures tended to be illiberal in 
nature. This highlights how complex Indonesian society is, and how difficult it is 
to categorise it. 
As outlined above, it certainly is the case that Indonesian nationalists had to 
contend with considerable ethnic, religious and cultural diversity when fomenting 
ideas about Indonesian nationalism. Pancasila was an attempt, and continues to 
be an attempt, to unite diverse groups of people into an Indonesian nation. The 
Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) of 1928 was an attempt to unite people by 
promulgating a common language. However, I do not accept that the literature has 
taken account of the extent to which the ethnic Chinese have not been fully 
accepted as genuine Indonesian. Therefore, I consider Indonesia to be what I have 
termed an indigenist rather than a civic nation. As mentioned above, diversity 
among the indigenous ethnic groups has been accepted, however, the ethnic 
Chinese heritage has not been included in national discourses. Leo Suryadinata 
alludes to this when he suggests that all the countries of Southeast Asia, except 
for Singapore, are "indigenous state-nations" where "the indigenous group is used 
as the `model' of the nation" (Suryadinata, 1997b: 5-6). 
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In recent years academic literature has questioned the homogenous nature of the 
nation. The voices of minority groups within the nation have begun to be heard. I 
will begin chapter three with an outline of two fields of study, multiculturalism 
and diaspora, which I consider of particular interest to an investigation of Chinese 
Indonesians (although the literature is not without its problems). Since the ethnic 
Chinese outside China have had particular difficulties being accepted into many 
nations in which they have settled, not just Indonesia, I will also discuss academic 
literature relating to Chineseness in particular. 
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Chapter 3 
Discourses of Difference 
There has been an acknowledgement in the academic literature in recent years that 
nationalist discourses have tended to ignore the experiences of "marginal groups" 
within the nation. Although a "civic" form of nationalism might be more 
accepting of those who are not ethnically related to others within the nation, both 
"civic" and "ethnic" concepts tend to promote cultural homogeneity. Civic nations 
may accept ethnic and cultural minorities, however, these groups have been 
expected, until recently, to play down their ethnic identity and assimilate into the 
dominant national culture. Globalisation is changing the way people think about 
nations. On the one hand people are settling in nations in which they were not 
born, they are also keeping in touch with nations they have left. On the other 
hand, ethnic conflict is a continuing problem and people have become more 
conscious of those who are not considered to belong. According to len Ang "the 
world is now a space of complicated entanglement, of togetherness-in-difference" 
(Ang, 2001: 5). Changes in the debate about nations and nationalism, and a move 
away from general theories, are partly the result of an awareness that the 
multiethnic aspect of most nation-states calls into question what a nation is and 
who belongs in it. 
In a country such as Indonesia, the inculcation of a national identity is 
complicated by the diversity of the population and the deeply-felt ethnic 
identities. There is a tension between the strongly-felt ethnic identities among the 
population, and the inculcation of a nation-wide identity. An "indigenist" 
discourse has also ensured that up to now only those cultures considered to be 
indigenous are accepted. 
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Sukarno regaled during a meeting with Ho Chi Minh that there were no minorities 
in Indonesia. If there were minorities, there were majorities, and then there would 
be exploitation. Instead, according to Sukarno, the ethnic groups of Indonesia 
were all part of the one Indonesian national body. According to Siau«w Tiong Djin, 
Sukarno's words ensure that "every cultural activity from every ethnic group 
contributes to the richness of Indonesian culture" (Siauw, 1998: 26-27). In reality 
Chinese Indonesians have not been accepted within the national discourses but the 
groups set up after 1998 are asking for this kind of recognition for their Chinese 
heritage. 
This chapter will discuss some of the academic debates which question the 
homogeneity of the nation. I will begin with a brief discussion of 
"multiculturalism". Although the Indonesian government does not use the term 
"multiculturalism", and the academic writing on this topic tends to deal with 
multi-ethnic nations in the West, such as the United States, Australia and Canada, 
I have found that some of the questions raised in this literature are useful to my 
examination of the Chinese experience in Indonesia. I will then move on to an 
investigation of the literature dealing with "diaspora" and assess whether it is 
useful to describe the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia as part of a diaspora. Finally the 
chapter will explore "Chineseness" itself and ask what makes people who have 
lived in Indonesia for generations, "Chinese". 
Minorities in the Nation-State 
Demands for recognition by minority groups have been common all over the 
world during the last thirty years or so. Before the 1960s a concept which became 
known as the "Anglo-Conformity" model ensured that immigrants in western 
societies were expected to integrate entirely into their new communities. 
However, during the 1970s, fuelled by demands from minority groups themselves, 
a more pluralistic policy was adopted and minorities were encouraged to maintain 
some aspects of their ethnic heritage. (Kymlicka, 1995a: 14-15). 
Bhikhu Parekh raises the problem of minorities within the nation-state who are 
not included in the national discourses. He states that: "National identity... is a 
matter of moral and emotional identification with a particular community based 
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on a shared loyalty to its constitutive principles and participation in its collective 
self-understanding" (Parekh, 1999a: 69). However, "minorities cannot feel part of 
a political community if its very self-definition excludes them and treats them as 
outsiders" (Parekh, 1999a: 70). Istvan Pogany also writes about minorities who 
are not included in national discourses. Writing about groups in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Pogany argues that pluralism, whether religious, linguistic, ethnic 
or cultural does not, in itself, cause the problems which have become familiar 
there. Firstly, he states that "political units" which are not based on the principle 
of national self-determination, such as Empires, do not have these problems 
(Pogany, 1999: 143). Such problems have only emerged in "highly suspect 
ideologies which regard ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic homogeneity as of 
overriding importance in the construction of States" (Pogany, 1999: 144-145). 
This resonates with Gellner's ideas about the function of the state in modern 
society as the only organisation large enough to cater to the needs of modern 
society, and the difficulties cultural difference causes in this more fluid society. 
Unlike Pogany, Gellner does not blame nationalism for this situation. For Gellner, 
industrialism needs a nation-state in which to function. Secondly, Pogany argues 
that the behaviour of particular minorities, as well as their size and economic 
dominance, may be a factor in determining the degree to which there is 
intercommunal friction within states (Pogany, 1999: 145). Pogany also points out, 
however, that majorities often judge minorities according to their own prejudices 
and assumptions, rather than on the basis of "objective information". Attitudes 
towards minorities are likely to have been `learnt' in childhood, or based on 
personal experience, rather than statistical information. (Pogany, 1999: 145). 
Basically, Pogany argues that problems for minorities in Central and Eastern 
Europe are as a result of the form of national identity based on ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural and religious homogeneity (Pogany, 1999: 145-146). 
The rights of minority groups within nation-states have been taken up by the 
United Nations which has ensured that minorities all over the world have become 
more aware of their rights to express their ethnic identities. Article 27 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
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community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language (Bowring, 1999: 4). 
Again in 1992, following many years of drafting, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Bowring, 1999: 7). 
One of the dominant discourses to develop out of calls by minority groups for 
more recognition is that of "multiculturalism". This is a contested term which, as 
David Bennett points out "has served variously as code for assimilation and 
cultural separatism; campus marxism and ethnic nationalism; transnational 
corporate marketing strategy and minority competition for state resources" 
(Bennett, 1998: 1-2). len Ang puts it in rather simple terms as "the official and 
informal recognition that racial and ethnic minorities in a particular nation-state 
have their own distinct cultures and communities, and... [are] recognized and 
appreciated as such" (Ang, 2001: 14). 
The term multiculturalism was coined by a Canadian Royal Commission in 1965 
(Bennett, 1998: 2) and it is the Canadian academic, Will Kymlicka, who is one of 
its leading exponents. Kymlicka explores two forms of multiculturalism. On the 
one hand there are those groups he calls "national minorities", who were 
previously self-governing and tend to prefer to continue as distinct communities, 
demanding various forms of autonomy, and self government (Kymlicka, 1995a: 
10-11). He calls these "multinational" societies (Kymlicka, 1995a: 17-18). On the 
other hand there are immigrant minorities, who usually wish to be accepted as full 
members of the new society, but may seek to "modify the institutions and laws to 
make them more accommodating of cultural differences" (Kymlicka, 1995a: 10- 
11). Societies with immigrant minorities are described as "polyethnic" societies 
(Kymlicka, 1995a: 17-18). 
A central point made by Kymlicka is that people should have access to "societal 
cultures" (Kymlicka, 1995a: 101). He argues that "the modern world is divided 
into... `societal cultures, ' whose practices and institutions cover the full range of 
human activities, encompassing both public and private life" (Kymlicka, 1995a: 
75-76). This also echoes Ernest Gellner's ideas about the need in modern society 
for a common culture, including a unifying language, through which common 
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economic, political and educational institutions are developed (Kymlicka, 1995a: 
76-77). According to Kymlicka, there are many minority groups throughout the 
world who are denied this access; unable to participate fully in society or maintain 
their own societal culture. Generally, Kymlicka believes that people with societal 
cultures tend to want to form nations. National minorities have societal cultures, 
but, immigrant groups do not (Kymlicka, 1995a: 101). 
Kymlicka asks some pertinent questions about what kind of society a multicultural 
one should be: 
Should each ethnic or national group have publicly funded education in 
its mother tongue? Should political offices be distributed in accordance 
with a principle of national or ethnic proportionality? ... 
[and] [w]hat are 
the responsibilities of minorities to integrate (Kymlicka, 1995a: 4-5). 
These are some of the questions which the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are now 
grappling with. For example, those I spoke to generally agree that Chinese 
Indonesians should be schooled in Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) and 
that Chinese languages might be taken as choices within the school curriculum. 
Whether Chinese Indonesians should be allocated positions in government and 
whether ethnic Chinese are needed to represent the views of their community is a 
highly contested question. Some, such as those who have set up political parties, 
believe that Chinese Indonesian public representatives are needed in order to 
ensure that their voices are heard, others believe that this is not the case. The 
extent to which the ethnic Chinese should integrate is also hotly contested. I will 
return to these questions in my analysis of my empirical data in chapters six, 
seven and eight. 
This multiculturalism debate acknowledges diversity within the nation-state but 
there is a concern that group identities may become essentialised. Critics of 
"multiculturalism" query whether there is a need for an individual to be located 
within a single cultural framework. David Brown states that the multicultural Ist 
arguments echo earlier primordialist views of ethnicity as providing a powerful 
emotional bond (Brown, 2000: 129). Such an ideology embeds people in one 
identity. Jeremy Waldron argues that "the sheer existence and vitality of the 
cosmopolitan alternative is enough to undercut an important part of the case for 
the preservation of minority cultures" (Waldron, 1995: 100). Waldron criticises 
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Kymlicka's emphasis on societal cultures. He argues that "the project of 
individuating societal cultures presupposes that cultures are somehow isolated and 
impervious to external influences... Cultures have influenced each other so much 
that there is no meaningful way to say where one culture ends and another begins" 
(cited, Kymlicka, 1995a: 101-102). 
John Packer also raises concerns about the essentialising of ethnic identities. He 
argues that we need to move away from the idea of the nation state as "an 
homogenous, pure entity" (Packer, 1999: 270). Pluralistic societies are the norm 
around the world and therefore, "we must think in terms of securing and 
expanding opportunities for multiple, open and evolving cultures and identities" 
(Packer, 1999: 270). Nira Yuval-Davis also queries this "identity politics" which 
is characteristic of multiculturalism. She states that "'[i]dentity politics' tend not 
only to homogenize and naturalize social categories and groupings, but also to 
deny shifting boundaries of identities and internal power differences and conflicts 
of interest" (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 119). 
Multiculturalism as a set of policies was not promulgated by the Indonesian 
government as such, however, the official motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which I 
translate as "Plurality but Unity", encompasses the multiculturalist concept that 
there are distinct ethnic groups within the society, "living-apart-together", to use 
len Ang's succinct phrase (Ang, 2001: 14). As Thung Julan has pointed out, 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika emphasises "the different roots of ethnic groups which 
existed long before the creation of Indonesian national unity" (Thung, 1998: 13 
note 5). These ethnic identities remain a very strong point of reference for people 
in Indonesia. 
Although, as discussed above, theorists question whether there are in fact seperate 
ethnic identities into which people easily fit - and I would agree with their 
questioning of the primordial aspects of the multiculturalist debate - in this 
thesis I am interested in the ways the Chinese Indonesian groups are articulating 
their identities and they do have a primordialist attitude towards their ethnic 
identities. I argue that their attitude to their ethnic identity corresponds with the 
discourses of Indonesian national identity. In other words, within Indonesian 
national discourses, the suku bangsa (ethnic) identity is considered primordial. 
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After 1998 the Chinese Indonesian groups called for more recognition of their 
ethnic heritage and they want their cultural heritage to be treated in the same way, 
as other ethnic groups in Indonesia. 25 
Another kind of identity which undermines the homogeneity of the nation, and on 
which there is a vast amount written, is the concept of a diaspora. len Ang argues 
that out of the failure of assimilation in the West, ethnic groups began to move 
away from the weak position of "ethnic minority" and assert themselves as part of 
a "diaspora". This imparted "a sense of being a `people' with historical roots and 
destinies outside the time/space of the host nation" (Ang, 2001: 12). The literature 
on diaspora appears to be particularly relevant to this study of the Chinese in 
Indonesia because the large numbers of people who have left China and settled in 
other countries has led to the Chinese being written about as part of a diaspora. 
However, as the next section will show, there are limits to its applicability to the 
case of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. 
Diaspora 
According to Elaine Tay, the difference between a "diaspora" and an "ethnic 
group" is that the diaspora maintains links with the original homeland. Tay quotes 
Khachig Tölölyan who states that "`a diaspora is never merely an accident of 
birth', it is not merely something defined by `being' but also by `doing' and 
`feeling"' (Tay, 2000). Emmanuel Ma Mung also highlights the active part of 
being in a diaspora. He argues that there are two characteristics needed to be 
considered a diaspora: "multipolarity of the migrations... and interpolarity of the 
relations" (Ma Mung, 1998: 36). In other words, relations must be continued with 
the country of origin, but also, between the various dispersed communities (Ma 
Mung, 1998: 36). 
Michael Jacobsen questions the necessity of coherence in a diaspora. He argues 
that "a diaspora constitutes a decentred, multi-levelled and fractious, generally 
ethnically affiliated, ideational network that allows people to move in and out of a 
given diaspora depending on their current social and political situation (Jacobsen, 
25 As I mentioned in chapter one, I take an "emic" understanding of ethnicity throughout this 
thesis. 
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2003: 1). Jacobsen argues that the ethnic Chinese are using the spaces which have 
opened up as a result of global pressures on national sovereignty to establish 
"diasporic like networks" which provide for "transnational ethnoscapes" or 
"nations without states" (Jacobsen, 2003: 2). 
Wang Gungwu questions the use of the term "Chinese diaspora" because it creates 
the image that there is a single global Chinese community which is ultimately 
loyal to China. He has appealed that "the Chinese overseas be studied in the 
context of their respective national environments, and taken out of a dominant 
China reference point". He is wary about the homogenising effect of the term 
"Chinese diaspora" and wants to emphasise that there is diversity among the 
world's Chinese. Wang states that "unless [the term diaspora] is used carefully to 
avoid projecting the image of a single Chinese diaspora, [it] will eventually bring 
tragedy to the Chinese overseas" (Wang, 1999 cited in len Ang, 2001: 81-84). 26 
Websites 
One of the ways in which diasporas can maintain communication between 
participants is through the use of the internet. After the violence in Indonesia in 
1998, which was directed mainly against the ethnic Chinese, the website 
huaren. org was established in response to the violence. 27 Elaine Tay uses the 
website as an example of "long distance nationalism" (Tay, 2000). 28 len Ang 
mentions that according to the people involved in producing huaren. org "any 
Chinese-American or Chinese-Canadian would do well, to all intents and 
purposes, to be Chinese first, and American or Canadian only second, and so help 
26 This contradicts Wang Gungwu's position on the Executive Committee and the Board of 
Governors of the Chinese Heritage Centre, which was established in Singapore in 1995. 
According to Wee Cho Yaw, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the centre, "[t]he 
establishment of this centre has made it possible to study overseas Chinese globally, rather 
than as separate communities" (Wee, 1998). 
27 Chinese Indonesian property was attacked, which tended to be the pattern of anti-Chinese 
violence in Indonesia. However, a more shocking new tactic was the rape of Chinese 
Indonesian women. This may have fed the outrage which led to the establishment of the 
website. I will discuss the violence in 1998 in more detail in chapter 5. 
28 huaren. org was established by Daniel Tse, a Chinese-Canadian research engineer, who 
emigrated from Hong Kong in 1980, and Joe Tan, a research chemist who emigrated from 
Malaysia to New Zealand in 1978. 
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bolster the internal cohesion and solidarity of the global Chinese diasporic 
community" (Ang, 2001: 80). The site asserts itself as "a cyber-clan organization 
that takes the traditional family, village, clan, and same-surname associations into 
a globalized cyber-level that is borderless [and] transnational" 
(http: //www. huaren. org/editorial/id/082898. html [accessed: 18 June 2000]). The 
name Huaren is used because it is the "standard Pinyin transliteration of the term 
`Chinese'... [and it is used] by the majority of Chinese speakers" 
(http: www. huaren. org/aboutus/ [accessed: 18 June 2000]). 
The website huaren. org was cited widely in academic literature at the time of the 
violence in Indonesia as an example of Chinese diaspora activity. The site was 
established as a reaction to the violence against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in 
1998. However, many Chinese Indonesians felt uncomfortable with this and there 
were calls for the website to look at the situation for Indonesians more generally, 
not just the ethnic Chinese. 
While huaren. org was considered an example of ethnic Chinese acting together 
globally, over-riding national identities and finding common cause in their 
Chineseness, there are other websites that could be cited, which illustrate the 
opposite - that is, the ethnic Chinese in different countries engaging with the 
national discourses of those countries in which they have settled, and trying to 
integrate into those societies. Obviously these websites still convey Chinese 
identities, but, they are less focused on linking up with other ethnic Chinese and 
more interested in reaching out to the communities in which they find themselves. 
For example, the Philippine-Chinese website tsinoy. com explained that it was 
"focused on engaging our community with the Chinese and the Filipino culture" 
(tsinoy. com, 2 December 2001 ["Welcome to tsinoy. com"]). For the celebration of 
the 104th anniversary of Philippine independence tsinoy. com looked at "the 
significant contributions of Tsinoys in our ancestors' fight for sovereignity" 
(tsinoy. com, 21 June 2002) ["A Salute to Tsinoy Heroes"]). The website 
chinatownsydney. com deals with the Chinese in Sydney, Australia. The site 
"comments on the Chinese community and their relationships with the broader 
Australian community". This site is also trying to breakdown stereotypes. It 
suggests that "[t]ime and again, we are told the Chinese are not interested in 
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politics; they don't have views. In Ozwatch, writers will provide commentaries on 
Australian and international events from Australian Chinese perspectives- 
(chi natownsydney. com, 2 December 2001 ["Overview"]). The British Chinese 
website Dimsum engages with other ethnic minorities in Britain. One of their 
writers, Wai Lam, explains the background to Ramadhan. Another correspondent, 
Shireen, looks at the "struggle for identity" of British-born Asians (dimsum. co. uk, 
2 December 2001 ["Welcome to Dimsum"]). From these websites it is obvious 
that these ethnic Chinese do feel in some way Chinese and they are expressing 
their Chinese identity. It is also clear, however, that they are engaging with the 
nations in which they live. By only citing the website huaren. com the idea that the 
ethnic Chinese are focused on their Chineseness becomes compounded and their 
enthusiasm for engaging with issues relating to the countries they have settled in 
becomes lost. 
Ethnic Chinese and Jews 
The outsider status of the ethnic Chinese outside China has been underlined by 
comparisons which are often made, both in the historical records and in the 
academic literature, between the Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Jews of 
Europe. This literature also emphasises the Chinese position as part of a diaspora. 
In historical records these comparisons have tended to be unfavourable. Edmund 
Scott, who travelled in Java during the first years of the seventeenth century wrote 
that, "the Chyneses... like Jewes, live crooching under [the Javans], but robb them 
of their wealth and send it for Chyna" (cited in Coppel, 2001: 4). Another 
comparison was made with the Jews by Sir Thomas Herbert, who travelled to 
Sumatra and Malacca in 1621. He stated that the Chinese traders were "too subtle 
for young merchants, oftimes so wedded to dicing, that, after they have lost[, ] 
their whole estate and wife and children are staked; yet in littel [sic] time, Jew- 
like, by gleaning here and there, are able to redeem their loss; if not at the day, 
they are sold in the market for most advantage" (Pan, 1991: 129) . 
Denys Lombard argues that the colonials considered the Chinese to be serious 
competitors and never forgave them for anticipating them in introducing complex 
structures of commerce to Southeast Asia. Therefore, the Chinese were compared 
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unfavourably with the Jews in Europe (cited in Coppel, 2001: 4). Citing Walter 
Zenner, Hillel Kieval suggests that Southeast Asians learned from European 
colonial administrators and scholars "to assign the specific moral evaluations of 
anti-Semitism to the local ethnic context" (Kieval, 1997: 215). Comparisons 
between Jews and Chinese made their way into nationalist discourses in Southeast 
Asia. In 1914, the European-educated Thai King Vajiravudh (who ruled from 1910 
to 1925) published anti-Chinese papers entitled "The Jew of the East" in which he 
stated that the Chinese in Thailand were like the Jews in Europe - "foreign, 
antinational parasites". This comparison was despite the fact that the Thai royal 
family was in part Sino-Thai (Chirot, 1997: 11). 
This comparison between the Chinese and Jews, although not following the 
distasteful stereotypes, has also been carried into the academic literature. In their 
book Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of 
Southeast Asia and Central Europe (1997), Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid see 
the comparison not as one of all Jews with all Chinese, rather "[t]he important 
comparison is in their creative and vulnerable role as `outsiders at the center' in 
dynamic processes of change" (Reid, 1997: 34). Chirot and Reid call the Chinese 
and the Jews "entrepreneurial minorities" (Chirot, 1997: 3). Abner Cohen calls 
them a "trade diaspora". "Middleman minority" is another term used to describe 
them. Reid and Chirot suggest that anti-Chineseness and anti-Jewishness 
intensified during the time when nationalism was creating more fixed notions of 
who belonged and who did not belong in the nation, both in Asia and Europe 
(Reid, 1997: 36). 
The comparison between ethnic Chinese and Jews is not always appreciated by 
Southeast Asian Chinese who are trying to fit into the countries in which they 
have settled. At the "International Conference on the Chinese Diaspora", held in 
Berkeley, California, in November 1992, some Southeast Asian delegates objected 
to the use of the term "diaspora" because of implications that a diaspora would 
one day return to the motherland (Reid, 1997: 36). Anthony Reid tries to allay 
their fears by using the term "diaspora" in the "modern" sense in which the word 
is used by Abner Cohen: "a nation of socially interdependent, but spatially 
dispersed communities" (cited, Reid, 1997: 36). 1 would question whether the 
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term "diaspora", even in this sense, is a useful concept to apply to the ethnic 
Chinese I have interviewed in Indonesia. My main reason for disputing the 
usefulness of this concept is that by and large the people I spoke to do not have 
contact with other ethnic Chinese outside Indonesia, therefore, they do not 
constitute a socially interdependent nation. 
Distinctions Between Indigenous and Non-Indigenous People 
In a discussion relating to "middleman" Jewish minorities in Europe, Hillel 
Kieval questions the terminology used in this literature. His questions are also 
useful for an investigations of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Theorists use the 
words "host" and "native" to describe the societies in which the Jewish minorities 
had settled, however Kieval suggests that the use of these words in the European 
context are often political constructs. For example, Jews have been in the Czech 
Republic at least as long as the Slavs, and certainly longer than the Germans 
(Kieval cited in Chirot and Reid, 1997: 212). 
The use of the term "indigenous"29 in Indonesia is also problematic. Sukarno was 
himself aware of the difficulty of deciding who might be indigenous and who a 
descendant of immigrants. The Chinese Indonesian magazine Mandarin Pos 
quotes a speech made by Sukarno before the Congress held by the Chinese 
Indonesian group Baperki3° in Jakarta in 1963. During the speech he states that 
"from time to time I ask myself, hey Sukarno, who is really an indigenous 
Indonesian? I don't know. Try, who can indicate those who are indigenous and 
those who are not? I don't know. Maybe I myself am two percent, five percent, ten 
percent Chinese" (Oei Hiem Hwie, 2001: 9). 
As I mentioned in the introduction, the ethnic Chinese have been arriving in 
Indonesia for centuries and have been inter-marrying with the local population 
perhaps since the fifth century. There is even a suggestion that it was a Chinese 
person - Zheng He - who introduced Islam to 
Indonesia (Lee, 1999: 233). 
Denys Lombard and Claudine Salmon mention Chinese Muslim communities, 
29 Pribumi and orang asli are the Indonesian language terms used. 
30 The Chinese Indonesian group Baperki, which was established in 1954 will be explored 
further in chapter four. 
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which had established themselves along the southern coast of China as early as 
the ninth century, and which participated in the Islamization of Java (Lombard and 
Salmon, 1994: 116). They also discuss collaboration between Chinese Muslim 
merchants and the Sultans of the archipelago. For example, John Jourdain passed 
through Banten (West Java) in 1614 and recounted that the Regent there had two 
or three Chinese Muslims as his principal advisers and assistants (Lombard and 
Salmon, 1994: 117). By the seventeenth century Lombard and Salmon describe 
Chinese Muslims who were "sufficiently desirous of participating in local 
administration to be converted [to Islam], take a vernacular title, and settle 
permanently in their host country" (Lombard and Salmon, 1994: 117). There is 
historical evidence from across the archipelago of Chinese Muslim marriages into 
elite families. It has even been chronicled that the founder of the first Javanese 
sultanate was a Chinese (Lombard and Salmon, 1994: 116). 
Lombard and Salmon also suggest that integration occurred at the lower levels of 
society. Numerous towns had a kampung Peranakan (local- born Chinese district) 
next to their Chinese kampung. According to reports from the nineteenth century, 
these Peranakan (local-born Chinese) "marry Javanese women; this results in 
mixed blood which become less so from generation to generation" (Lombard and 
Salmon, 1994: 120). These assimilations have tended to be forgotten. For 
example, Lombard and Salmon have traced the descendants of Han Siong Kong 
who was born in China in 1673 and who died in Java in 1744. Entire branches of 
the family have converted to Islam and have "assimilated into the surrounding 
Javanese society, to the point of forgetting their origin" (Lombard and Salmon, 
1994: 116). Politically, these connections have also been suppressed. The 
Javanese historian, Slamet Muljana, published a book in 1968 which explored 
Chinese participation in the Islamization of Java. However, this book was 
withdrawn from circulation in 1971 by order of the public prosecutor (Lombard 
and Salmon, 1994: 116). 31 
31 Lombard and Salmon do not suggest why this book was banned, however, I would surmise 
that the alleged communist coup attempt of 1965, in which, according to official propaganda, 
China and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were implicated, may have left the authorities 
feeling uneasy about any suggestions that much of the population might well 
have some 
Chinese blood. 
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Like the debate over "multiculturalism", scholars have begun to question the 
usefulness of the term "diaspora" which is ultimately essentialising and bounded. 
len Ang feels reticent about using the term "diaspora" at all because although it 
moves beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, it creates its own boundaries 
between the Chinese people, and everybody else (Ang, 2001: 16). Ang 
promulgates the idea of "hybridity" as a way of acknowledging the blurring of 
identities between people (Ang, 2001: 16). 32 She states that "centuries of global 
Chinese migrations have inevitably led to a blurring of the original limits of 'the 
Chinese': it is no longer possible to say with any certainty where the Chinese end 
and the non-Chinese begin" (Ang, 2001: 88). She calls on people to move away 
from essentialised concepts of Chineseness towards a more hybrid concept of 
identity. Ang urges the construction of "open-ended and plural `post-Chinese' 
identities... through investments in continuing cross-influences of diverse, lateral, 
unanticipated intercultural encounters in the world at large" (Ang, 2001: 50-51). 
According to Ang, hybridity is an important concept to hold onto because unlike 
other discourses of difference, such as, diaspora, and multiculturalism "it 
foregrounds complicated entanglement rather than identity, together-in-difference 
rather than virtual apartheid" (Ang, 2001: 3). 
Ang argues that Perranakan identity in Indonesia is a "thoroughly hybrid identity" 
(Ang, 2001: 27). Although I concur that objectively this is the case, the ethnic 
Chinese groups in this research do not tend to consider their identities as hybrid 
identities, as such. This is a confusing, but very interesting aspect of Indonesian 
identity. Although there has obviously been inter-mixing of ethnic groups, and 
Sukarno alluded to this when he questioned to what extent one could be 
considered indigenous, there are also distinct ethnic groups into which, according 
to the ethnicity of their father, people are placed. So, for example, in the census of 
32 Ang's ideas on "hybridity" stem from Homi Bhabha's writing on "culture's in between" 
(Bhabha, 1998: 29). Bhabha argues that the claim that national identity is a homogenous 
identity is a fiction. Influenced by Benedict Anderson's investigation of the ways through 
which nations are imagined and sustained, Bhabha states that "it is from those traditions of 
political thought and literary language that the nation emerges as a powerful historical idea in 
the west. An idea whose cultural compulsion lies in the impossible unity of the nation as a 
symbolic force" (Bhabha, 1990: 1). Bhabha celebrates the "quiet contamination" of dominant 
narratives by minority groups within the nation-state which leads to a "third space"; what len 
Ang describes as "the in-between space of hybridity" (Ang, 2001: 2). 
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2000, the first to ask a question about ethnicity, there was no opportunity to state 
one was a mixture of ethnicities. Instead, one had to write one ethnic group 
according to that of one's father. 
In the case of whether Chinese Indonesians should be considered part of a 
diaspora, I argue that at this point their in history they should not. Although 
Chinese Indonesians are included in the Chinese diaspora in the literature, they 
are trying to find a place for themselves within Indonesian society and are 
generally not actively engaged with Chinese groups outside Indonesia. This may 
change in the future, of course, as they have more access to internet technology 
and as they learn more about their Chinese heritage. 33 It may be more useful to the 
discussion of diaspora if the Chinese as a whole were not included, but those 
Chinese who are actively engaged with Chinese groups outsider their countries, or 
who have maintained links with China are included, and others, who do not have 
an active engagement with these activities, are not. This points to the fact that 
where the Chinese went and when they left China has had an important bearing on 
their identity, and on their behaviour towards their adopted country, as well as 
towards China. I will now turn to the literature on the Chinese outside China. 
Chinese Outside China 
Eighty percent of the Chinese who live outside China34 live in Southeast Asia 
(Wang, 1998c). As I mentioned in the introduction, by the late nineteenth century 
some Chinese communities had been established in Southeast Asia for centuries. 
These included the "Baba" Chinese in the British Straits Settlements, and the 
"Peranakan" in Java (Esman, 1986: 146-147). 
The difficulty for the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia to be accepted as part of the 
nation resembles the experiences of Chinese all over the world. The desire that the 
33 Only one of the group members I spoke with, and the only totok among them, Nurdin 
Purnomo, was actively engaged with Chinese groups outside Indonesia. As chairman of the 
Indonesian Hakka Association and chairman of the Federation of Asean Hakka's 
Association, he was involved in organising conventions and meetings of these groups. All the 
other groups, are engaged with developing links with groups within Indonesia and not with 
groups outside. 
34 This statistic comes from Wang Gungwu and he includes in his understanding of "China" 
all those who live outside the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
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nation should be as racially and culturally homogenous as possible was used as a 
reason to keep the Chinese out of the USA, Canada, and Australia in the 
nineteenth century (Ang, 2001: 77). In the USA it was felt that the Chinese did not 
fit in with the culture of American life and Chinese immigrants were not eligible 
for citizenship until 1952 (Stratton and Ang, 1998: 161 note 51). The policy in 
Australia was more explicitly based on race and it was not until the official 
introduction of multiculturalist policies and the liberalisation of the White 
Australia policy in the 1970s that restrictions on Chinese migration there were 
reduced (Stratton and Ang, 1998: 151). 
As I mentioned earlier, the waves of immigration which had continued to 
Southeast Asia from the sixteenth century caused gaps to emerge between the 
"old-timers" (laoke), and the "newcomers" (xinke) (Wickberg, 1998: 116). At first 
the migrants were mostly men who intermarried with the local population. Later 
on as more women went abroad the Chinese tended to marry within their own 
ethnic group, and so distinct Chinese communities developed in Southeast Asia. 
Robin Cohen cites 1911 as the point at which the traditional pattern of Chinese 
sojourning became more difficult to maintain. Chinese families were now two or 
three generations in Southeast Asia, and were gradually losing their close identity 
with China. Also, the emerging nationalism in former colonies was incompatible 
with the close political ties which had been in place between China and those 
Chinese overseas (Cohen, 1997: 89). Yen Ching-Hwang suggests that the rise of 
indigenous nationalism in some Southeast Asian countries was a reaction to the 
nationalism of the "overseas Chinese" which developed in the nineteenth century 
(Yen, 1995: 147-148). Before World War Two both types of nationalism co- 
existed. After the war, however, with the increased demands for independence 
from the indigenous nationalists, the Chinese faced a dilemma (Yen, 1995: 147- 
148). They had to decide whether to stay or whether to return to China; whether to 
assimilate into the new nation or whether to maintain their Chinese identity 
(Wang, 1999: 104). Robin Cohen outlines the problems felt by Malaysian Chinese 
at the time. On the one hand, if they continued with their tradition of sojourning, 
they were persecuted for not showing any commitment to the struggle for 
independence. On the other hand, if they did attempt to assimilate into Malaysian 
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society, they were considered a threat to the indigenous population (Cohen, 1997: 
90). 
Terminology 
In the following section I will question to usefulness of some of the terms used to 
describe the ethnic Chinese outside China. This section highlights the importance 
I place on the terms used to name people. I concur with Stuart Hall's assertion that 
identities are not things we are born with, rather they are "formed and transformed 
within and in relation to representation" (Hall, 1992: 292). Academics - both 
ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese scholars - are in a powerful position in relation 
to representing the ethnic Chinese. By using terminology such as "overseas 
Chinese", for example, scholars undermine attempts by ethnic Chinese to find an 
identity within the nations in which they have settled. In this thesis I argue that 
the Chinese Indonesian groups are trying to find a place for themselves within 
Indonesian national discourses, therefore, I question the appropriateness of this 
terminology both for the Chinese in Indonesia and elsewhere. 
The term "overseas Chinese" (huaqiao) is widely used in English language 
literature to describe the ethnic Chinese outside China. The term tends to be used 
unquestioningly in the literature on the ethnic Chinese in Europe, whereas in 
relation to Southeast Asia, where the Chinese have been settling for centuries, the 
term is more contested. 35 len Ang suggests that whereas "overseas Chinese" used 
to be the most commonly used English term to describe migrant Chinese groups, 
in the past decade or so the term "Chinese diaspora" has been used more 
frequently (Ang, 2001: 77). This shift from "overseas Chinese" to "diaspora" is 
very clearly evident in the change of title to Lynn Pan's book Sons of the Yellow 
Emperor. The first edition of the book, published in 1990, has the subtitle, The 
35 Flemming Christiansen uses the term "Overseas Chinese" in his recent book on the ethnic 
Chinese in Europe, Chinatown, Europe: An Exploration of Overseas Chinese Identit}" in the 
1990s (2003) and it is also widely used in Gregor Benton and Frank Pieke (ed. ) (1998) The 
Chinese in Europe. 
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Story of the Overseas Chinese, whereas, the second edition, published in 1994, 
has the subtitle, A History of the Chinese Diaspora. 36 
Yen Ching-Hwang and Wang Gungwu have argued that the term "overseas 
Chinese" describes a particular period in their history: those who "sojourned" 
outside China prior to the mid-twentieth century and maintained strong links with 
China. In China and the Chinese Overseas (1991) Wang Gung,, wwu argues against 
the general use of the word huaqiao to describe all ethnic Chinese. He explores 
the historical use of the terminology and suggests that the dominant pattern of 
Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia from at least the nineteenth century 'was 
the huashang (the trader) mode. Wang contrasts this to the huaqiao pattern which 
he suggests became more common between 1900 and the 1950s. Instead of using 
huaqiao as a general term to describe the Chinese outside China, he argues that 
the term was introduced at a particular historical point to unite the Chinese in 
Southeast Asia in support of the nationalist ideology emerging in China at the end 
of the nineteenth century. Instead of describing groups of Chinese according to the 
place within China from whence they came (for example Min Guangr-en to 
describe people from Guangdong), the term huaqiao was used to instil in the 
people a sense of loyalty towards China as a whole (Duara, 1997: 41-42). Wang 
Gungwu argues that the term huaqiao should now refer to Chinese nationals 
(including those from the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong) who have left their native 
place to live abroad, but who have not become citizens of their new place of 
abode (Wang, 1998b: 16-17). He uses huaren (ethnic Chinese), to refer to people 
of Chinese descent who have foreign nationality or permanent residence rights 
outside China (Wang, 1998b: 16-17). 
Wang argues that the difficulty in using appropriate terminology is a result of the 
"upgrading of migrants". He suggests that the most successful "upgrading" in 
Southeast Asia has been in Thailand. There the former Chinese migrants have 
been integrated into society to such an extent that the term huaren may no longer 
be applicable (Wang, 1998b: 25). In Indonesia, Wang argues, the upgrading has 
36 Not only is it interesting that "Overseas Chinese" has become "Chinese Diaspora", it is 
also interesting that the phrase "The Story" has become "A History". The author seems to 
be 
accepting that there are many versions of the Chinese experience outside China. Lynn 
Pan 
does not comment of this change of title in the afterword she wrote for the new edition. 
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been incomplete. He suggests that "the government is conscious of the ethnic 
Chinese who still think of themselves as Huaren, and the majority of them are 
normally limited to commercial activities and certain technical professions" 
(Wang, 1998b: 25). Wang Gungwu also criticises the terminology used by the 
sending country, particularly the People's Republic of China, which tends to use 
the term Huaqiao-Huaren to describe ethnic Chinese who reside outside China. 
He suggests that this is too ambiguous and fails to take into account the variations 
among ethnic Chinese (Wang, 1998b: 26). In the end Wang propounds that as the 
ethnic Chinese become more involved in the national politics of the country in 
which they have settled, the sooner the concept of huaren will lose its resonance 
(Wang, 1998b: 28). 
As I mentioned, Yen Ching-Hwang also considers the term "overseas Chinese" to 
refer to those who left China during the first half of the twentieth century 
(including those who went to Hong Kong and Macao). 37 These people maintained 
strong links with China, and hoped to return at some stage in the future. After the 
Second World War, however, many Chinese residing in Southeast Asia adopted the 
citizenship of these new nations and, thus, changed from being "overseas Chinese 
" (huaqiao) to "ethnic Chinese" (huaren) (Yen, 1995: ix). 
Paul Bolt uses the term "Chinese overseas" which he claims avoids the problems 
of using the historical and political "overseas Chinese" (Bolt, 1996: x). However, 
as he points out, this term, "Chinese overseas", is not without difficulties. For 
example, it may imply that the Chinese who are citizens of countries other than 
China are not really "home". He also suggests that the word "Chinese" implies a 
homogeneity when in fact these are diverse groups of people (Bolt, 1996: x). 
Ch'ang-yung Ku rejects this narrow interpretation of the term huaqiao and argues 
that it refers to people who are ethnically and culturally Chinese. He also points to 
the confusion of the English term "overseas Chinese" because it can mean both 
huaqiao and huar-en (cited in Bolt, 1996: 118). 
37 Note that Yen Ching-Hwang suggests that those Chinese who went to Hong Kong were 
considered "overseas Chinese" while Wang Gungwu argues that Chinese who left Hong 
Kong to reside elsewhere were "overseas Chinese". 
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Lynn Pan also differs with Wang and Yen in her use of the phrase "overseas 
Chinese". She uses it to describe most Chinese in Southeast Asia - people who 
are Chinese by descent, but who hold the citizenship of their new countries. She 
calls these people "hyphenated" Chinese. They are "Chinese by descent but [their] 
non-Chinese citizenship and political allegiance collapse ancestral loyalties" (Pan, 
1998: 15). Pan distinguishes this type of Chinese from others who have been 
assimilated, either through marriage or otherwise, into a different culture and 
cease to call themselves Chinese. Pan suggests that people who have assimilated 
into the host culture may choose to call themselves Chinese at some point in the 
future (Pan, 1998: 15). For example, the babas in Malaya were highly integrated 
into Malay culture, but in the twentieth century, in the communal environment of 
Malaysia, they reasserted their Chinese identity once again, joining Chinese 
political parties and social groups. (Wickberg, 1998: 116). 
len Ang explores in detail the definitions presented by Lynn Pan. Ang explains 
that between those "hyphenated" Chinese and those who are considered to have 
assimilated "is the nebulous and fuzzy border zone where the Chinese/non- 
Chinese boundary is decidedly up for grabs, indeterminate and unsettled" (Ang, 
2001: 86). Ang suggests that anybody interested in the ethnic Chinese should be 
exploring this porous border area between Chinese and non-Chinese because in 
this era of globalisation it is this area which will become more crowded and gain 
in significance (Ang, 2001: 87). 
Adding to the confusion over the appropriate terms to use for ethnic Chinese outside 
China, terms have also been coined in the many countries where they have settled. For 
example, the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia are called baba. This term, baba, and the 
term peranakan which is widely used in Indonesia, refer to ethnic Chinese who have 
intermarried with the indigenous population and lost much of their Chinese identity 
(Lee, 1997: 83). Peranakan Chinese are those who have been in Indonesia for a 
number of generations, who no longer speak Chinese and have integrated into their 
Indonesian community. 
Interestingly, these terms emphasise more explicitly the national orientation of 
these ethnic Chinese groups towards the countries in which they have settled and 
do not emphasise the links back to China as much as the English and Chinese 
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language words. Those who do have strong links with China - who are first 
generation Chinese or maintain Chinese cultural activities - are called totok in 
Indonesia and so are distinguished from the more culturally Indonesian 
peranakan. In Burma the ethnic Chinese are known either as Letshe (long sleeve) 
or Leto (short sleeve) depending on their occupations. Letshe refers to w'. white- 
collar workers such as bankers or traders, Leto refers to blue-collar workers such 
as farmers, or coolies (Than, 1997: 117). In the Philippines they are called Tsinoy 
a shortened version of Tsinong Pinoy (Chinese Filipino) (See, 1997: 177). 
In Indonesia the term Chinese Indonesians generally use to describe themselves is 
Tionghoa. Most ethnic Chinese I spoke to preferred this term to the term Cilia 
which was used during the New Order. They considered Cilia to be a term of 
abuse which associated them too closely with China. According to Filomeno 
Aguilar, Tionghoa was commonly used in the Dutch East Indies by the 1910s. In 
China the term Zhonghua was not widely used until the 1930s. Aguilar concludes 
that the term Tionghoa can be said to have a distinctly Indies/Indonesian history 
(Aguilar, 2001: 511). The belief that the word Tionghoa describes the ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia and not those in other countries outside China is a view 
prevalent among ethnic Chinese I interviewed and is a term they commonly use to 
describe themselves. In other words, by using the term Tionghoa rather than Circa 
the Chinese in Indonesia are associating themselves more closely with Indonesia. 
As I have shown here, the terminology used to describe the ethnic Chinese outside 
China to varying degrees emphasise the "Chineseness" of the person and a 
perceived link with China. Charles Hirshman appeals that the ethnic Chinese in 
Southeast Asia today should be understood as minority groups who happen to be 
Chinese, rather than as Chinese who happen to live outside China (Hirshman, 
1988: 30). I agree with this sentiment and in this research I will not use the term 
"overseas Chinese" to describe the people I interviewed in Indonesia. They do not 
use that term and they do not consider themselves to be Chinese overseas, rather 
they see themselves as Indonesians of Chinese origin. I will use the terms 
"Chinese Indonesian" or "ethnic Chinese" instead. Again, I am interested in their 
articulations of their identities rather than what categories theorists say they fit 
into. Although the people in the organisations I have investigated consider 
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themselves to be Indonesian, they also maintain an identity as Chinese, therefore, 
the next section will explore what kinds of characteristics it might be necessary to 
have in order to be Chinese. 
Being Chinese 
Large-scale migration by ethnic Chinese to Southeast Asia had more-or-less 
ceased by the early 1930s, after which, according to Benton and Gomez, the 
ethnic Chinese began to identify with the countries in which they had settled 
(Benton and Gomez, 2001: 18). If this is the case, then why do they still consider 
themselves, and why are they still considered by others, to be Chinese? As 
mentioned above, the ethnic Chinese suffered discrimination in many countries in 
which they settled. Tu Wei-ming acknowledges that it is precisely this 
discrimination towards them and restrictions on them that have played a role in 
ensuring that they hold on to a sense of their Chineseness. For example, in 
relation to the Philippines, Tu suggests that a policy of restricting certain 
occupations to citizens and making it difficult for Chinese to become citizens, has 
made assimilation problematic (Tu, 1994: 20). len Ang recounts the experience of 
William Yang who had "a... harsh coming into awareness of his own, unchosen 
minority status" (Ang, 2001: 37). Yang, who grew up in a small mining town in 
Australia, was jeered at and taunted by a child at school who said he was Chinese. 
Yang had no idea what the child meant and returned home to ask his mother if it 
was true that he was Chinese (Ang, 2001: 37). Both of these examples resonate 
with the experiences of Chinese Indonesians. There were reports from people I 
spoke to in Indonesia that during the violence of 1998 school children, who had 
no knowledge that they were ethnic Chinese, had similar experiences to William 
Yang. 
The extent to which particular objective traits are necessary in order to be Chinese 
is contested in the academic literature. Some scholars have argued that certain 
characteristics and cultural practices are an important part of being Chinese. Lynn 
Pan, for example, suggests that "[t]he possession of [an] ancestral language is the 
supreme mark of being Chinese, imparting as it does a sense of unbroken 
continuity with the earliest years of Chinese history" (Pan, 1991: 248). She has 
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said that if one does not have sufficient command of Chinese to understand Tang 
poetry, one would not be able to appreciate what it means to be Chinese (Khanna, 
1995). David Yen-Ho Wu indicates two sentiments which identify a person as 
Chinese - culture and race. Wu suggests that "overseas Chinese (regardless of 
racial mixture) remain Chinese in the fullest sense as long as they are able to 
claim a Chinese male ancestor, a homeplace in China from where this ancestor 
supposedly emigrated, and observe some manner of cultural practices" (Wu. 1994: 
152). 
Running through this literature there has been an assumption that ethnic Chinese 
outside China feel the pull of their "homeland". Tu Wei Ming suggests that "the 
push of local conditions as well as the pull of the homeland impels the Chinese to 
become unassimilable" (Tu, 1994: 20). China is also central to Lynn Pan's 
representation of who is Chinese. A pictorial representation of different categories 
of Chinese in The Encyclopedia of Chinese Overseas, which she edited, shows 
that the closer one associates with China the more Chinese one is, until one 
reaches the outer limits of being Chinese (furthest away from China on the 
diagram) and becomes assimilated (Pan, 1998: 14). 
Recent scholarship tends to be more nuanced. Increasingly scholars are 
concluding that China no longer sits at the top of a scale of what is considered to 
be authentically Chinese. Benton and Gomez argue that "`Chineseness' is no set 
edifice or residue of some ancestral culture that can be preserved against erosion 
or rescued from decay but the outcome of a process of struggle and negotiation" 
(Benton and Gomez, 2001: 28). Tan Chee-Beng has criticised Peter Gosling for 
suggesting that the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia "have become increasingly 
Southeast Asian rather than `Chinese"'. That they will have appropriated a more 
Southeast Asian approach is true, but, Tan Chee-Beng criticises the tendency 
among scholars to compare the Chinese in Southeast Asia to "an invisible static 
model of `traditional' Chinese identity" (Tan, 1988: 157-158). He argues that 
ultimately it is the consciousness of being Chinese which counts and not some 
material and cultural features (Tan, 1988: 139). Ariel Heryanto also asserts that 
"Chineseness is not - and has never been -a quantitative substance or 
immutable essence that can be said to be either present or absent. He attempts to 
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go beyond the question of whether Chineseness "as some sort of 'thing' frozen in 
time" has survived or not (Heryanto, 1998: 110). 
Some scholars are also moving their focus away from links with China and 
towards the idea of ethnic Chinese "growing roots where they land" (luodi 
shenggen) (Wang, 1998: vii). This was the theme of the International Conference 
on Chinese Overseas, held in San Francisco in 1992. The luodi shenggen concept 
was compared to the luodi guigen (return to their roots) paradigm which was 
common among earlier migrants from China (Wang, 1998a: x). Tan Chee Beng 
does not accept that there is a "global Chinese identity". Instead, he suggests that 
the increased communication between Chinese in different countries highlights 
their diversity rather than their similarities (Tan, 1998: 44). Tan stresses the need 
to distinguish culture from ethnicity. He also makes the very important point that 
there needs to be a distinction between an identification with Chinese culture and 
genuinely felt identification among ethnic Chinese with the nations they have 
settled in (Tan, 1998: 44). 
Tu Wei-ming's edited volume The Living Tree was an attempt to decentre China 
from what it means to be Chinese (Tu, 1994: vi-vii). Tu discusses the concept of 
"cultural China" (wenhua Zhonghoa) which he suggests consists of "three 
symbolic universes". Firstly, those societies populated predominantly by "cultural 
and ethnic Chinese", the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Secondly, 
those countries in which there is a significant Chinese minority. Thirdly, people 
such as scholars, journalists, writers and traders "who try to understand China 
intellectually and bring their own conceptions of China to their own linguistic 
communities" (Tu, 1994: 13-14). Tu wishes to "explore the fluidity of 
Chineseness as a layered and contested discourse" and in the process moves the 
cultural centre of what it means to be Chinese away from China towards "cultural 
China" (Tu, 1994: viii). len Ang argues that this movement away from China 
towards a "cultural China" is yet another centring, another homogenization (Ang, 
2001: 42-43). She states that "the metaphor of the living tree is by no means 
ideologically innocent" because everything flows back to the roots, that is, 
everything still flows back to China (Ang, 2001: 44-45). 
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The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are a good example of the difficulties involved in 
defining who constitutes a "Chinese" person. On the one hand some people are 
considered to be Chinese although they no longer speak a Chinese dialect, and no 
longer have a Chinese name. There are also ethnic Chinese people «who no longer 
consider themselves to be Chinese but who are treated as Chinese by, other 
Indonesians. Charles Coppel defines Chinese in Indonesia as: 
persons of Chinese ancestry who either function as members of, and 
identify with, Chinese society or are regarded as Chinese by indigenous 
Indonesians (at least in some circumstances) and given special 
treatment as a consequence... such a definition includes a number of 
people who regard themselves as Indonesians and have refused to align 
themselves in any sense with Chinese society, but whose ancestry (or 
Chinese physical appearance) has been treated as socially and 
politically significant or relevant (Coppel, 1983: 5). 
Leo Suryadinata provides an ascriptive definition of Chineseness suggesting that a 
person in Southeast Asia is Chinese if the indigenous population considers them 
Chinese (Suryadinata, 1998c: 50). len Ang, herself born into a Chinese-Indonesian 
family, has pointed out that even though the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia tend no 
longer to speak Chinese or have any links with China, they still consider 
themselves to be Chinese. In relation to her own Chineseness she says that "there 
is an instinctiveness to our (s ometimes reluctant) identification as `Chinese' 
which eludes any rationalization and defies any doubt" (Ang, 2001: 47). 
As I mentioned in the introduction, "ethnicity" tends to be widely accepted as a 
fixed, given identity, even among the academic elite (Heryanto, 1998: 95). This is 
also the case among the ethnic Chinese groups I have investigated here. In the 
Western academic literature scholars have been moving away from this primordial 
understanding of ethnicity. I sympathise with those scholars such as Stuart Hall 
and Etienne Balibar who discuss ethnicity as "plastic and malleable social 
constructions" (Smith, 1998: 204). Ethnicity in my understanding is a social and 
political construct. It is a discourse as national identity is a discourse. Stuart Hall 
makes this link with discourse when he states that: "[t]he term ethnicity 
acknowledges the place of history, language and culture in the construction of 
subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all discourse is placed, 
positioned, situated, and all knowledge is contextual" (Hall, 1996: 446). However, 
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the Chinese Indonesians I interviewed identify themselves as primordiallvv 
Chinese. Even though they do not speak a Chinese language, or have links with 
China, many of them feel Chinese because they have Chinese ancestors. I will 
return to their understanding of their Chineseness when I analyse my empirical 
data in chapters six, seven and eight. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated some of the concepts which have begun to question 
the value of trying to maintain a homogenous nation. The world is a place of 
movement and flux with people settling away from the nations they were born in 
and keeping in touch with the nations they have left. Multiculturalism insists on 
the acknowledgement of ethnic and cultural diversity within the nation, however, 
there are fears that this kind of recognition locks people into identities and does 
not take account of the informal ways in which cultures and identities change 
through contact with others. Diaspora is also in the end a bounded and internally 
homogenising identity. As Indonesian scholars point out, however, the 
primordialness of ethnic identities in Indonesia tends not be questioned, therefore, 
Indonesia is perceived by the people who live there as a multi-cultural, multi- 
ethnic country where each person has a primordial ethnic identity. 
The multicultural debate raises interesting questions about how a multi-ethnic 
society should be managed in order for it to be a fair place for all ethnic groups. 
The groups I spoke with have organised themselves along ethnic lines, and have 
raised some of the questions Kymlicka raises about language teaching and 
political organisation. However, unlike the societies which Kymlicka writes about, 
such as Canada, Australia and European societies, the Chinese in Indonesia are 
not calling for special treatment as such. They are asking for the same treatment 
as other ethnic groups in Indonesia. 
As to whether the Chinese group members I spoke with are part of a Chinese 
diaspora, on the whole I argue that they are not actively part of a diaspora, even 
though they tend to be considered part of a Chinese diaspora in the existing 
literature. Despite their lack of connections with China and their lack of Chinese 
language skills, however, they do believe themselves to be Chinese. Like the 
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groups engaged in making websites such as tsinoy. com and dinisum. co. uk, the 
ethnic Chinese groups accept their Chinese identity, but also wish to find a place 
for themselves within the nation in which they have settled. 
Having discussed literature which is relevant to an analysis of Chinese Indonesian 
articulations of their identities in post-Suharto Indonesia, I will continue to 
underpin my argument that although the Chinese groups which developed after 
1998 are promoting themselves as Chinese, they are also trying to find a place for 
themselves within Indonesian national discourses. The following two chapters 
provide an historical analysis which underlines the difficulties which the Chinese 
groups face in their activities and will also show that Chinese Indonesians have 
been trying to find a place for themselves within the nation since it was declared 
in 1945. 
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Chapter 4 
Colonial Times to the New Order 
By providing an historical overview of nationalist discourses in Indonesia this 
chapter and the following one will allow me to contextualise the arguments of the 
ethnic Chinese groups. As mentioned in chapter one, discourse is situated within 
an historical and social context, therefore, the following two chapters will provide 
an historical context for the analysis in the later chapters. Another important 
reason for the inclusion of this historical background is that during my interviews 
with Chinese Indonesians most of the interviewees stated that colonial policy and 
New Order policy in particular promulgated discourses that excluded them from 
becoming fully accepted Indonesians. Chapter four will discuss the period up to 
the end of the New Order in 1998. The dramatic events of 1998 will be discussed 
in chapter five. 
Late Colonial Indonesia 
The Ethnic Chinese in Colonial Tinzes 
By the time Indonesia declared its independence in 1945 the ethnic Chinese were 
a minority who were apart from the rest of the population. There had been 
violence towards them during the colonial period. The earliest cited attacks 
against them were in 1740 when Chinese revolted against Dutch authority in and 
around Jakarta and were met by fierce resistance both from the Dutch and later 
from local rulers in the area (Somers Heidhues, 1999: 152). Daniel Lev argues 
that this speeded up the process of categorising the ethnic Chinese as a "minority" 
(Lev, 2000: 1-2). He explains that Chinese who were arriving in Indonesia long 
before the Dutch, were not considered particularly strange or dangerous, however, 
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Dutch policy towards them ensured that they were singled out for special 
attention. Dutch policy also highlighted the ambivalent position of the ethnic 
Chinese which to some extent has continued to this day. In relation to commercial 
practices the ethnic Chinese were treated under Dutch East Indies law as other 
western traders were. However, in relation to the criminal law they were treated as 
"indigenous" Indonesians (Lev, 2000: 4). 
According to Benedict Anderson there were three "fundamental forces" which led 
to a change in the process of gradual assimilation of Chinese into their respective 
societies in South East Asia. Firstly, the policies of the colonial powers eventually 
led to Chinese segregation from the rest of the population (Anderson, 1998: 13- 
14). Between 1677 and 1777 the Dutch East Indies Company extended its political 
and economic domination over Java and the colonials used the ethnic Chinese to 
collect taxes from the indigenous population, and to run the colonial enterprises. 
As mentioned above, in some legal areas the Chinese enjoyed a higher status than 
the indigenous population, they lived in segregated areas, and their children 
attended Chinese-language schools. The Dutch also forced them to wear the 
Manchu queue and dress in traditional Chinese clothing (Schwarz, 1999: 102). 
According to Mary Somers Heidhues, unlike in the Philippines, where the ethnic 
Chinese were treated as a "special kind of native" by the Spanish colonials, in the 
Dutch East Indies they were treated as a "special kind of Chinese" (cited in 
Aguilar, 2001: 506). 
The second reason why Chinese assimilation into the indigenous populations of 
Southeast Asia halted was the Taiping rebellion (1850-64) which led to the loss of 
Qing control of the southern coast of China. This, along with the advent of the 
steamship, and a shortage of labour in Southeast Asia, led to unprecedented levels 
of migration (Anderson, 1998: 14). Finally there was an upsurge in Chinese 
nationalism at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1877 the first Chinese 
consulate was established in Singapore. By the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911, 
46 consulates had been established around the world. These consulates sold 
honours and titles to the ethnic Chinese outside China and also recruited support 
for China's economic development among the Southeast Asian Chinese (Zhuang, 
1998: 99). Between 1900 and 1911 the constitutional monarchists, led by Kan- 
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Youwei, and the Republicans led by Sun Yatsen, also tried to garner support from 
the Southeast Asian Chinese for their vision of the future of China (Duara, 1997. 
39-40). The Chinese in Indonesia, and in Southeast Asia generally, had been 
divided by speech groups, by native place in China, and by trade and occupational 
group (Pan, 1998: 76-77). The reformers and the Qing government were trying to 
transform these fluid identities into a fixed sense of Chineseness which also 
hardened the boundaries between Chinese and non-Chinese (Duara, 1997: 40-41). 
Along with this activity among the ethnic Chinese, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century they also had to contend with the nascent nationalism of the 
Indies population. The following section will outline these early nationalist 
discourses. 
Early Nationalist Discourses 
Budi Utomo (Pure Endeavour), which was established between 1906 and 1908, 
was one of the earliest nationalist organisations in Indonesia (Kahin, 1952: 64- 
65). This was a student organisation which began at Stovia (The School for the 
Training of Indonesian Doctors), the first higher education institute in the East 
Indies (Suryadinata, 1998a: 50-51). Budi Utomo called for the development of 
traditional as well as Western education among the people, the improvement of 
agriculture, industry and commerce and "everything that will guarantee them the 
life of a dignified people" (L. M. Sitorus cited in Kahin, 1952: 65). 38 By the end of 
1909 Budi Utomo had about 10,000 members (Kahin, 1952: 65). However, the 
organisation had been taken over by priyavis (members of the Javanese official 
class) and non-student members quickly outnumbered students. This has led some 
to suggest that the first nationalist youth movement was the Tri Koro Dharmo 
(Three Noble Objectives) which was founded in March 1915 and which later 
changed its name to Jong Java (Young Java) (Suryadinata, 1998a: 51). 
At first these organisations were cultural rather than overtly political. Jong Java, 
for example, promoted Javanese music and dancing (Suryadinata, 1998a: 52-53). 
Also, they reflected Javanese rather than Indonesian nationalism (Suryadinata, 
38 L. M. Sitorus (1947) Sejarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia (History of the Indonesian 
Nationalist Movement), Jakarta, pp. 10-1 1. 
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1998a: 71-72). Although there were non-Javanese students at Stovia. none of them 
were involved with Budi Utomo (Suryadinata, 1998a: 51). Jong Java did not 
admit non-Javanese until three years after it was established. 39 Indeed, other 
regions, influenced by Jong Java, established youth organisations: Jong Sumatran 
Bond (Young Sumatran Association) was founded in December 1917 in Jakarta, 
and Jong Minahasa, Jong Ambon and Jong Celebes followed (Suryadinata, 1998a: 
52). 
Ethnic Chinese did not tend to get involved in these organisations. Mary Somers 
Heidhues has pointed out that the nationalist movements of this period 
emphasised racial differences and encouraged competition between ethnic Chinese 
and non-Chinese (Somers Heidhues, 1999: 184). Sar-ekat Islam was one such 
nationalist movement. It grew out of Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trading 
Association) which was formed in order to protect "indigenous" traders from 
Chinese business successes which were harming their businesses, particularly in 
the batik and kretek cigarette industries (Somers Heidhues, 1999: 154-155). 
Boycotts of Chinese goods were organised and in 1912 there were riots against the 
ethnic Chinese in Surakarta and Surabaya (Kahin, 1952: 67). Religious differences 
were also emphasised by this nationalist organisation. George Kahin argues that 
Sarekat Islam "was seen by Indonesians in general, regardless of their economic 
function, as a symbol of religious - and thereby of Indonesian - unity against 
foreigners, at first especially Chinese" (Kahin, 1952: 67). Lynn Pan argues that 
perhaps there was more hostility between the ethnic Chinese and indigenous 
groups in Indonesia than anywhere else in Southeast Asia because unlike other 
countries, there was more commercial competition between indigenous and non- 
indigenous in Indonesia (Pan, 1991: 215). 
By 1919 Sarekat Islam had a membership of two and a half million people and its 
aim was complete independence of Indonesia, by force if necessary (Kahin, 1952: 
66). The Dutch authorities decided against an outright ban on the organisation, 
reasoning that due to the large membership, a huge backlash might ensue. 
However, they felt they needed to do something to quell the rising demands for 
39 The Sundanese share the island of Java with the Javanese. 
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independence. In March 1914 an act was passed which conferred legal status on 
some branches of Sarekat Islam, but official status was refused to the organisation 
as a whole. This move made it very difficult for Sarekat Islam to develop in a co- 
ordinated manner and it seriously weakened the organisation (Kahin, 1952: 69- 
70). 
Although Sarekat Islam was the largest nationalist organisation at this time, other 
influential organisations were also established. In 1912 the Indische Partij 
(Indonesian Party) was formed. It had "an embryonic concept of an Indonesian 
nation (Indische natie)" (Suryadinata, 1998a: 71-72). The party's motto was "the 
Indies for those who make their home there" (Kahin, 1952: 70). The aim of the 
Indische Partij was to "create a free nation" made up of people who considered 
the Dutch East Indies to be their motherland, regardless of their ethnic origin. The 
membership of the party was small and its leadership was predominantly Eurasian 
with a few Javanese intellectuals: as a result its influence in the East Indies itself 
was negligible. However, their ideas influenced East Indies students in Holland, 
who would return in the 1920s and take the lead in the anti-colonial movement 
(Suryadinata, 1998a: 71-72). Outstanding among these leaders was Sukarno who 
in 1927 established the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), and became the first 
president of Indonesia in 1950. 
The Japanese occupied Indonesia from 1942 until 1945. In their efforts to win 
support from the Indonesians for their war effort, the Japanese unwittingly aided 
the nationalists in their struggle for independence, and more inhabitants of the 
East Indies became aware of nationalist ideas (Simone & Feraru, 1995: 71). The 
Japanese permitted the Indonesian national anthem Indonesia Rava (Great 
Indonesia) to be sung, and the national flag to be flown (Suryadinata, 1998a: 76)40 
They also established a unified educational system; Indonesian schools replaced 
Dutch schools, Bahasa Indonesia became the common language and they trained 
40 The flag consists of two equally sized horizontal stripes, the top one red and the bottom 
one white. 
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an Indonesian military force, the Peta (Volunteer Army of Defenders of the 
Fatherland)". 
In order to enlist the support of the prominent nationalist leaders for their war 
effort, including Sukarno and his future vice-President Mohammad Hatta, the 
Japanese promised that self-government would ultimately be granted (Kahin, 
1952: 106). The Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian 
Independence was established in 1945. The Committee comprised of an elite 
group of mostly secular nationalists. They drafted a constitution during the closing 
months of Japanese occupation. This 1945 constitution was a short, vague 
document which provided for a strong president and a weak legislature (Masters, 
1999). 
Independence and the Status of the Ethnic Chinese 
After the end of the Second World War, the Indonesians had to fight against Dutch 
attempts to re-control their colonial territories and finally won independence in 
1949. In relation to the Chinese, it was decided that any Chinese person who was 
born in Indonesia automatically became a citizen of the new nation after 
independence, so long as they did not reject Indonesian citizenship and actively 
opt for Chinese citizenship. Leo Suryadinata suggests that the young republic was 
weak and desperately needed the support of the economically powerful Chinese 
community (Suryadinata, 1998a: 96). According to James Mackie and Charles 
Coppel, this automatic acceptance of the ethnic Chinese as citizens raised doubts 
in the mind of indigenous Indonesians about the loyalty of the Chinese (Mackie 
and Coppel, 1976: 10). In fact, from 1949 to 1950, under new regulations, a large 
number of ethnic Chinese did reject Indonesian citizenship. At this time, Mao 
Zedong's victory in China reinvigorated a pride in feelings of being Chinese 
(Mackie and Coppel, 1976: 10). Approximately 40 percent of ethnic Chinese 
(600,000-700,000 people) rejected their Indonesian citizenship and another 
million Chinese were foreign-born, so were automatically excluded as Indonesian 
a' Peta is an abbreviation for Pembela Tanah Air. This is the force which fought the Dutch 
when they attempted to restore colonial rule in 1945. 
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nationals (Aguilar, 2001: 515). This was a great worry to the Indonesian 
authorities. 
Even those who had not opted for Chinese citizenship were a worry because they 
still had dual nationality of China and Indonesia because under the Chinese 
principle of jus sanguinis every child of an ethnic Chinese parent was a citizen of 
China, regardless of their birthplace (Mackie and Coppel, 1976: 9). A process to 
end dual nationality was begun at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 
1955. Present at this ceremony were the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Zhou Enlai, and his Indonesian counterpart, Sunarjo. The treaty was ratified in 
1960 and over a two year period from 1960 to 1962, anybody who had dual 
citizenship had to declare in a court of law whether they opted for Chinese or 
Indonesian citizenship (Tan, 1997: 33). Official Indonesian sources estimate that 
65 percent of the approximately 1 million with dual nationality opted for 
Indonesian citizenship (Tan, 1997: 35). 
During the 1950s action had been taken to curtail the activities of the "alien" 
Chinese on the archipelago, that is, those Chinese who did not have Indonesian 
citizenship. This may explain why so many took up Indonesian citizenship when 
the opportunity arose in 1960. Actually, Charles Coppel suggests that although 
these policies were aimed at alien Chinese, not those who were citizens, the 
intention was to advance indigenous Indonesians rather than Indonesian citizens 
generally (Coppel, 1983: 105). In order to try to improve the economic position of 
the indigenous entrepreneurs the "Benteng system" was introduced in 1950. Under 
this system only indigenous Indonesians were given licenses to import certain 
goods. This system ended in 1954 with no obvious success, mainly due to 
continuing inflation, the inexperience of indigenous businessmen and the 
activities of ethnic Chinese silent partners who continued to run the businesses 
(Suryadinata, 1992: 132). There were also attempts to "indigenise" the rice mills 
and harbour facilities, however, these did not lead to widespread improvements 
for the indigenous population either (Suryadinata, 1992: 132-133). During the 
transition to Guided Democracy and the Guided Democracy period itself, 
discrimination in the economic sector was aimed specifically at alien Chinese 
rather than all ethnic Chinese. A head tax was imposed on aliens in 1957, and in 
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1959 Presidential Decree No-10 refused permission to alien Chinese to pursue 
retail trade in rural areas. 42 This caused an exodus of over 100,000 Chinese to 
China and caused huge disruption to the national economy, since indigenous 
businessmen were not equipped to take over so quickly from the alien Chinese 
(Coppel, 1983: 37). 
The People's Republic of China viewed Indonesia as an important ally and kept a 
close eye on how the ethnic Chinese there were treated. The Chinese government 
was very disappointed by Sukarno's actions in 1959 when he banned retail in 
villages carried out by "alien Chinese". As a result, they launched a campaign to 
invite the Chinese in Indonesia to return "home" to China. A statement made by 
one Chinese official stated that "[w]e want none of our dear ones to suffer in 
foreign lands and it is our hope that they will all come back to the arms of the 
motherland" (Pan, 1991: 216-217). Continued attention from China, and the 
increasing power of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) put the Chinese 
Indonesians in a very vulnerable position "since it made them seem ever more like 
Fifth Columnists" (Pan, 1991: 218). 
Those Chinese who did opt for Indonesian citizenship still found that they were 
not accepted fully into Indonesian society. The ethnic Chinese protected 
themselves from discrimination by bribing underpaid officials which merely 
served to reinforce stereotypes of Chinese behaviour among the indigenous 
population. There was also the continuing suspicion that they simply chose 
Indonesian citizenship because they felt it best served their interests, not because 
they felt any loyalty to Indonesia (Mackie and Coppel, 1976: 11-12). The issue of 
ethnic Chinese citizenship status and loyalty to Indonesia has been a constant 
theme in Indonesia since independence. In 1962 the issue was settled temporarily 
with those who chose Indonesian citizenship gaining legal status. Although this 
gave them some legal redress if they were discriminated against, with the 
administrative and economic chaos leading up to the more authoritarian Guided 
42 This limit on retail trade in rural areas is called PP10. The retail ban caused difficulties 
during the discussions with the Chinese government to end dual nationality and caused 
implementation of the treaty to be delayed until 1960 (Coppel and Mackie, 1976: 11). 
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Democracy period (1959-65), unofficial forms of discrimination were common 
(Mackie and Coppel, 1976: 11). 43 
As well as attempts to improve the position of indigenous Indonesians in the 
economic field, there were also attempts to decrease the influence of Chinese 
culture in Indonesian society. In 1957, in an attempt to reduce the numbers 
studying in Chinese-medium schools, it became illegal for Indonesian citizens to 
attend "alien schools" (Coppel, 1983: 36-37). Leo Suryadinata notes that there 
were 2,000 Chinese-medium schools with 425,000 students of whom 250,000 
were Indonesian citizens. By July 1958 there were 850 Chinese-medium schools 
whose 150,000 pupils were all alien Chinese (Suryadinata, 1992: 151). There were 
also attempts to reduce the Chinese language media. In 1958, the Commander-in- 
Chief of the army, Nasution, decreed that all newspapers with a script other than 
Latin or Arabic should be shut down. This was later modified, however, when it 
was decided that there was still a need for Chinese language newspapers to inform 
people about government policies and regulations (Suryadinata, 1992: 159). 
Despite these government attempts to remove visible signs of Chineseness from 
Indonesian society, ethnic Chinese citizens found a voice for themselves in 
political and cultural debates of the time. There were two main schools of thought 
among the ethnic Chinese during the Old Order - assimilationist and 
integrationist (Coppel, 1976: 44). The themes which were argued over and 
discussed by these two political streams have parallels with those discussed in the 
groups established after 1998. For example, there was disagreement in the 1950s 
and 1960s about whether Chinese Indonesians should completely assimilate into 
Indonesian society, or whether they should maintain their cultural distinctiveness. 
They also disagreed about whether Chinese Indonesians should join mainstream 
political parties, or whether they should form their own party to defend their 
interests and how ethnic Chinese could show loyalty to Indonesia. 
43 Guided democracy, despite the name, marked the end of Indonesia's experiment with 
liberal democracy. During this period Sukarno's personal rule was reminiscent of Javanese 
feudalism (Schwarz, 1999: 16). Political parties were restricted in their activities, political 
arrests became more frequent and the press was restricted (Feith, 1962: 593). 
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Early Chinese Indonesian Politics 
Strategies which the ethnic Chinese adopted during the 1950s and 1960s, to try to 
integrate themselves into their local communities, tended to be viewed with 
suspicion by non-Chinese Indonesians. The observations of Charles Coppel sum 
up the dilemma which the Chinese Indonesian found themselves in at this time. 
and they also have resonance today. In his discussion of the difficulties for the 
ethnic Chinese in the area of political participation Coppel stated: 
The Indonesian Chinese are caught on the horns of a dilemma if they 
consider political activity. If they engage in the politics of dissent, they 
are labelled subversive. If they support the authorities of the day, they 
are labelled opportunistic. And if they keep clear of politics, they are 
also opportunistic because they are said to be only interested in profit 
(Coppel 1983: 24-25). 
Integrationists 
Integrationist views were represented by Baperki (Badan Permusyawaratan 
Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship) 
which was established in 1954. The leader, Siauw Giok Tjhan, stated that: 
We founded Baperki because we rejected the idea that citizenship 
problems are the concern of the ethnic groups involved. We are of the 
opinion that citizenship problems are national problems and their 
solution must be struggled for by an organization of national character 
(Baperki, 1963: 112). 
Despite this aim to make citizenship a national issue and open Baperki 
membership to all Indonesians, 98 percent of its members were ethnic Chinese 
and 1 percent were other citizens of foreign descent (Coppel, 1976: 46). 
Baperki's stated aims were the promotion of Indonesian citizenship among the 
ethnic Chinese and the elimination of discrimination towards them. 
They 
considered themselves a mass organisation rather than a political party, 
however, 
they did field candidates in the 1955 election when its chairman Siauw Giok 
Tjhan was elected to parliament, and another candidate won a seat 
in the 
constituent assembly44 (Coppel, 1976: 46). Baperki supported the ethnic 
Chinese 
44 The constituent assembly was established in 1956 to devise a new Constitution 
for the 
country. It was dissolved in 1959 when Sukarno declared the 
1945 Constitution to be the 
only legal Constitution of Indonesia (Ramage, 1995: 16-20). 
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against the "indigenisation" of Indonesian industry and also opposed the 
government's requirement that dual nationals reject their Chinese citizenship 
(Coppel, 1976: 48). 
Baperki was also involved in the field of education. After the government banned 
Chinese Indonesian citizens from attending Chinese-medium schools Baperki set 
up Indonesian-medium schools which followed the national curriculum. Again, 
these schools were open to indigenous and non-indigenous pupils, however, the 
vast majority who attended were ethnic Chinese. This had the effect that although 
the ethnic Chinese were now studying the national curriculum in the Indonesian 
language, they were in schools which were catering almost exclusively to ethnic 
Chinese (Coppel, 1983: 17). Baperki also established University Res Publica in 
central Jakarta in 1960 which was attended by a majority of ethnic Chinese 
students (Suryadinata, 1992: 153). 
Although Baperki took a politically non-aligned position at first, it did gradually 
come to be associated with the communist PKI. Siauw Giok Tjhan never called 
himself a communist, although he did have a desire to mould "an Indonesian 
socialist society" (Baperki, 1963: 115). This shift to the left corresponded with 
Sukarno's own move to the left during the Guided Democracy period. This led to 
Baperki's demise after the alleged communist coup attempt in 1965. Baperki 
schools at the time were placed under government control and University Res 
Publica was burnt to the ground. Siauw himself was arrested and spent thirteen 
years in jail (Siauw, 1993: 124). 
On the one hand Sukarno supported the integrationist stance of Baperki and 
included the ethnic Chinese as an integral part of the Indonesian nation (Bangsa 
Indonesia). In a speech to the Baperki conference in 1963 Sukarno asserted that 
the peranakan Chinese were one of the legitimate ethnic groups (suku) of 
Indonesia. On the other hand, in the same year, Sukarno also supported the 
establishment of the assimilationist organisation LPKB (Lembaga Pembinaan 
Kesatuan Bangsa, Institute for the Promotion of National Unity) (see below). 
Suryadinata asserts that Sukarno had very vague ideas about «'hat the Indonesian 
nation actually was and may have had the hope that various ethnic groups would 
be united into an "`Indonesian national identity' which was still in the making" 
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(Suryadinata, 1992: 33) As I have explained in chapter one, there were hopes 
among nationalist leaders at the time that the ethnic identities of Indonesians 
would become less important than an archipelago-wide identity which they 
promulgated. 
Assimilationists 
The assimilationist LPKB was led by K. Sindhunata. The members disagreed with 
Baperki about what they considered to be an "exclusive" organisation. Baperki 
asserted that they were not exclusive because they permitted "indigenous" people 
to join, even though most of their membership were ethnic Chinese. For the 
assimilationists, Baperki (and other organisations such as the Chinese Association 
of University Students, Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Indonesian who played an active 
role in the Indonesian Student Federation, Pei-kumpulan Perhimpunan Mahasisiva 
Indonesia) was still exclusive as long as most of the members were ethnic 
Chinese (Coppel, 1976: 52). As well as opposing integrationist organisations, 
LPKB also encouraged ethnic Chinese to change their names to Indonesian 
sounding ones, and to marry "indigenous" Indonesians (Thung, 1998: 45). They 
also asserted that one of the main obstacles to assimilation was the exclusiveness 
of the Chinese themselves. As Baperki had aligned itself with the left, the 
assimilationist movement accepted support from the other dominant power in 
Indonesia at the time, the army (Coppel, 1976: 55). One prominent assimilationist, 
Onghokham, wrote in his 1960 article, "The Case for Assimilation" that: 
Progress toward... unity can only be achieved by means of assimilation, 
so that the exclusiveness of the minority is destroyed and the relations 
between minority and majority are improved and mixed marriages 
increase... Assimilation means the abolition of distinctions between 
one group and another, so that discrimination naturally disappears 
because the differences are no longer visible (Onghokham, 1960: 348). 
Interestingly LPKB as an organisation did not encourage the conversion of ethnic 
Chinese to Islam (although individuals who were involved in the organisation did 
convert, for example, one of the leading spokesmen on Chinese assimilation, 
Yunus Yahya) (Suryadinata, 1997a: xix). Nor did they demand that Christian 
schools should be closed along with Chinese ones. Coppel suggests that the first 
tenet of Pancasila (belief in one supreme God) allowed them to decry religious 
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assimilation. This policy was probably also related to the large numbers of 
Chinese Christians among the assimilationists (Coppel, 1976: 53-54). 
Assimilationists in Indonesia often refer to the Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) of 
1928 to explain their ideas. In 1961, a group of thirty Chinese Indonesians who 
espoused assimilation, signed an "Assimilation Charter" (Piagam . 4similasi) 
which asserted that their aspirations were based on the Youth Oath of 1928 
(Suryadinata, 1997c: 159-160). They stated that: 
For those who have received Indonesian citizenship the consequence is 
that they must have a firm intention to serve their country, Indonesia, 
and their nation, the Indonesian nation, with body and soul; have the 
firm intention to become one with the entire Indonesian people and 
become true and patriotic Indonesians, and to reject and rid themselves 
of attitudes and actions which are in conflict with this intention 
(Assimilation Charter, cited in Suryadinata, 1997c: 159). 
Charles Coppel makes a very important point, criticising the assimilationists for 
not dealing with the question of what kind of identity the ethnic Chinese should 
assimilate into. He suggests that "most writing on assimilation presupposes a 
`master cultural mould' or a `core society and culture' to which minorities might 
assimilate... The problem of applying these concepts to a `new nation' with frail 
national integration, like Indonesia, has not been faced squarely by the 
assimilationists" (Coppel, 1976: note 114,221-223). Coppel asks: 
Must the Chinese assimilate to the indigenous sukus first, before they 
were themselves welded into a national whole? Or should they, being 
heavily concentrated in the large urban centres which were often 
ethnically heterogeneous, assimilate in one jump to the all-Indonesian 
culture... which was developing there (Coppel, 1976: 54)? 
This question is just as pertinent today after years of pressure from the Suharto 
administrations for the ethnic Chinese to assimilate. I will return to this when I 
investigate how the post-1998 groups propose Chinese Indonesians should behave 
in order to be fully accepted into Indonesian society. 
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The Alleged Coup Attempt of 1965 
Widespread Violence 
On the 30 September 1965 an alleged coup attempt led to the deaths of up to 
500,000 people and changed the face of Indonesian politics and the Chinese 
Indonesian position in it (Ramage, 1995: 24). Much of the violence occurred on 
Java and later on Bali, with some smaller scale outbreaks in other parts of 
Indonesia. In most areas the violence was carried out by units of the army and 
civilian vigilante groups (Cribb, 1990: 3). The truth about what actually happened 
is still unclear. Robert Cribb points out that information about who was killed, 
where, when, why and by whom "is so patchy that most conclusions have to be 
strongly qualified as provisional" (Cribb, 1990: 3). 
Robert Cribb, who has carried out extensive research into these events, puts 
forward four possible explanations for the violence. The first explanation is that 
the military orchestrated the violence. Some argue that Suharto was directly 
involved in order to be rid of his main rivals for power, the PKI. Cribb does not 
go this far. He suggests that he finds this argument "implausible though, like most 
conspiracy arguments, not impossible" (Cribb, 2002a: 552). Cribb argues that 
military involvement does not explain why so many people were murdered in 
Indonesia. He compares the violent crackdown on communism in Indonesia to 
state suppression of communism in Argentina and Chile, which occurred shortly 
after the events in Indonesia. The death toll in Indonesia was much higher which 
suggests to Cribb that other factors were involved (Cribb, 2002a: 552). 
The second attempt to explain the violence at this time is that it was a result of 
"extreme political tension" throughout the archipelago (Cribb, 2002a: 553). There 
was great political uncertainty and lots of questions about whether Indonesia 
would take a communist, Islamic or another road to modernity, and who would be 
in charge of this process. At the same time, Indonesia was one of the poorest 
countries in the world. During the first half of the 1960s inflation was 600 percent 
and foreign debt was rising rapidly (Berger, 1997: 1997). This argument suggests 
that the pressure which came to bear on the population led them into a frenzy of 
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violence (Cribb, 2002a: 553-554). The third explanation of the violence takes into 
account the variations across the country in local patterns of violence. These 
variations have led scholars to suggest that localised social and political tensions 
also had a part to play in the bloodshed (Cribb, 2002a: 554-555). Finally, it has 
been argued that Indonesian society seems to include a subculture of violence in 
the form of jago which Cribb translates as "tough guys" or "toughs". Research 
which has been carried out on this kind of violence tends to conclude that the jago 
are tolerated by those in power because they fulfil a useful role of intimidation 
and murder of those considered a problem by the government (Cribb, 2002a: 556- 
557). 4s 
Despite these numerous possible explanations for the violence, Mary Zurbuchen 
makes clear that the Indonesian people were given only one official account of 
what happened. Through government rhetoric, symbolism and also through the 
school curriculum, Indonesians have been inculcated with the belief that the PKI 
were completely to blame for the murder of the generals, and as such they were 
traitors who needed to be eliminated (Zurbuchen, 2002: 566). 
Ethnic Chinese Involvement 
It was presumed at the time that Chinese Indonesians were involved with the PKI 
and that those killed included large numbers of Chinese. For example, Life 
magazine and the Far Eastern Economic Review claimed that hundreds of 
thousands of Chinese had been slaughtered (Coppel, 1983: 58). Cribb disagrees 
with this and argues that the violence tended to be directed against alleged 
communists irrespective of ethnicity (Cribb, 2002a: 557). This concurs with 
Charles Coppel's assertion that the anti-Chinese violence at this time was to a 
certain extent action against the left generally and not focused on the Chinese in 
particular (Coppel, 1983: 55). Chinese who were considered supporters or 
members of the Communist Party were killed, but killing of Chinese because they 
were Chinese was more sporadic (Coppel, 1983: 58). Coppel estimates that 
as Jago were also in evidence during the violence in 1998, which led up to the fall of the 
Suharto regime. This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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around 2,000 ethnic Chinese were killed in the months following the coup 
attempt. This is based on Chinese government estimates in 1965-66. 
As I mentioned, most massacres of communists took place in rural Java and Bali, 
where Chinese people had been under-represented in the population, since the 
retail trade ban of 1959 had driven them out. Also, most of the Chinese left in 
these rural areas were relatively wealthy and able to pay protection money to the 
local military or take refuge with relatives in urban areas (Coppel, 1983: 58-59). 
Finally, the leader of the communist party, D. N. Aidit, had already removed the 
ethnic Chinese from leadership positions (Schwarz, 1999: 105). This is not to say, 
however, that the Chinese were not right to be , Worried. As James Mackie points 
out, many of their supporters and protectors in elite circles were overthrown to be 
replaced by those most virulantly opposed to them in the army and Muslim 
political parties (Mackie, 1976: 111). Pressure on the ethnic Chinese varied from 
province to province but intimidation and fear caused many thousands to flee to 
China. In Aceh and North Sumatra in particular the pressures on the ethnic 
Chinese to leave were immense, and thousands ended up in refugee camps in 
Medan (Mackie, 1976: 116). 
The stigma attached to closeness with the communists became hereditary. Family 
members of those involved in the PKI, those sympathetic to them, or people who 
had family members who were sympathetic towards them, have passed on the 
stigma to the next generation. Those who have suffered violence and 
discrimination as a result have included non-Chinese as well as Chinese 
Indonesians (Heryanto, 1998: 99). An example of this stigma is outlined by Mary 
Zurbuchen. Those imprisoned as communists, or communist sympathisers during 
this period had "ex-political prisoner" (eks tahanan politik, eks tapol, ET) 
stamped on their identity card on release. This allowed the authorities to carry out 
surveillance of these people and their families (Zurbuchen, 2002: 568). This also 
meant that ex-political prisoners and their families did not have ready access to 
the social services available to other citizens. The government now issues identity 
cards without the ET code, however, those cards belonging to ex-political 
prisoners have expiry dates, whereas, ordinary identity cards do not expire 
(Zurbuchen, 2002: 568). 
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Ariel Heryanto argues that the "official narrative" of the events of 1965 - that 
the attempted coup was carried out by the PKI who, due to this traitorous 
behaviour, needed to be annihilated -"should be regarded as constituting a 
central component and force in the processes that gave birth to the New Order 
`Self"' (Heryanto, 1998: 97). Thung Julan suggests that the events of 1965 could 
be viewed as "the turning point in Indonesian history from a situation of mild 
acceptance of plurality... under Sukarno's Guided Democracy to a strong emphasis 
on unity... under Suharto's New Order" (Thung, 1998: 38). As mentioned above, 
despite evidence that few Chinese Indonesians were involved with the PKI, the 
ethnic Chinese tended to be associated with them. This led to a narrowing, almost 
to the point of extinction, of the areas where Chinese cultural and political 
activities were acceptable. The next section of this chapter will explore the 
policies towards Chinese Indonesians during this post-1965 period which ended in 
1998, as it had begun, with violence. 
The Ethnic Chinese During the New Order 
Difficult Beginnings for the Ethnic Chinese 
For the ethnic Chinese the New Order had an unpropitious beginning at an army 
seminar in Bandung in 1966. The main aim of the conference was to reformulate 
the role of the army in the new political times. At this conference the decision was 
made to use the term war-ga negara Cina (Chinese citizen) to describe an ethnic 
Chinese with Indonesian citizenship, instead of warga negara Tionghoa which 
had been used previously. The People's Republic of China became known as 
Republik Rakyat Cina instead of Republik Rakyat Tiongkok (Coppel, 1983: 89). 46 
Suharto agreed with the use of Cina and he made this official at the cabinet 
presidium of 1967 (Aguilar, 2001: 505). The reasons given for using Cina rather 
than Tionghoa or Tiongkok were that Cina had historically been used in 
Indonesian to describe China and the Chinese. More ominously, officials also 
explained that they particularly wanted to "remove a feeling of inferiority on the 
46 Tiongkok is based on the Hokkien word for Zhongguo (Mandarin for China) (Aguilar, 
2001: 51 1). 
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part of our own people, while on the other hand removing the feeling of 
superiority on the part of the group concerned within our state" (Coppel, 1983: 
89). Benedict Anderson points out that although all the national languages of 
Southeast Asia have derogatory words for the Chinese, only Suharto's Indonesia 
insisted on the official use of such a word. As a result Chinese Indonesians tended 
to use the English word "Chinese" to describe themselves instead of the 
Indonesian term Cina which Anderson translates as "chink" (Anderson, 1998: 14 
note 28). 
In 1967 the word pribuini rather than asli became the official term to describe 
indigenous citizens. Coppel sees this as an improvement suggesting that the word 
pribumi lacks the sense of "genuine" and "authentic" which was contained in the 
term asli. According to Ariel Heryanto however, the term pribumi did come to 
have this sense of authenticity associated with it. He argues that "[n]ation-ness, 
and hence the distinction between Indonesian and non-Indonesian, are only a step 
away from the ethnic dichotomy of pribumi and non pribumi" (Heryanto, 1998: 
100). Although the Indonesian constitution is not based exclusively on ethnicity 
and descent, and Suharto's New Order regime projected an image of social 
harmony within the ethnic diversity, only the pribumi ethnic groups were included 
(Heryanto, 1998: 101). The use of the term Cina rather than Tionghoa underlines 
the desire on the part of the New Order to distance the ethnic Chinese from the 
discourse of the nation. 
The New Order had a more comprehensive policy towards the ethnic Chinese than 
had been the case during the Old Order. This was a policy of cultural assimilation 
in which there was much less scope for Chinese political organisation than had 
been the case during the Sukarno era. In 1967 "The Basic Policy for the Solution 
of the Chinese Problem" was published. It set out rules for Chinese behaviour. All 
except one Chinese language newspaper was closed. The one newspaper 
remaining - Harian Indonesia - was run by the government and was used 
by 
the authorities to communicate government policy to the ethnic Chinese. 
Expressions of Chinese culture were confined to the home, Chinese language 
schools were phased out, Chinese script was outlawed, and Chinese Indonesians 
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were encouraged to change their names to Indonesian sounding ones (Schwarz, 
1999: 106). 
Citizenship Issues 
When Suharto came to power there were still over 1 million alien Chinese in 
Indonesia, out of an ethnic Chinese population of around 3.29 million people. 
With the New Order's concentration on economic growth and stability they made 
an attempt to deal with the issue of alien Chinese once again. In 1967 diplomatic 
relations between China and Indonesia were severed because of alleged Chinese 
activity in the coup attempt of 1965. Official relations did not resume until 1990 
(Tan, 1997: 35). In 1969 Suharto abrogated the Dual Nationality Treaty which had 
been signed in Bandung in 1955. This meant that the children of alien Chinese, 
who had the opportunity to choose Indonesian citizenship themselves after coming 
of age, lost this opportunity and had to go through a naturalisation process (Tan, 
1997: 35). Coppel suggests that the government feared for the security of the 
country if ethnic Chinese were permitted to choose Indonesian citizenship without 
proper intelligence screening (Coppel, 1983: 155). The Indonesian authorities 
permitted naturalisation of Chinese from 1969, but high costs and excessive 
bureaucracy prevented large numbers from taking up the offer (Suryadinata, 
1997a: 97). 
Chinese language schools for aliens were all closed down in May 1966 in 
continuing attempts by the government to reduce the links between China and the 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Coppel, 1976: 64). Some children had their 
education disrupted as a result of this, however in 1969 "special project national 
schools" were opened with funding from the totok Chinese. The language of 
instruction was Indonesian and up to 40 percent of the places were given over to 
alien Chinese, although this figure was sometimes higher (Coppel, 1976: 64-65). 
Chinese chambers of commerce, regional speech group associations and 
Indonesia-China Friendship Institutes were also shut down (Coppel, 1976: 65). 
On the one hand, having a large population who held the citizenship of another 
country was an embarrassment to the Indonesian government and a potential 
threat to security. On the other hand, mass expulsion was not an option as it would 
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threaten the economic stability of the country. Offers of citizenship to these alien 
Chinese were rejected by Suharto for fear of widespread opposition from militant 
groups opposed to the ethnic Chinese (Coppel, 1983: 95). There was also 
suspicion that the alien Chinese were using the institution of marriage to gain 
citizenship even though they were not loyal to Indonesia. Eventually, in 1980, 
Suharto issued a presidential decree simplifying the procedure for these alien 
Chinese to become Indonesian citizens. By the end of the 1980s there were 
288,000 alien Chinese left in the country (Suryadinata, 1997a: 8). 
New Order Pancasila 
Pancasila was used as the ideological basis of Suharto's regime as it had been 
during the Old Order. However, it shifted from being a common platform under 
which different groups could come together, to being the "ideological pillar of the 
regime". The government became the only official interpreter of Pancasila and 
used Pancasila to justify its authoritarian rule (Ramage, 1995: 24). The New 
Order view of society was similar to that of the integralists of the 1940s and 
1950s: Indonesia was conceived as "one large integral family with Bapak (Father) 
Suharto as the `paternal figure"' (Antlöv, 2000: 210). 
In 1978 the People's Consultative Assembly approved a decree entitled "The 
Guide to the Full Comprehension and Practice of Pancasila" (Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila). With this began a nation-wide 
indoctrination programme to instil the state ideology in the minds of all 
Indonesians (Ramage, 1995: 31-32). In 1983, after "winning" a third term in 
office, Suharto declared that the state ideology of Pancasila was the most 
effective way of holding together all the diverse groups in Indonesia "now and in 
the future" (Suryadinata, 1998a: 38). In 1985 all social, religious and political 
organisations were forced to adopt Pancasila as their asas tunggal (official 
ideology) (Suryadinata, 1998a: 40). Suharto argued that if different groups and 
political parties were permitted to pursue their own agendas, there would be chaos 
(Suryadinata, 1998a: 38). 
Suharto also linked economic development to Pancasila. The regime argued that 
the final tenet of Pancasila, "social justice", was violated by Sukarno and 
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economic prosperity was linked to the implementation of this tenet. \lark Berger 
has pointed out that during the Suharto era "a powerful Indonesian development 
(pembangunan) discourse" developed. This discourse advocated that Indonesians 
"work together to develop the nation... under the leadership of the `father of 
development' (Bapak Pembangunan), Suharto" (Berger, 1997: 344). 
Also central to the Pancasila indoctrination programme was the importance of 
social harmony (kerukunan). As part of this desire for kerukunan the government 
introduced a policy which prohibited any discussion of ethnicity, religion, race, or 
group differences (suku, agama, ras, antar golongan; SARA) which might 
provoke unrest or cause tension between societal groups. According to Sumartana, 
this ban on the open discussion of SARA issues meant that tension simmered 
below the surface and was not dealt with in any meaningful way (Sumartana, 
1999: 254). 
This policy of SARA also meant that anti-Chinese propaganda was less overt than 
it had been, however, it did not disappear altogether. For example, newspapers 
would subtly highlight the ethnic origin of Chinese convicted of dishonest 
practices, but leave out the ethnic identity of Chinese Indonesian sports people 
and other individuals who carried out positive activities (Coppel, 1983: 158). 
Under SARA, the New Order had a particular method of dealing with 
"indigenous" ethnic groups also. According to Michael Jacobsen "indigenous 
cultures" were used by the New Order to "exemplify the national motto: 
`Diversity in Unity"'. Therefore, only the performative aspects of indigenous 
culture were permitted, not those which may have jeopardised Pancasila 
indoctrination, such as social organisation or legal traditions (Jacobsen, 2000). In 
relation to the ethnic Chinese of course, even the more benign aspects of their 
cultural traditions were not permitted. 
As well as banning the celebration of Chinese Indonesian culture, the New Order 
government also had an ambivalent attitude towards Confucianism even though 
the right of Indonesians to practice a religion is central to the ideology of 
Pancasila. In 1965, Presidential Decree No. 1 recognised both Confucianism and 
Buddhism as religions (Coppel, 1983: 107). The Suharto government considered 
religion to be a useful force against the re-emergence of the PKI and after 1965 
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citizens were required to have their religion printed on their identity cards (Kartu 
Tanda Penduduk). Those who did not were suspect in the eyes of the authorities 
(Suryadinata, 1997b: 162). Presidential Instruction number 14. issued in 1967, 
also acknowledged the right of Indonesian citizens to practice their chosen 
religion. The government stated, however, that: 
without derogating from the guarantee of freedom to embrace a 
religion and to carry out its observances, those manners of Chinese 
religious observances which have aspects of cultural affinity which are 
oriented to their ancestral land should be practised privately amongst 
the family or individually (Coppel, 1983: 144). 
In 1979 Confucianism was de-recognised as a religion. Suryadinata suggests that 
by the mid-1970s the New Order had consolidated its hold on power and 
Confucianism, which had been supported as a force against the re-emergence of 
communism, was now considered contrary to the government's assimilationist 
policy. The government also feared ethnic Chinese demands for religious rights 
such as the teaching of Confucianism at school and the recognition of Confucian 
holidays, which was also considered contrary to its assimilationist policy 
(Suryadinata, 1997b: 164-165). Therefore, although it was still possible to 
practice Confucianism privately after 1979, it was not considered an "official 
religion". 47 This meant that Confucianism was not permitted to be practised in 
public, there were no Confucian religious holidays officially marked by the state, 
Confucianism was not offered as a religious subject in school, and Confucian 
marriages were not recognised by the state (Suryadinata, 1997b: 165). 
Chinese Indonesian Organisations During the New Order 
The LPKB, whose influence was evident in the New Order policies, by putting 
pressure on ethnic Chinese to assimilate, sought a new role during the Suharto 
era. They wished to become chief policy formulators relating to both the ethnic 
Chinese citizens and alien Chinese. After MPRS48 sessions in 1966, which 
highlighted the need for the promotion of national unity, LPKB made an even 
a' The official religions were now Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, and Hindu- 
Bali. 
48 Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Perm usjawara tan Rake at 
Semc'rrtara). 
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more grandiose bid to become the main organisation in the promotion of unity in 
the nation, not just in relation to the ethnic Chinese (Coppel, 1983: 80). However, 
government resolve to dissolve organisations they considered in conflict with 
Pancasila meant LPKB had to be satisfied with a much reduced role in national 
affairs (Coppel, 1983: 81). After the MPRS session of 1966 their function was 
reduced to dealing only with matters pertaining to Chinese Indonesian citizens. By 
1967 LPKB themselves decided to halt activities altogether. They stated that 
LPKB policies had already been accepted by the government and they felt no 
further need to have a separate body to promote assimilation. 
Charles Coppel suggests that there are other reasons for the LPKB's decision to 
stop their activities. He suggests that the job of promoting the activities of a 
particular ethnic group became too risky, even if it was assimilation that was 
being promoted. Also, many people who joined LPKB did so to oppose the pro- 
communist position of Baperki. After the demise of Baperki and the communists 
those involved felt it was no longer necessary to have an organisation such as 
LPKB (Coppel, 1983: 143). The New Order considered Chinese socio-political 
groups to be exclusive and contrary to their policy of assimilation. Organisations 
based on politics, commerce or industry which had been common, were no longer 
permitted after government policy towards the Chinese was published in 1967 
(Suryadinata, 1992: 205). 
After rioting in Jakarta in 1974 and alarm at how the increasing gap between rich 
and poor was being perceived along racial lines, some former members of LPKB 
set up the Organisation for the Promotion of National Unity (Badan Pembina 
Kesatuan Bangsa, BPKB), with the approval of the Governor of Jakarta. They 
played a low-key role in Jakarta until 1977 when they took part in a conference 
entitled "Communication Week for the Appreciation of National Unity" (Pekan 
Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa). At this conference they suggested 
that a forum for communication and consultation between the ethnic Chinese and 
the government should be established. The result of this was Bakom-PKB which 
was established on 28 October 1977.49 Like LPKB before it, Bakom-PKB was 
49 Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa (Communication Body for the 
Appreciation of National Unity) 
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established to promote assimilation of the ethnic Chinese and to hase with the 
government on behalf of Chinese Indonesians (Suryadinata, 1992: 204). 
One of the main policies which had been promoted by LPKB and Bakom-PKB 
was the need for a clear division between Chinese Indonesian citizens and alien 
Chinese, and an end to the division between ethnic Chinese and "indigenous" 
citizens (Coppel, 1983: 74). They wanted Chinese citizens to be treated like any 
other group in Indonesia and not treated differently because of their Chinese 
origins. Charles Coppel explains that despite LPKB requests Suharto did not treat 
the ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese equally. This ambivalence is evident in 
Suharto's 1967 independence day speech. On the one hand, Suharto states that all 
citizens of Indonesia, including the ethnic Chinese, have the same rights. On the 
other hand, he singles them out and encourages them to assimilate and not to be 
exclusive. They therefore do not have the right, as other groups do, to feel they 
fully belong to the Indonesian nation. In the speech Suharto asserted that: 
We must draw a clear line between alien Chinese and Chinese who are 
citizens of Indonesia. Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, although 
they are of Chinese descent, are still citizens of Indonesia and have a 
position, rights and duties which are the same as everybody else's... 
Also, we must make efforts to help them lose their exclusive ways and 
try to develop one nation by simplifying the procedure for changing of 
names. We appeal to citizens of Chinese descent not to delay any 
longer assimilation with the native people of Indonesia (masyarakat 
Indonesia [asli]) (Suharto's 16 August 1967 independence day speech, 
cited in Coppel, 1999: Appendix A). 
Paradoxical New Order Policies 
Anti-Assimilation Policies 
Discussion up to now has centred on governmental pressure on Chinese 
Indonesians to lose their association with Chinese culture and assimilate into 
Indonesian society. Complete assimilation was prevented, however, since the 
identity cards of the ethnic Chinese contained codes to differentiate them from 
indigenous Indonesians. This means that no matter how much effort a Chinese 
Indonesian makes to lose her Chinese culture and assimilate into an Indonesian 
culture, she will always be considered Chinese by the state. Chinese-Indonesians 
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were strongly encouraged to change their names to Indonesian sounding ones, but 
to access public services they still need to declare their former Chinese names 
(Heryanto, 1998: 104). Intermarriage has been encouraged, but up to today the 
children of an ethnic Chinese man are still classed as non-pribumi even if their 
mother is indigenous (Heryanto, 1998: 103). 50 This is part of the official way in 
which the ethnic Chinese have been made to feel "other". They have never really 
been permitted to assimilate. 
Another government activity which worked against assimilation was their 
categorisation of economically weak and strong groups along racial lines 
(Suryadinata, 1998b: 36). As discussed above, the Chinese in Indonesia have been 
dominant in the economic field since arriving in Indonesia as traders and acted as 
middlemen during the colonial administration. During the Old Order there was 
anti-Chinese feeling linked to their dominant position in the economy. What 
distinguished the New Order period from these earlier periods is that during the 
latter the ethnic Chinese found it difficult to enter into other professions. No 
Chinese Indonesian served in any of Suharto's cabinets, there were no ethnic 
Chinese in the top ranks of the military, and ethnic Chinese students found it 
difficult to gain admission to state universities (Schwarz, 1999: 106). 
51 
Suharto's Cronies 
The Suharto era also saw the development of what became widely known as the 
cukong system. The term cukong (which means "master" in Hokkien dialect) is 
used to describe an ethnic Chinese businessman who collaborates with a member 
of the political elite. Under this system the ethnic Chinese partner runs the 
business and the non-Chinese, usually a member of the military, provides 
protection and access to influential people (Suryadinata, 1988: 266). Suharto's ties 
with ethnic Chinese businessmen stemmed from his position as military 
50 Lineage is patrilineal so if you are the son or daughter or an ethnic Chinese woman and an 
indigenous man it is possible to assimilate, if you do not have physical features which are 
very obviously Chinese. 
51 At the very end of the New Order administration Suharto did appoint his friend Bob Hasan 
to his cabinet. However, Hasan, one of Suharto's crony businessmen, was not popular with 
the ethnic Chinese or non-Chinese. 
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commander in Central Java in 1957. Military units used Chinese traders to 
provide supplies and it was here that he met two of the most po« erful ethnic 
Chinese tycoons, Liem Sloe Liong and Bob Hasan (Freedman, 2000: 109). 
Anthony Reid hints that these business dealings were not always straightforward, 
with smuggling and other "shady business" going on (Reid, 1999). The cukong 
system led to the growth of a small number of very wealthy, usually totok, 
businessmen who had very close links to the Suharto government. In exchange for 
providing political funds and business opportunities to their patrons the big 
Chinese cukongs received tax breaks, access to trading licences, introductions to 
foreign investors and funding from state banks (Schwarz, 1999: 107-108). 
According to Siauw Tiong Djin the impression was that the ethnic Chinese were 
Suharto's partners (sekutu) (Siauw, 1998: 13). 
These two developments - the concentration of ethnic Chinese in the economic 
sector and the cukong system - led to huge feelings of resentment among the 
non-Chinese. Rumours spread that the ethnic Chinese who constituted three 
percent of the population owned seventy percent of the economy. 52 Charles 
Coppel asserts that the ethnic Chinese under the New Order "had much less scope 
to assert their Chineseness than in the years preceding the coup attempt". At the 
same time, however, "the opportunities for Chinese businessmen to prosper were 
probably greater than at any time since Indonesian independence" (Coppel, 1983: 
175). The New Order government rejected demands from indigenous Indonesian 
businessmen that there should be "a more radical assault" on the position of the 
ethnic Chinese in the economy (Coppel, 1983: 175). The close relationship 
between the cukongs and the government, and the favours they received led to 
allegations of corruption which were attached to ethnic Chinese generally, not just 
the privileged elite. The fact that these cukongs tended to be totok rather than 
peranakan reinforced the perception that the ethnic Chinese were more loyal to 
China than to Indonesia. Ariel Heryanto argues that Suharto's New Order regime 
carried on the divide-and-rule policy of the Dutch towards the ethnic Chinese 
(Heryanto, 1999: 326). This was a policy privileging the Chinese business 
S2 This statistic still appears in newspapers when discussing the economy (see Mann, 1999: 
180). 
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community, but reducing the ethnic minority to "near pariah status" in all other 
areas, such as, culture, politics, education, language, public service and law 
(Heryanto, 1999: 326). Heryanto also astutely points out that anti-Chinese feelings 
worked in the interests of the New Order regime. Dependence of the ethnic 
Chinese on state protection during the New Order made them unlikely to 
overthrow the state, and their dominance reduced the likelihood of the emergence 
of a domestic bourgeoisie which might have more success in undermining the 
state. Anti-Chinese violence also deflected violence away from the government 
and on occasion provided opportunities for the New Order authorities to arrest 
potential dissidents among the protesting pribumis (Heryanto, 1998: 102, see also 
Heryanto 1999: 327). 
Anti-Capitalist Sentiments 
As well as a feeling of resentment that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were 
benefiting from close relationships with the elite, there is another problem which 
those in business have to contend with in Indonesia. Arief Budiman has pointed 
out that although Indonesia has adopted capitalism, at an ideological level the 
individualism and materialism which are inherent to this system are rejected in 
Pancasila. Wealth through capitalist means is not quite acceptable (Budiman, 
1999b). As Joannes Riberu points out, the Pancasila economy fostered by 
Sukarno was based on "[a] communal spirit of solidarity and mutual co-operation" 
(Riberu, 1990: 171). Filomeno Aguilar provides a very interesting discussion of 
perceptions of ethnic Chinese business activity during this period. He asserts that 
Chinese wealth is considered morally questionable and stigmatised because of its 
basis in commerce. Pribumi who are wealthy are said to have "inherited" their 
wealth, whereas the Chinese extract theirs from the poor pribumi in dubious moral 
circumstances (Aguilar, 2001: 522). 
Based on research carried out by Onghokham, Arief Budiman mentions a Javanese 
traditional belief that wealth for a person who is not part of the ruling elite, is 
believed to come from a tuyul, a spirit being who steals people's possessions and 
money during the night (Budiman, 1999b). Aguilar suggests that based on this 
belief, looting Chinese property could be considered a legitimate way for the 
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people (rakyat) to reappropriate what is rightfully theirs (Aguilar, 2001: 523). 
Another observation made by Aguilar and Budiman is that during the New Order 
period, officials were perceived as innocent people who were corrupted by 
immoral Chinese. With pribumi in the role of the tempted, "in the final analysis 
this thinking absolves Suharto and his family of greed, corruption, and plunder. 
They merely succumbed to the `deception' posed by monied Chinese". Some even 
suggest that Suharto himself might be part Chinese. This is the only way they can 
explain how he was capable of such deviousness (Aguilar, 2001: 525). 53 
Chinese Indonesian Opinion 
Although indigenous Indonesians were generally very suspicious of the ethnic 
Chinese and doubted their loyalty to Indonesia, the small amount of empirical 
research, carried out during the New Order period, showed that young Chinese 
Indonesians tended to feel loyalty towards Indonesia. A survey carried out by the 
magazine Editor in 1990 explored Chinese Indonesian views on Indonesia and 
China. 54 According to the 129 17-25 year olds surveyed, 14.72 percent considered 
China to be their fatherland, wished to visit China regularly and maintain Chinese 
customs. 41.86 percent considered China to be their ancestral land but did not 
wish to visit China, and 43.41 considered China to be a foreign country. 93.79 
percent regard Indonesia as their "real fatherland", 2.32 percent were unsure about 
this. Only 5.42 percent of respondents were still able to write and speak any form 
of Chinese. 35.65 percent understood some Chinese and the rest understood none 
(Suryadinata, 1997a: 17-18). 
Thung Julan argues that young Chinese Indonesians have been adapting 
themselves to the official discourse that they should assimilate and lose their 
Chinese cultural identity. She concludes, however, that this does not lead them to 
feel more Indonesian. They are willing to assimilate but feel insecure as a result of 
the government policy which in the end means they are not fully accepted as 
53 An "indigenous" interviewee of mine suggested this to me also. 
54 This research was carried out prior to the normalisation of relations between Indonesia and 
China which had been suspended in 1967 and were resumed with a Memorandum of 
Understanding in 1990 (Tan, 1997: 36). 
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Indonesians either (Thung, 1998: 308). In research undertaken in Jakarta in 1998, 
she found that only one out of her eighteen ethnic Chinese respondents described 
themselves as "Indonesian". Nine respondents described themselves according to 
their profession and social group, not according to an ethnic or national identity. 
For Thung this shows that they are losing their affiliation to Chinese culture but 
are not necessarily replacing this with an Indonesian identity (Thung, 1998: 142). 
As Thung stated, the "ideal model" for a good citizen during the New Order was 
to be, or to become, "non-Chinese". She suggests that her research indicates that 
Chinese Indonesians have tended to comply with this rule (Thung 1998: 58). 
Nationhood and Chineseness At the End of the New Order 
By the end of the New Order, to use Ernest Gellner's phrase, "entropy resistant 
characteristics" had been ensconsed in Indonesian society by the discourses 
surrounding nationhood and Chineseness. Officially it was not possible to be both 
culturally Chinese and Indonesian. Their culture was banned and they were 
strongly advised to assimilate. The perception that the ethnic Chinese were not 
genuinely Indonesian has been in circulation since ideas about an Indonesian 
nation were first formulated. It was also the case that as a result of the inability of 
the ethnic Chinese to fully assimilate, it was actually not possible to be both 
ethnic Chinese and Indonesian, even for those ethnic Chinese who lost all links 
with and knowledge of their ancestral culture. 
During the New Order period there was what Ariel Heryanto has called an 
"erasure" of Chinese identity. (Heryanto, 1998: 104). Chinese business elites, had 
little political power and were dependent on state protection, therefore, they 
did 
not threaten the domination of Suharto and his governments. Essentialist 
ideas of 
the ethnic Chinese were promulgated. These stereotypes - that they were 
industrious, good at business, thrifty - led Chinese Indonesians to 
be branded as 
unpatriotic, selfish, and exclusive. This policy of favouring an ethnic 
Chinese 
business elite also deferred the emergence of a domestic bourgeoisie (Heryanto, 
1998: 102-103). 
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Filomeno Aguilar highlights the paradox which is at the core of the Chinese 
position in Indonesia. Because they are perceived as coming from outside the 
nation the ethnic Chinese: 
have been consigned to a time that stood still because of the imagined 
irreconcilability of inside and outside... However,... the `problem' is 
that the Chinese are fully imbricated with and historically inseparable 
from Indonesia: the orang Tionghoa and orang Cina are inexorably 
inside Indonesia (Aguilar, 2001: 517). 
The New Order came to an end amid economic collapse and violence in 1998. In 
the next chapter I will outline the events which led to the dramatic fall of the 
regime and the violent aftermath. The violence was largely targetted at the ethnic 
Chinese and in chapter five I will also survey the ways the violence was reported 
in the national press. Since the press is one of the ways in which the discourse of 
national identity is promulgated, this analysis will help me to understand the 
position of the ethnic Chinese just prior to the establishment of the groups. 
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Chapter 5 
1998: A Defining Year 
According to Judith Bird 1998 "was one of those years in Indonesia's history that 
stands out, like 1945 or 1966 in which momentus and tumultuous political 
changes take place with no defining clues as to whether the year would slip into 
disaster or end in hope" (Bird, 1999: 27). This chapter will begin with an outline 
of the events leading up to the fall of the Suharto regime on 21 May 1998. I will 
then discuss the violence during that month, which was largely targetted at the 
ethnic Chinese population. 1998 was a very significant year for Chinese 
Indonesians. Both the fall of Suharto and the violence of that year influenced 
some Chinese Indonesians to establish groups to look out for their interests. 
Within a national context, the events of that year enabled a spacc to develop in 
which Chinese Indonesians could articulate their hopes and desires for the future. 
The End of the Suharto Regime 
In 1997 financial crisis descended on East Asia. The first country to be hit was 
Thailand, but the contagion spread across the region and the Indonesian rupiah 
fell from 2,400 to the American dollar in November 1997 to 17,000 to the dollar 
in January 1998 (Wibowo, 2001: 129). In May 1998, as a pre-emptive strike 
before an IMF meeting on 4 May, which would decide whether to release funds to 
Indonesia, the government reduced fuel and electricity subsidies. They also 
increased the price of kerosene by 25 percent; the fuel used by poor people for 
cooking. Diesel increased in cost by 60 percent and petrol by 71 percent (Eklöf, 
1999: 175-176). Before the crisis, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(BPS, Biro Pusat Statistik), 22.5 million people, or 11.3 percent of the population 
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lived below the poverty line. The International Labour Organisation calculated 
that after the crisis that figure was expected to climb to 100 million people, or 48 
percent of the population (cited Eklöf: 120). 55 
Suharto secured "re-election" in March 1998, however, students who had been 
demonstrating against his "re-election" did not halt their protests after this result. 
Nevertheless, Suharto went ahead and chose his cabinet. Eklöf v-ie«ws these 
appointments as the actions of a lonely president, who chose people not for their 
competence, but for their loyalty to him (Eklöf, 1999: 155). In this cabinet, for the 
first time in his 32 year rule, Suharto selected a Chinese Indonesian. The 
appointment of Bob Hasan was not a victory for Chinese Indonesians, however. 
Hasan, a timber baron, was one of Suharto's crony businessmen. He was never 
active in the Chinese community and was not considered by the ethnic Chinese to 
be their representative (Suryadinata, 1998a: 109). 
Suharto's new cabinet only lasted a couple of months. He stepped down as 
President on 21 May 1998 after pressure from students, NGO activists, 
intellectuals and even his own cabinet, became too great (Eklöf, 1999: 210-213). 
Suharto's vice-President, B. J. Habibie, took over control of the government and 
he took over a nation in crisis. Although he was despised by those calling for 
reform, due to his closeness to Suharto, Habibie surprisingly facilitated the 
holding of elections in 1999 and instigated a number of policies which liberalised 
the repressed society over which Suharto had presided. For example, Habibie 
permitted freedom of the press. Publication licences became easier to attain and 
government was not permitted to close down a newspaper or magazine because 
they disagreed with its content (Anwar, 2001: 9). 
56 Habibie also freed up the 
restrictions on political parties which led to the emergence of about 140 parties, 
48 of which took part in the election of 1999 (Anwar, 2001: 9). 
ss Eklöf points out that the official numbers of those below the poverty line were low by 
international comparison, before the crisis, which may mean that the real number of people 
below the poverty line was higher before the crisis hit (Eklöf, 1999: 120 note 50). 
56 Dewi Fortuna Anwar was personal advisor to Habibie during his time in office. 
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Violence Against the Ethnic Chinese 
The commonly cited statistic that the ethnic Chinese, who made up about three 
percent of the population of Indonesia, controlled seventy percent of the wealth of 
the country, led them to be targeted with much of the blame for the economic 
catastrophe. Chinese Indonesians were also heavily criticised in the media and by 
the military and political elite for leaving the country in great numbers and taking 
vast sums of money with them; money which it was felt was badly needed for 
economic recovery. Their loyalty to Indonesia was questioned. For example, in 
January 1998, the commander of the armed forces called on the owners of the top 
thirteen conglomerates to bring their money back to Indonesia. He did not 
mention the word "Chinese" in his appeal, but it was well publicised that wealthy 
Chinese Indonesians had been leaving the country with vast sums of money 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998). In late January, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid referred to 
the ethnic Chinese as "rats" who had no sense of nationhood and who were taking 
away "the fruits of our national development" (Human Rights Watch, 1998). 
Suharto's son-in-law and then head of the army Special Forces (Kopassus), Maj. 
Gen. Prabowo Subianto, endorsed claims that the crisis had been caused by "the 
conglomerate group [and] their henchmen overseas" (Human Rights Watch, 1998). 
Suharto alluded to "certain business people" as responsible for the economic 
crisis which Stefan Eklöf asserts was a reference to the ethnic Chinese (Eklöf, 
1999: 136). 
On 13 to 15 May 1998 there was an outpouring of anger and violence towards the 
ethnic Chinese in a number of cities across Indonesia. The worst hit areas were 
Jakarta, Solo (Central Java) and Medan (North Sumatra), but there were also 
smaller scale riots in Surabaya in East Java and in Palembang and Bandar 
Lampung both in South Sumatra (Eklöf, 1999: 189-190). This violence involved 
looting and burning of Chinese shops and businesses. In their analysis of the 
Jakarta riots, The Volunteer Team for Humanity (TRUK, Tim Relawan Untuk 
Kemanusian). one of the first NGOs on the scene, discovered a pattern in the way 
the violence was instigated. Local people reported that small groups of unknown, 
highly trained individuals came from outside the communities and instigated the 
violence. These groups were bused in to an area, shouted anti-Chinese slogans, 
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burned tyres, wood, and other goods to attract people to particular areas and 
encouraged the local people to join in looting of the shops, however, the 
instigators of the violence did not take part in the looting (TRUK, 22 May 1998). 
During his research James Siegel heard people say that the groups who instigated 
the violence "came in trucks and some had on [military] boots" suggesting that 
sections of the military, may have been involved in instigating the violence 
(Siegel, 1998: 81). 
In Jakarta, Medan and Surabaya rape of ethnic Chinese women also occurred, and 
in some cases their torture and murder. The number of victims is still debated. In 
their final report the Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF, Tim Gabungan Pencari 
Fakta) verified sixty-four cases of rape and nine cases of other sexual violence or 
torture (Eklöf, 1999: 187-188). These figures are in contrast to those in an earlier 
version of the documentation given to me by TRUK, one of the groups involved in 
the Joint Fact Finding Team. They cited the number of rapes in Jakarta, Solo, 
Medan, Palembang and Surabaya as 168 (TRUK, 13 July 1998). 57 TRUK also 
cited a larger number of dead than government estimates. TRUK's figure of 1,190 
dead was more likely than the governments 288, because bodies had already been 
removed for burial before the government investigation began (Eklöf, 1999: 187 
note 19). Most of the material damage to property and also the rapes were suffered 
by Chinese Indonesians. Some public property including buses, a refuse truck and 
two motorway toll booths were set on fire. It is wrong to assume, however, that all 
the victims were Chinese Indonesians. In their report TRUK writes that local 
people took advantage of the situation "to have what is normally beyond their 
buying capablities" and 1,200 non-Chinese who became trapped in the burning 
buildings also lost their lives. (TRUK, 9 June 1998). 58 
57 TRUK was established after the shooting of four students at Trisakti University during a 
peaceful protest on 12 May 1998. TRUK's role at first was to provide medical assistance but 
they saw a need for people to gather evidence and information about atrocities which occured 
so they turned to evidence gathering (interview with Sandyawan, September 2000). 
58 There was criticism at the time that all the attention was focused on the ethnic Chinese 
victims, while the non-Chinese victims were not reported in the media, either in Indonesia or 
outside the country. As a result the violence in May 1998 became synonymous with "anti- 
Chinese violence" (Purdey, July 2000: 1). Fr. Sandyawan related to me his dismay with the 
UN because they "only concentrated on the rape cases [and] did not broach the substantial 
case which was organised state violence" (interview, 13 September 2000). 
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Sofyan Wanandi has written that attacks on Chinese-Indonesians and their 
property was not new but "this time the situation is different. Never before have 
they felt so totally hopeless and unprotected. There is a widespread feeling that 
the Government has allowed this to happen and even that some sections of the 
Government were behind the campaigns targeting Chinese-Indonesians" (cited 
Mann 1999: 187). Ariel Heryanto suggests that the violence at this time was 
driven by a number of factors including feelings of economic inequality, political 
manipulation and racial hatred (Heryanto, 1999: 310). 
There is no doubt that people did take advantage of the chaotic situation in order 
to have things which would normally be beyond their reach. Children and young 
people who went to look at the spectacle became caught up in the violence (see 
TRUK 9 June 1998). However, Ariel Heryanto rejects the suggestion that the 
violence was a spontaneous reaction against the perceived wealth of the ethnic 
Chinese. He does not wish to deny that there is racial antagonism and economic 
discrepancies, rather, he questions the links which are too often made between the 
violence in 1998 and the economic crisis (Heryanto, 1999: 315). He argues that 
blaming "an imagined collective mass" of urban poor, who have no power to 
refute such claims, provides some sort or rationalisation and even justification for 
the violence, and also exonerates the real culprits, Suharto and those close to him. 
Heryanto also suggests that this explanation does not make clear why violence did 
not take place in other cities like Semarang, Surabaya or Yogyakarta, each of 
which have large ethnic Chinese populations and large industrial bases. It also 
does not explain why the most intense violence outside Jakarta took place in Solo, 
where the ethnic Chinese population had been considered well integrated into the 
local communities and economic discrepencies were not as great as in other cities 
(Heryanto, 1999: 314-315). 
TRUK highlighted the very systematic way in which the violence developed. A 
number of things led them to the conclusion that the violence was orchestrated. 
The leader of the organisation, Fr. Sandyawan Sumardi related to me that "the 
violence was very systematic. The military and the political and economic elite 
were involved. These groups used the ordinary people as a field of conflict and 
blamed the conflict on the ordinary people" (interview, September 2000). At a 
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presentation before parliament in Washington, Fr. Sandyawan, stated that the riots 
were inseparable from the power struggle which had intensified in the days 
leading up to the violence. The aim of the riots was to cause chaos so that military 
rule would be justified (Ocorandi, 1998). Because the main aim was to cause 
chaos and halt any chance of student demands for reform being realised, Fr. 
Sandyawan stated that the riots were not racist in nature. This caused some 
discontent among those who were concerned about the fate of the ethnic Chinese. 
However, Fr. Sandyawan has also argued that in order to carry out their plan the 
elites in the power struggle took advantage of the increasingly anti-Chinese 
atmosphere and the scapegoating of ethnic Chinese in the wake of the financial 
crisis, by targeting Chinese-owned businesses. (Ocorandi, 1998, see also 
Ocorandi's interview with Fr. Sandyawan, 21 June 1998). In the case of the rape 
of ethnic Chinese women, Fr. Sandyawan told me that "the Chinese women were 
chosen because the government wanted to make it look like a racial problem" 
(interview, September 2000). 
In its final report on the violence in 1998 TGPF, stated that the violence was 
organised at "the level of the highest decision-making people", which implies that 
Suharto was involved (cited in Eklöf 1999: 195). However, the team were unable 
to present concrete evidence about who organised the riots and whether there were 
connections between the violence which occurred in various cities across the 
country. Therefore, they stopped short of concluding that the violence had been 
orchestrated as part of a national plan. In the case of the rapes, both TRUK and 
Ariel Heryanto argue that the rapes were more likely to have been carried out by 
members of the military rather than by members of the public (Heryanto, 1999: 
317; TRUK, 13 July 1998). 
Although the evidence suggests that this violence was state orchestrated, the fact 
that the authorities were able to tap into anti-Chinese feelings among the 
population highlights the racial antagonism felt by the people towards the ethnic 
Chinese. len Ang suggests that "Indonesia is an intensely racialised social 
formation, in which the Chinese/Pribumi distinction is generally read in terms of 
economic advantage/disadvantage. In other words, `Chineseness' in contemporary, 
Indonesia does not denote primarily cultural identities, but economic identities" 
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(cited Purdey: July 2000: 14). In order to explore further the discourses of 
Chineseness in Indonesian society at this time, the next section will analyse how 
the national press reported the violence against the ethnic Chinese in 1998. 
Reproducing Ethnic Chinese Discourses 
As mentioned in chapter two, the press is one of the methods through which 
societal discourses are channeled. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out the 
newspaper is a very important tool in the "re-production" of the nation. He argues 
that the newspaper is a "technical means of `re-presenting' the kind of imagined 
community that is the nation" (Anderson, 1991: 25). Michael Billig also 
acknowledges the importance of newspapers in his analysis of "banal 
nationalism": the daily "flagging" of the nation in the lives of its citizens (Billig, 
1995: 6). 59 Arus Yumul and Umut Özkirimli use Billig's idea to explore the 
flagging of the Turkish nation in thirty eight daily newspapers. They quote John 
Hartley who argues that the national press "presents a `consensual model' of 
society which `requires the notion of unity: one nation, one people, one society, 
often simply translated into ours - our industry, our economy, our nuclear 
deterrent, police force, balance of payments, etc. " (Yumul and 
Özkirimli, 2000: 
792). 
This section surveys articles from eight national newspapers between May and 
December 1998.60 I am interested in the language used in the articles when 
discussing the ethnic Chinese. The articles reveal attitudes of the journalists, 
military, government, business elite plus ethnic Chinese themselves, mainly 
members of the newly emerging groups. An image of the ethnic 
Chinese is being 
presented to reinforce the idea that they actually have brought their problems upon 
themselves because they cannot be bothered to fully assimilate, thereby 
perpetuating the myth about Chinese Indonesians. 
59 Billig argues that in the West it is generally believed that nationalism is not as prevalent as 
it is in some of the less stable parts of the world. He refutes this claim and explores 
ho«w the 
nation is "flagged" in a banal (but not necessarily benign) way 
in the print media in Britain. 
60 The eight newspapers I have used are Bisnis Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, 
Kompas, Media 
Indonesia, Mi'rdeka, Repulika, Suara Karya and Suara Pembaruan. According to Idris and 
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Although in 1998 the violence against the ethnic Chinese was discussed in the 
press and questions were raised about why it happened, and how it might be 
prevented in future, two inter-linked discourses dominated the newspaper articles. 
Firstly, Chinese Indonesians were still portrayed as not genuinely part of the 
nation. Secondly, because they were not considered an inherent part of the nation, 
they constituted a problem, which was only solved when the ethnic Chinese 
assimilated into the "indigenous" population. In the following section I will 
explore some of the ways in which the newspapers articulated these two themes. 
Distinctions on Economic Grounds 
Siauw Tiong Djin writes about the difference in meaning between the words 
pembauran and assimilasi, both of which are translated into English as 
"assimilation". According to Siauw, pembauran means a less rigid form of 
assimilation than assimilasi. Pembauran does not ensure that an ethnic group 
must "lose the characteristics of its ethnicity", rather, it urges "association with 
the people in a society" rather than intermarriage in order to disappear into the 
people (Siauw, 1998: 27). The newspapers which I analyse in this section use both 
terms interchangeably, and none of them make a distinction between the two types 
of integration. As the previous chapter indicated, during the New Order period the 
ethnic Chinese were expected to lose their Chinese cultural identity and assimilate 
into their local population. Therefore, although the word pembauran was used 
during this time, it had a stronger connotation than Siauw's understanding. The 
ethnic Chinese did indeed have to lose the characterisitics of their ethnicity. b' 
len Ang's suggestion that the distinction between Chinese and Pribumi in 
Indonesia tends to be in terms of economic advantage/disadvantage is evident in 
the newspaper articles I have analysed. Perhaps this also stems from New Order 
policy towards them. Since they were not permitted to openly display their 
Chinese culture during the New Order period, the ways in which they are 
Gunaratne there were twenty national dailies in circulation in 1998 (Idris and Gunaratne, 
2000: 274). 
61 I will return to Siauw's understanding of the terms pembauran and assimilasi again in 
chapter eight. The ethnic Chinese groups, who also discuss assimilation, do seem to be 
making the distinction between pembauran and assimilasi. 
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criticised are based on economic rather than cultural differences. Again and again 
the ethnic Chinese are portrayed as wealthy compared to poverty stricken 
indigenous Indonesians. The statistic that the ethnic Chinese who make up three 
percent of the population own seventy percent of the wealth of the country was 
mentioned in a number of articles (see Merdeka, 22 May 1998; Republika 14 June 
1998; Bisnis Indonesia, 4 July 1998; Jakarta Post, 29 July 1998; Merdeka 29 
September 1998). Their involvement in KKN (Corruption, Collusion and 
Nepotism) in order to maintain their privileged position is also mentioned 
(Republika, 6 June 1998; Media Indonesia, 7 June 1998; Merdeka, 11 June 1998; 
Republika 14 June 1998, ). Those who fled Indonesia are urged to return. and 
bring their money with them, in order to help rebuild the economy. Many articles 
concentrated on the numbers of ethnic Chinese who fled the country during this 
period. The occupancy rate of hotels in Singapore was said to be one hundred 
percent with prices in the range of ninety-seven US dollars per night, a prohibitive 
amount for most Indonesians (Merdeka, 23 May 1998). An article in The Jakarta 
Post has the title "Ethnic Chinese at the Ready for Quick Escape" perhaps 
suggesting that Chinese Indonesians are not loyal, although the article also 
included Chinese Indonesians whose property had been destroyed declaring their 
love for Indonesia (Jakarta Post, 13 June 1998). 
In order to show that they are genuinely Indonesia, Chinese Indonesians writing in 
the media use an economic argument also, explaining that they are not all wealthy. 
The badminton star, Rudy Hartono, who is of ethnic Chinese descent, stated that 
Chinese Indonesians feel horrified by the size of the businesses of Liem Sioe 
Liong and other conglomerate owners (Republika, 6 June 1998). William 
Soeryadjaya, chairman of Astra Group, stated that all ethnic Chinese are not like 
the tycoon Liem Sioe Liong. Rather, there are many who are poor and who are 
still in Indonesia; they did not flee abroad (Merdeka, 23 June 1998; see also 
Media Indonesia, 1998; Merdeka, 1 August 1998). The leaders of the organisation 
Persabi, an organisation established in 1997 in order to gather together Chinese 
Indonesian Muslims, urged all "Indonesian citizens of foreign descent, especially 
the ethnic Chinese" (warga negara Indonesia keturunan asing, terutama 
keturunan Cina) to remain in solidarity with the nation and not flee abroad. This 
organisation goes on to explain that the reason for the violence is frustration 
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among people at the wealth of the ethnic Chinese and an inability to channel this 
frustration through political means (Media Indonesia, 21 May 1998). 
A poor ethnic Chinese living in Jakarta states that Chinese Indonesians should not 
live in exclusive areas, rather they should assimilate and then the situation would 
be more peaceful (Hidup berbaur dengan masvarakat jauh lebih aman) (Ifedia 
Indonesia: 7 July 1998b). In this article the lack of assimilation is associated with 
wealth. The wealthy Indonesians who live in exclusive areas of the city are 
considered to have assimilated less successfully than poor Chinese Indonesians 
such as himself. Interestingly, this poor ethnic Chinese who is calling for more 
assimilation has kept his Chinese name, Liang Gun Heng. During the New Order 
Chinese Indonesians were encouraged to take Indonesian sounding names in order 
to show an affiliation with Indonesia. Liang explains that one's name is given by 
one's parents and that it is therefore disrespectful to change it. Liang also states 
that he does not believe that a person's name is the main problem. Another ethnic 
Chinese explained that during the violence of 1998 the poor Chinese of his area 
were not attacked because they were one with the non-Chinese of the area. He 
goes on to suggest that assimilation may be limited by social class (Merdeka, I 
August, 1998). 
Ethnic Chinese Must Make the Effort 
Having illustrated some of the ways in which the ethnic Chinese are distinguished 
from the non-Chinese Indonesians, this section will depict how the onus falls on 
the ethnic Chinese to make efforts to assimilate in order to be fully accepted as 
part of the nation. Although there is some acceptance that there is discrimination 
against ethnic Chinese, it is up to Chinese Indonesians to change their behaviour. 
One article suggests that restrictions on Chinese in government, the civil service, 
and at state universities should be lifted so that they can assimilate. If they are 
permitted to join politics and the civil service and the military, their outlook will 
be opened up. They will not just live for business, but they will also care about the 
nation (Media Indonesia, 4 July 1998). Also, when government officials admitted 
that some administrative practices - such as the distinguishing mark on the 
identity card, and the need for ethnic Chinese to apply for a citizenship certificate 
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discriminated against the ethnic Chinese, the acknowledgement was couched in 
demands that Chinese Indonesians also make efforts to assimilate.. government 
official stated that "if the ethnic Chinese do not change their attitude and 
assimilate, the pribumi who discriminate against them will not be entirely to 
blame" (Merdeka, 30 June 1998). 
Non-Chinese Indonesians writing in the newspapers tend to blame the ethnic 
Chinese for the problems between Chinese and non-Chinese. For example, the 
non-Chinese psychologist, Djamaludin Ancok, suggested that a segment of the 
ethnic Chinese population, who own enterprises, are to blame for the problems 
and are so numerous it is hard to avoid them (Media Indonesia, 7 June 1998). The 
article suggests that research into relations between Chinese and non-Chinese 
carried out twenty years ago is still relevant. In fact the article argues that Chinese 
Indonesians have become more exclusive, for example they go to America to 
study and attend schools especially for ethnic Chinese (Media Indonesia: 7 June 
1998). Ramadhian Adi Broto suggests that "citizens of Chinese descent need to 
strengthen their affiliation" with Indonesia. He states that attitudes such as 
friendliness (bersahabat), group orientation (berkelompok), working together 
(bekeija sama) and caring for other people (peduli kepada orang lain) all aid 
assimilation (Bisnis Indonesia, 7 June 1998)62. At a symposium held in June 1998 
and attended by Amien Rais one of the speakers suggested that, with Chinese 
Indonesian inclusion in politics and the opening up of avenues outside the 
business sector, it was hoped that they would end their collusion with the 
government (Suara Karya, 8 June 1998). On another occasion a Muslim leader, 
Kiyai Hasyim, stated that ethnic Chinese who had a higher standard of living than 
non-Chinese held themselves back from the community. Racism was not just the 
fault of the non-Chinese, according to Kiyai Hasyim, ethnic Chinese businesses 
preferred to hire Chinese Indonesians (Suara Peinbaruan). Another article states 
that Chinese Indonesians who marry non-Chinese tend to be banished from their 
families (Bisnis Indonesia, 10 June 1998). The governor of Jakarta urges the 
ethnic Chinese to assimilate by not living in exclusive areas because this causes 
jealousy and outbreaks of violence (Koinpas, 27 June 1998). 
In almost all the articles which express some sympathy vN, ith Chinese Indonesians 
for the violence they suffered, there are also calls that they make more effort to 
assimilate. In 1998 the then Minister for Justice, Muladi, said that the government 
was willing to ratify the international convention against racial discrimination and 
the convention against torture, but that the ethnic Chinese must make an effort to 
assimilate (meinbaur) and to lose their exclusive tendencies (Koinpas, 12 June 
1998, Bisnis Indonesia, 13 June 1998). The governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, 
apologised to the ethnic Chinese for the violence of May 1998, but went on in the 
next sentence to instruct (berpesan) Chinese Indonesians to assimilate fully. He 
particularly insisted that they live in areas which were not exclusively inhabited 
by other ethnic Chinese (Kompas, 27 June 1998). The Co-ordinating Minister of 
the Economy, Finance and Industry of the time, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, stated 
that the government was very sad at the devastation suffered by the ethnic Chinese 
and he assured them that they were an integral part of the nation. On the other 
hand, he said that no government help would be available for the ethnic Chinese 
who had to re-build their businesses because funds were very scarce. Anyhow, 
Ginandjar went on, the ethnic Chinese did not need help. He stated that they had 
suffered this kind of violence before and overcame it because they have a network 
(jaringan). This network means that they can look after themselves (Suara 
Pembaruan, 1 June 1998). He also echoed what Bambang Wiyogo, the leader of 
Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia (Hipmi, The Association of Young 
Indonesian Entrepreneurs) had urged, that is the return of those who fled the 
country along with the money they have taken. Like Wiyogo, Ginandjar argued 
that because they made their money in Indonesia, with many benefits from the 
Indonesian government, ethnic Chinese were obliged to bring the money back to 
Indonesia (Suar-a Pembaruan, 1 June 1998). There is a sense that the ethnic 
Chinese are viewed as not really loyal to Indonesia because they have fled with 
lots of money, which is needed for economic redevelopment. It also implies that 
those Chinese Indonesians who have left did not really deserve this money, rather, 
they have cheated the "real" Indonesians out of it. Another government minister, 
Muladi. stated that he would introduce legislation to protect ethnic Chinese from 
62 In this article pentbauran and asimilasi are used interchangeably. 
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racial discrimination, however, they would have to be less exclusive in their 
behaviour (Bisnis Indonesia, 13 June 1998). These kinds of comments lead to 
what might be considered an explanation or even a justification for the violence 
against the ethnic Chinese. 
According to the majority of the articles, it is very much the responsibility of the 
ethnic Chinese to take the initiative in trying to assimilate. In one article it is 
explained that since the pribuml have accepted the ethnic Chinese (sudah 
menerima mereka) as citizens since they first arrived on the archipelago, so it is 
now up to the ethnic Chinese to start assimilating (Merdeka, 30 June 1998, see 
also Bisnis Indonesia, 7 June 1998). Yunus Yahya cites an anecdote expressed by 
Mohammad Hatta63 that if there is a gap of 100 metres between an ethnic Chinese 
and a non-Chinese Indonesian, then the ethnic Chinese must quickly close the gap, 
not the "indigenous" Indonesian (Merdeka, 12 August 1998). It is clear that 
although the non-Chinese are encouraged to be more accepting of ethnic Chinese 
who do endeavour to assimilate, the onus is on the ethnic Chinese to make most 
of the effort in initiating the assimilation process. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, calls in the media for the ethnic Chinese to assimilate by 
becoming Muslim are not in evidence. This highlights the complexity of the 
concept of assimilation in Indonesia and also the difficulty for the ethnic Chinese 
who might feel fully assimilated but might still have attributes which some 
consider non-Indonesian. Different people highlight different means by which 
assimilation might take place. Despite these differences of emphasis, however, the 
main discourse is that the ethnic Chinese must assimilate more successfully into 
Indonesian society. 
Stigmatised as Outsiders 
The outsider status of the ethnic Chinese is also reinforced by emphasising that 
they originally came from outside the archipelago. A discussion about the history 
of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was entitled "Mereka ti"ang Datang darf Utara" 
(Those Who Have Come from the North), even though the article acknowledges 
63 Mohammad Hatta was vice President of Indonesia after Independence was won from the 
Dutch in 1948. 
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that Chinese have been coming to Indonesia for centuries. In fact the article stated 
that they have been arriving in Indonesia since long before the kingdom of 
Sriwijaya was established in the sixth century. Despite this their arrival from 
outside the archipelago was still highlighted in the title of the article (. Media 
Indonesia, 7 July 1998a). 
Highlighting their "Chineseness" also raised questions about their genuineness as 
Indonesians. For example, in an otherwise quite sympathetic interview with some 
people who fled to Hong Kong after the violence in May, the people's Chinese 
names were included along with their Indonesian names, even though they no 
longer used the names or spoke any Chinese (Merdeka, 27 May 1998). In a 
discussion about the business practices of Chinese Indonesians, their 
hardworking, diligent behaviour, and their perceived tendency to trust only their 
close family and friends, was said to stem from their Confucian heritage (Bisnis 
Indonesia, 10 June 1998). 
The terms used to describe the ethnic Chinese also reinforces the idea that they 
are not really authentic Indonesians, which means that their presence in Indonesia 
constitutes a problem. A distinction is still made between ethnic Chinese who are 
citizens and indigenous citizens. The most common term used to describe 
Chinese-Indonesians at this time was non pribumi (non-native). Another term 
used to distinguish them from "indigenous" Indonesians is WNI keturunan 
(Indonesian citizens of foreign descent). As discussed in the previous chapter, this 
phrase has a contrived, legalistic tone and the phrase "Indonesian citizen" (WNI, 
Warga Negara Indonesia) is not used to describe "indigenous" Indonesians. 
The way the ethnic Chinese were represented in the newspapers followed the 
pattern of urging them to become more Indonesian by overcoming the anti- 
Chinese stereotypes, such as living in less exclusive areas, caring about something 
other than money, and genuinely showing loyalty to Indonesia. Even when articles 
were sympathetic to Chinese Indonesians who had suffered during the violence, 
they also took a rather defensive attitude, urging ethnic Chinese to behave more 
appropriately and they would not suffer abuse. Despite this rather negative 
reporting, there were also positive outcomes, one of which was that Chinese 
Indonesians themselves began to have a voice in the national media, as the next 
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section describes. Although these voices urged Chinese Indonesians to act in ways 
which did not anger the non-Chinese, they also began to argue that Chinese 
Indonesians should be treated like any other ethnic group in Indonesia, and that 
their cultural heritage should be accepted. 
Chinese Indonesian Voices 
Teun Van Dijk argues that it is common for minorities living in specific nations to 
be voiceless in the media. They tend to be relient on the voices of supporters 
(Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 173). In Indonesia in 1998 the ethnic Chinese were not 
voiceless any more. Some of their voices were heard through groups such as those 
I have investigated in this research. However, in many ways the ethnic Chinese 
writing in the media, and those who spoke to journalists, illustrated how they had 
internalised the anti-Chinese discourses. For example, they called on the ethnic 
Chinese to be less exclusive, to use their money to help Indonesia, and to declare 
their loyalty to Indonesia. Stuart Hall discusses a similar phenomenon in an essay 
entitled "Cultural Identity and Diaspora". In a discussion of diaspora Caribbean 
representations of their cultural identity, Hall states that in a person's cultural 
identity there is an awareness of difference as well as an awareness of similarity 
with others. He suggests as well as being constructed as different in Edward 
Said's "`Orientalist' sense" there is also an internalisation among those classified 
as "other" so that they too conform to this norm (Hall, 1993: 394-395). 
Throughout the newspapers I examined ethnic Chinese also use the rhetoric of the 
stereotypes in their appeals for calm. For example, in an article appealing to 
ethnic Chinese not to leave the country they are called on to stand shoulder-to- 
shoulder with their fellow Indonesians to solve the economic and social problems 
(bersama-sama turut bahu-membahu memperbaiki krisis yang kita alami 
bersama-sama) (Media Indonesia, 21 May 1998). The badminton champion Rudy 
Hartono, who is of ethnic Chinese descent, called on Chinese Indonesians not to 
lose heart after the riots of 1998, and to continue to give service to the country 
(Mari kita terus memberi darma bakti pada negeri ini) (Republika. 6 June 1998). 
In both these examples they are trying to show that there are ethnic Chinese «who 
care about the country and want to stay to re-build it. 
115 
Another way in which the ethnic Chinese showed that they were loyal Indonesians 
was to declare their love for Indonesia in a very forthright manner in the articles. 
This necessity is probably linked to the discourse of "assimilation" in that the 
pressure is on Chinese Indonesians to prove that they are true Indonesians. One 
individual who fled to Hong Kong, for example, said that Indonesia was still his 
homeland, he was born and grew up there and would return. In an article entitled 
"Citizens of Foreign Descent Genuinely Love Indonesia" (rJärga Keturunan itu 
Sejatinya Begitu Cinta Indonesia) a staff journalist from the magazine . -lsiait'eek 
who is based in Hong Kong, and is Chinese Indonesian, declared that he felt just 
like a pribumi. He speaks Indonesian with his family, passionately loves 
Indonesia, from the culture and natural beauty to the political system, and he feels 
that China is just like any foreign country and does not hold a special place in his 
heart (Republika, 28 May 1998a). A second article in Republika on 28 May about 
the Chinese Indonesians who had fled the country was entitled, "I Still Love 
Indonesia" (Saya Masih Cinta Indonesia). This victim said that "rain of stones in 
your own country is better than golden rain in a foreign one" (Republika, 28 May 
1998b). Another Chinese Indonesian who fled abroad said that Indonesia was still 
his homeland (tanah air), that he was born there and grew up there and would 
return when the situation became calmer (Merdeka, 27 May 1998). Another 
Chinese Indonesian says that she has lots of Pribumi friends and so feels very 
lucky (Bisnis Indonesia, 7 June 1998). A man whose shop was destroyed during 
the riots in 1998, and whose father and grandfather also had businesses destroyed 
in riots in 1990 and 1947, still insists that "[Indonesia] is also our country. We 
were all born and grew up here" (The Jakarta Post, 11 June 1998). The Chinese 
Indonesian leader of the organisation Parpindo (Indonesian Assimilation Party), 
Jusuf Hamka, stated that "we love peace, and love and care for all the people of 
Indonesia. Although we are citizens of foreign descent we were born here and 
wish to die in Indonesia" (Merdeka, 11 June 1998). In August Chinese Indonesians 
performed waiang in Jakarta. ` According to one of those involved in the 
production, Dandoel, the aim was to show that the ethnic Chinese were not just 
close to Chinese culture. He stated that Chinese Indonesians have been in 
b4 1f«-yang is the Javanese tradition of telling stories using leather or wooden puppets. 
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Indonesia a long time and they feel that Indonesia is the country of their ancestors, 
therefore, the culture of Indonesia is understood and loved by them (Merdeka, 21 
August 1998). 
Many seminars organised by NGOs, intellectuals and members of the nerv Chinese 
Indonesian groups were held to discuss the difficulties between ethnic Chinese 
and non-Chinese after the violence. Although "assimilation" was still central to 
the discussions, the meaning of the term became more unclear and more open to 
interpretation. For example, the cultural observer, Ignas Kleden, said that there 
needed to be assimilation in various sectors which had not been possible up to 
now, such as politics, the economy as well as culture. In other words, he said, 
everybody should have the same opportunity to express themselves in the 
political, economic and cultural sectors. Kleden seems to be suggesting that all 
the ethnic groups in Indonesia, including the ethnic Chinese, should have the 
freedom to express their ethnic heritage and to feel they belong to the nation 
(Suara Pembaruan, 29 June 1998). Kwik Kian Gie also follows this line of 
argument (Media Indonesia, 4 July 1998). In a seminar entitled, "The Problem of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous at this Time" (Masalah Pri dan Non-Pri Dewasa 
177i) the social commentator Nurcholish Madjid said that diversity should be 
accepted as a national asset (Kompas, 25 June 1998, see also Republika, 29 July 
1998; Media Indonesia, 4 July 1998; Merdeka 24 August 1998; Media Indonesia 
24 August 1998). This fits more with Siauw Tiong Djin's understanding of the 
term pembauran which I mentioned above. 
The press in 1998 in some ways continued to articulate discourses which strongly 
encouraged the ethnic Chnese to assimilate completely into Indonesian society, 
and although sympathy was expressed in the press for the violence which was 
perpetrated against them, their exclusive behaviour and lack of loyalty to 
Indonesia was also highlighted as possible reasons for the violence. However, 
changes also seemed to be happening in the portrayal of Chinese Indonesians. 
These changes were particularly evident in the opportunity which Chinese 
Indonesians had to voice their opinions about what had happened and what should 
happen in the future. Seminars and conferences were organised in which people 
discussed the racial problems in Indonesia and these were reported in the press. 
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This would have been unheard of under the New Order rules on SARA. (see The 
Jakarta Post, 29 June 1998; Suara Pembaruan, 29 June 1998; Media Indonesia, 4 
July 1998). Chinese Indonesians started to speak out more forcefully about the 
problems they faced. For example, at a seminar in August 1998 a conference heard 
how the ethnic Chinese feel like visitors in Indonesia (Suara Karva, 8 . -august 
1998). There also started to be discussion about stopping the use of pri and non- 
pri, and changing some of the regulations which affected Chinese Indonesians, 
such as, the mark on the identity card which allowed the authorities to know who 
was ethnic Chinese (see Bisnis Indonesia, 29 June 1998, The Jakarta Post, 30 
June 1998; Kompas, 24 July 1998; Suara Kai-ja, 19 October 1998). 
After the violence of 1998 and the fall of the New Order regime it became clear 
that people were calling for radical changes in the political structure of the 
country. According to Siauw Tiong Djin, of all the reforms that needed to be 
introduced, many related to the policies towards minorities, particularly the 
Chinese minority (Siauw, 1998: 7). This was important according to Siauw 
because racism against the ethnic Chinese dampened their spirits and led to 
corruption, collusion and nepotism. It also undermined Indonesia's reputation as a 
modern nation which upheld acceptable standards of human rights (Siauw, 1998: 
8). To have the ethnic Chinese integrated or assimilated (terintegrasi/terbaur) into 
the body of the nation was Siauw's hope at the start of the reform process (Siauw, 
1998: 8). 
In the rest of this thesis I will explore what some Chinese Indonesians did with 
the more accomodating space which opened up within Indonesian society after the 
demise of the New Order regime. In the next chapter I will introduce eleven of the 
Chinese Indonesian groups which developed out of the chaos and violence of 
1998. It is difficult to over-emphasise how radical their activities were, given the 
ban on Chinese culture which had been in place for over thirty-two years. As is 
evident from the newspapers at this time, they began to voice their concerns and 
their hopes for the future, particularly their hope that Chinese Indonesians would 
be accepted as a genuine, loyal Indonesian ethnic group. The significance of 1998 
for the Chinese Indonesians I interviewed is that the violence highlighted for them 
the vulnerable position they were in. Within the more open space which emerged 
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after the violence these people decided that it was time for Chinese Indonesians to 
speak out and look after themselves. 
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Chapter 6 
Chinese 
Indonesia 
Organisations in Post-Suharto 
Chapters four and five have provided the context within which the groups 
emerged. After the fall of the New Order regime, a very new situation developed 
because for the first time in thirty-two years Chinese Indonesians were organising 
themselves as Chinese and gathering with other ethnic Chinese to demand changes 
to the way they were treated. Not all ethnic Chinese engaged in this way with the 
reform movement. There were some who were acting individually and joined 
political parties, and non-governmental organisations. There are also ethnic 
Chinese who are not involved at all. The groups I am looking at are significant 
because for the first time in thirty-two years they are dealing mainly with issues 
relating to Chinese Indonesians. 
This chapter will introduce eleven Chinese Indonesian groups which were 
established in 1998. My categorisation of the organisations is based on a list 
produced by The Indonesian Chinese Social Association (Paguyuban Sosial 
Marga Tionghoa Indonesia, hereafter PSMTI), one of the organisations which will 
be examined in this research. They have divided the groups into non- 
governmental organisations, religious associations, and political parties (PSMTI, 
2001). During the fieldwork it became clear that there is a division within the 
non-governmental organisations category between those which concentrate on 
social and cultural issues, and others which campaign on anti-discrimination 
issues. Therefore, in this research the non-governmental organisations have been 
divided into "social-cultural groups" and "anti-discrimination groups". 
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Actually, I would argue that despite the categorisation, all these organisations are 
broadly political, although some of the groups told me that they are trying to stay 
out of politics. In this regard I agree with Jenny Chapman who argues that 
"[p]olitics is about all decisions that shape our lives, not only those made in a 
restricted arena conventionally defined as `politics"' (Chapman, 1995: 100). 
My aim was to meet with members from at least one group in each of the four 
categories of organisation. 65 In total I spoke to representatives from six out of ten 
NGOs (both social-cultural and anti-discrimination groups), " three out of four 
political parties, " and two out of four religious organisations. 68 
Non-Government Organisations: Social-Cultural Groups 
Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia 
The Indonesian Chinese Social Association (PSMTI) 
PSMTI was one of the first Chinese Indonesian organisations to be established 
after the violence of May 1998. It was set up by a former Brigadier General, Tedy 
Jusuf, on 28 September 1998. Marga in Indonesian means "family name" and this 
association developed out of Chinese family name groups in Jakarta. Primarily, 
PSMTI developed out of the Rumah Abu (Ash Houses) in Jakarta. Ash Houses are 
places where Chinese Indonesians have traditionally brought the ashes of family 
members who have passed away. In Ash Houses candles are lit, photos of the 
deceased family members are placed on the walls, and family members visit to 
honour their relatives. The Ash Houses are organised by family name, and 69 
65 The numbers I provide are based on the list given to me by PSMTI and my own knowledge 
of the organisations. There may be other groups that I am not aware of. 
66 The non-governmental organisations I did not meet with are Forum Komunikasi Sarjana 
Tionghoa Indonesia (Communication Forum of Chinese Indonesian Scholars), Yayasan 
Lestari Kebudayaan Tionghoa Indonesia (Foundation for the Preservation of Chinese 
Indonesian Culture), Paguyuban Banlam Indonesia and Badan Koordinasi Antar Alumni se 
Jakarta (The Coordinating Body of Alumni of Jakarta). 
67 The political party I did not meet with was Partai Buddhis Demokrat Indonesia (The 
Democratic Buddhist Party of Indonesia). 
68 The religious organisations I did not meet with were Dewan Pengurus Pusat Perwakilan 
Unrat Buddha Indonesia (Walubi. Central Committee of Buddhist Leaders of Indonesia), and 
Paguyuban Unrat Tao Indonesia (Puti, Association of Taoist Leaders of Indonesia). 
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family names are represented by an Ash House in Jakarta (PS. NITI, 2000a). The 
original declaration of PSMTI was signed by 88 individuals who represented 
different Chinese family name groups. They now have branches of the 
organisation in more than forty districts throughout Indonesia. 
The functions (fungsi) and aims (tujuan) of the organisation are set out in 
Anggaran Dasar, Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Program Kerja 2000-2003 (Statutes, 
Rules of Association, and Programme of Action 2000-2003). The functions as 
stated in the statutes are, to co-ordinate and channel the aspirations of the 
members of the organisation, to facilitate communication between the members, 
and between members and other groups (PSMTI, 2000b: 17). They have very 
broad aims, the first of which is to play an active part in all aspects of the 
development of Indonesia, and to strive for justice and prosperity for the people. 
Secondly, they wish to bring about integration in Indonesia in accordance with the 
Youth Oath (Sumpah Pemuda) of 1928 and the concept of "Plurality but Unity" 
(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). Finally they aim to ensure that human rights are 
protected, especially those of the ethnic Chinese (PSMTI, 2000b: 17). 
PSMTI established itself as an organisation in which only Chinese Indonesians 
could become full members. Non-Chinese Indonesians who are family members 
(husbands, wives, children) or are closely involved with issues relating to Chinese 
Indonesians may become honorary members (PSMTI, 2000b). PSMTI is the only 
organisation established since 1998 which does not permit non-Chinese to become 
full members. Tedy Jusuf explained to me that "in Indonesia all ethnic groups 
have such organisations so the Chinese should too" (interview, April 2001). 
Another member, Ernawati Sugondo, explained that "before May 1998 there was 
no organisation where the Chinese could go to ask questions or voice their 
aspirations. There has been discrimination against the Chinese and now this 
organisation lobbies the government on behalf of the ethnic Chinese to get rid of 
discrimination" (interview, May 2001). 
Aspects of PSMTI policy, including the ban on non-Chinese members, caused a 
large number of the original members to leave the organisaton. According to Tedy 
Jusuf, 90 percent of the members left at one point. Despite this setback Jusuf 
claimed to have rebuilt the organisation and said there are branches in 40 districts 
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throughout Indonesia. Most of the people who left joined Perhimpunan Indonesia 
Keturunan Tionghoa (The Chinese Indonesian Association, hereafter INTI). 
Perhimpunan Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa 
The Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI) 
INTI was established on 5 February 1999 in Jakarta (INTI, 1999a: 2). The General 
Chairman of the organisation is Eddie Lembong, the owner of the pharmaceutical 
company PT Pharos Indonesia. He explained to me that: 
INTI was declared on 10 April 1999. It is not a political party and I 
specifically did not want it to be mistaken for one so I called it a 
perhimpunan (association). INTI is a mass social organisation. We 
want all Chinese Indonesians to become members of INTI. But, very 
importantly, it is not only for the ethnic Chinese (interview, 4 April 
2001). 
The purpose of INTI, according to Eddie Lembong, is to solve the "Chinese 
problem" (interview, April 2001). According to Lembong, "this problem is a 
historical product, in other words, INTI do not perceive the problem to have been 
caused by the ethnic Chinese, nor by other people. It is part of the history and 
heritage we have inherited" (interview, April 2001). 
The stated aims of the organisation are: to defend and build upon the philosophy 
of Pancasila, to educate people about the positive side of pluralism and to 
emphasise that everybody is equal in the eyes of God, to implement the historical 
mission of the nation of Indonesia, that is, to develop a nation which is prosperous 
and just, and finally, to help develop a modern culture which will prepare 
Indonesia for the twenty-first century (INTI, 1999a: 3). As with PSMTI, these are 
very broad, vague aims and there are various different departments within the 
organisation each of which has a specific part to play in fulfilling them. INTI's 
aims are also very ambitious and long-term. The Education Department, for 
example, aims to build new schools and improve schools which have a low 
standard of education. In the long term they hope to build academies and 
universities, establish public libraries and provide scholarships to students who 
cannot afford to continue their education (INTI, 1999b: 3-4). The Legal 
Department aims to provide legal aid to all members of the organisation, to fight 
to eliminate all types of discriminatory laws, and recruit lawyers to work for the 
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organisation full-time (INTI, 1999b: 4). 69 The Art and Culture Department hopes 
to encourage the development of the culture and traditions of all the ethnic groups 
in Indonesia, including those of the ethnic Chinese. They also hope to establish 
schools of dance and art (INTI, 1999b: 5). 
Members of these two social-cultural organisations tend to be older people, many 
of whom remember the situation of Chinese Indonesians before the coup attempt 
of 1965, and the subsequent crackdown on Chinese culture. This may explain why 
they are keen to re-introduce Chinese language and culture to the younger 
generations. For example, both Tedy Jusuf and Eddie Lembong spent some time in 
Chinese language schools during their childhood. 
Both organisations are very interested in encouraging young people to re-discover 
their Chinese heritage. PSMTI have published a number of booklets aimed at 
young people, such as, Sekilas Btrdav a Tionghoa di Indonesia (A Glance at 
Chinese Indonesian Culture) which introduces issues such as Chinese marriage 
and burial traditions, traditional Chinese clothing, and religious traditions (Jusuf, 
2000). They have also published a booklet with information about all the Chinese 
family names in Jakarta along with addresses of Rumah Abu where people can go 
to reintroduce themselves to Chinese social networks (PSMTI, 2000b). As part of 
their campaign to encourage Chinese Indonesians to return to their Chinese names 
and to choose Chinese names for their children, they have also published a book 
of Chinese names for boys and girls. (interview with PSMTI member Eddy Sadeli, 
May 2001). INTI have established a Youth Department through which they hope 
to gather together young people and students, especially those of Chinese descent, 
and organise "positive activities which prepare for the future of the nation" 
(kegiatan-kegiatan positif sebagai kader bangsa) They also hope to integrate the 
recreational activities of young Chinese Indonesians into the general activities of 
young Indonesians at a local and national level (INTI, 1999b: 4). 
6i9 A prominent lawyer is a member of INTI. His practice provides advice on citizenship 
issues, changing of names from Chinese to Indonesian ones, and immigration documentation. 
On his company's documentation he provides his Chinese as well as his Indonesian name 
(his Chinese name is in roman lettering not Chinese) so he is obviously promoting his 
practice towards Chinese Indonesians. 
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These groups are still tentative about getting involved in politics. Neither PS'MITI 
nor INTI wishes to be portrayed as political. After calling for the law to be 
changed so that it is not necessary for the President of Indonesia to be an 
indigenous person (orang asli) as was stated in article 6 of the Constitution, Tedv 
Jusuf of PSMTI stated that he did not want people to think that they had political 
aims, or wanted an ethnic Chinese to be president, because PSMTI was not a 
political organisation and did not have any affiliation with political parties. It was 
simply that PSMTI did not want the Constitution to be discriminatory (Rak)'at 
Merdeka, 4 March 2000). They also state this in their rules and regulations 
(PSMTI, 2000b: 16). Eddie Lembong also reassured people that INTI was not 
interested in politics (Suara Kaiya, 12 April 1999). When asked whether the 
ethnic Chinese would "demand" to be included in the Cabinet after the 1999 
election, Eddie Lembong replied: 
We would be very grateful... but for us what's more important is that 
each Cabinet member must fight for the interests of the whole nation, 
not the interests of a certain ethnic or other group (The Jakarta Post, 
26 October 1999). 
Eddie Lembong explained that "at the moment INTI promotes education. If we 
talk about reforming the government and so on it would be very political which 
we try to avoid". Lembong describes INTI as "a mass social organisation" 
(interview April 2001). Tedy Jusuf explained that "it is important for the Chinese 
to take part in politics and also to join other sectors (other than business). But, the 
Chinese should join political parties which are not exclusively for Chinese; they 
should join mainstream organisations. This organisation is not a political 
organisation. It is cultural and social" (interview, April 2001). 
Neither PSMTI or INTI were willing to disclose how many members they had in 
their organisations. There are 109 people listed as being part of the Central Board 
of PSMTI, however, general membership is not listed (PSMTI, 2000b). INTI have 
no details in their literature about how many members they have. In response to 
the questions I asked in relation to membership all the groups were very unwilling 
to respond. I surmise from this and from my knowledge of Indonesian society that 
the groups do not have as many members as they would like. Many Chinese 
Indonesians were still unwilling or not interested in getting involved in such 
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openly Chinese organisations so soon after riots against them. I also speculate that 
most of their members are ethnic Chinese. Although INTI are open to non-Chinese 
the emphasis on encouraging Chinese cultural activity means that most non- 
Chinese are not interested in getting involved. 
Non-Government Organisations: Anti-Discrimination Groups 
Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi 
Indonesian Anti-Discrimination Movement (GANDI) 
I found that younger Chinese-Indonesians have tended to become involved in 
more overtly political organisations, which are also integrated to a greater extent 
into the reform activities of other non-ethnic based groups in Indonesia. GANDI is 
one of these groups. It was established after the violence of May 1998 by Nico 
Krisnanto, a Chinese Indonesian businessman who works for the financial and 
banking group, Lippo. According to GANDI literature, they were very concerned 
about the tragedy of May 1998 so "a group of Indonesian Chinese businessmen 
and executives gathered and after much deliberation decided to form an institution 
to fight for our dignity and human rights" (GANDI, 1998). 
The name GANDI was suggested by Abdurrachman Wahid who associated the 
vision of the organisation with the peaceful aims of Mahatma Gandhi. GANDI 
was officially established on 6 November 1998 at the home of Wahid (Ciganjur). 
Also in attendance was the current President, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Although 
there seem to be close links between GANDI and Abdurrachman Wahid (some 
former members of GANDI are now in Wahid's party PKB), GANDI declares 
itself to be a non-partisan and non-profit organisation and no members of the 
organisation are permitted to be members of any political party (GANDI, 1998). 
One of the main aims of GANDI is to pressure the government to abolish legal 
regulations which discriminate against Chinese Indonesians. In their mission 
statement they explain that "[w]hile racial tension and conflicts emerged and 
spread across the nation, only the Chinese are treated unfairly under a 
legal 
framework" (GANDI, 1998). Their programme of action is explained in their 
yearly report. GANDI identifies government policy (formal and informal) which 
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they consider discriminatory, and along with other organisations, lobby the 
government to change these laws. The organisation also identifies international 
conventions which deal with the issue of discrimination, and lobby the 
government to ratify these. In relation to the population at large GANDI wish to 
highlight discriminatory policy through the mass media, and through seminars, 
journals and articles, so that people reach an agreement about the importance of 
all their fellow citizens. They hope that they can create a dialogue between 
different groups in society so that they can learn to understand and to value each 
other. GANDI also hope to establish networks with organisations in Indonesia and 
overseas to promote issues such as human rights, discrimination, and democracy. 
Finally, GANDI aim to carry out advocacy work on behalf of individuals who 
have suffered discrimination (GANDI, 2001: 3). 
GANDI have also outlined how they have begun to put into practice this 
programme of action. They have collaborated with other non-governmental 
organisations, including Komnas HAM (National Human Rights Commission), 
SNB (Solidarity for Motherland and Nation) and FKKB (National Unity 
Communication Forum) to organise conferences related to issues of 
discrimination and human rights. The proceedings of some of these have been 
published, including Menjalin Persaudaraan dalam Perbedaan [Weaving 
Friendship out of Difference], a conference held on 15 December 1998 in Jakarta 
which consisted of dialogue between various religious leaders. Another 
publication of conference proceedings is Indonesia Menuju Penghapusan Segala 
Bentuk Diskriminasi [Indonesia Aims for the Abolition of all Types of 
Discrimination], held on 5 May 1999, and opened by the then chairman of 
Komnas HAM (National Human Rights Commission), Marzuki Darusman. 
GANDI has also established a "Friends of GANDI Forum". These are a group of 
interested people including students, academics, social commentators, and 
members of the public, which meets to discuss issues relating to discrimination. In 
the year 2000 they debated "Fanaticism and Fundamentalism in Indonesia", 
"Implementation of (Penegakan) the Law in Efforts to Abolish Racial 
Discrimination", "Equal Citizenship in the Future; Ideas for the Amendment of 
Section 26 of the 1945 Constitution", "The Chinese Minority and Equal 
127 
Citizenship", "Nationalism in Equal Citizenship: Strengthening National 
Integration", and "The Construction (Penciptaan) of the Chinese ; Minority in 
Indonesia" (GANDI, 2001: 26-35). 7° 
On 3 January 2000 GANDI became a member of the Working Committee for the 
Review of Discriminative Policies along with Komnas HAM (National 
Commission for Human Rights) and FKKB (National Unity Communication 
Forum). This work involved examining current regulations and legislation which 
was discriminatory and preventing discriminatory legislation being introduced in 
the future (GANDI 2001: 21). They held discussions with government 
departments which have enforced discriminatory laws. 7' With financial aid from 
the Asia Foundation (an American NGO which funds democratisation programmes 
in the Asia Pacific) GANDI also arranged public seminars, discussion groups, and 
television appearances in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Makasar (South Sulawesi), Medan 
(North Sumatra) and Pontianak (West Kalimantan) to gather the suggestions of 
local people to a change in law number 62/1958, which relates to citizenship in 
Indonesia. The result was the presentation of new draft citizenship legislation to 
the government (GANDI, 2001: ii). 
GANDI have also taken a photographic exhibition to West Kalimantan and East 
Java. The photos depict the violence of May 1998. In West Kalimantan they 
collaborated with the local branch of the fire brigade (Pasukan Mencegah 
Kebakaran Republic Indonesia) and in East Java they collaborated with The 
Communication Forum of Religious Leaders (Forum Komunikasi Antar Umat 
Beragama) (GANDI, 2001: 37), to bring this exhibition to the people. Finally, 
according to their literature, GANDI also contributes relief and assistance to 
people suffering in areas where there is social unrest (GANDI, 2001: 39). 
70 1 will return to the ideas which developed out of these discussions in chapter eight. 
71 These departments were The Department of Justice and Human Rights, The Education 
Department, The Department of Religion, The Department of Internal Affairs, The Director 
General of Immigration, and The State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (BAKIN) which 
was represented by the Director of The Coordinating Agency 
for Chinese Problem (BKM'IC). 
128 
Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa 
Solidarity for Motherland and Nation (SNB) 
Another organisation set up after 1998, and working in similar areas as GANDI, is 
SNB. This organisation was established by Ester Jusuf, a young Chinese- 
Indonesian lawyer from East Java who previously worked at the Jakarta Legal Aid 
Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta). It was while working at the Legal 
Aid Institute in 1996 that Ester's eyes were opened to how corrupt and 
discriminatory the legal system was. At this time the Jakarta offices of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri's party, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia), were attacked by the military. 72 The left-wing People's Democratic 
Party (PDR, Partai Demokrasi Rakyat) were blamed. Ester, who was acquainted 
with these people through her work at the Legal Aid Institute, knew that they were 
not to blame. It was after this that she decided to try to work to change the legal 
system (interview, April 2001). 
SNB was established to fight to end racial and ethnic discrimination in Indonesia. 
They hold seminars, discussions and workshops in which they collaborate with 
other groups on issues relating to discrimination and human rights. They also 
lobby the government to change laws which are discriminatory. They carry out 
advocacy work on behalf of people who have been discriminated against, for 
example, SNB has offered legal advice to MATAKIN (The Supreme Council of 
Confucian Religion in Indonesia) in their attempts to have Confucianism 
recognised as a religion in Indonesia (SNB, 2000). SNB has also been involved in 
the attempts to investigate the mass murders of 1965-66. Ester also takes part in 
international conferences run by the United Nations and other transnational 
groups (SNB, 2000). 
72 PDI were formed in 1973. They were a fusion of Protestant, Catholic and nationalist 
parties which were forced to consolidate under Suharto's conception of Pancasila democracy. 
This was a concept started by Sukarno whereby political parties would not be permitted tc 
form a viable opposition (Ramage, 1995: 28-29). 
129 
Solidaritas Pemudi-Pemuda Tionghoa Indonesia Untuk Keadilan 
Solidarity of Young Chinese Indonesian Women and Men for Justice 
(SIMPATIK) 
Two other anti-discrimination groups, which have been established by young 
Chinese Indonesians, will be discussed in this section. SIMPATIK is a very small 
organisation made up of about ten people. The founders are Surya Chandra, a 
lawyer with the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, and All Sutra. Both Surya and All used 
to be members of PSMTI, but they left after disagreements «'ith the leader, Tedy 
Jusuf, over the role the military should play in the political system of the country 
(interview, August 2000). 
SIMPATIK meet regularly to discuss the national situation and are also invited to 
discussions and demonstrations by other organisations such as GANDI, SNB, and 
Komnas HAM. Like GANDI and SNB, SIMPATIK are adamant that they do not 
concentrate solely on issues relating to the ethnic Chinese. According to Chandra, 
they also deal with labour issues and help people whose land has been confiscated 
by the government (interview March 2001). 
Hirnpunan Mahasiswa Tionghoa Indonesia 
Association of Chinese Indonesian Students (HMTI) 
The student organisation HMTI was established in Jakarta on 2 June 2000 and has 
100 members. There are also older branches of the organisation in Pontianak 
(West Kalimantan) which has 500 members and Semarang (Central Java) with 50 
members (interview, 10 August 2000). According to the president of the 
organisation, Isyak Meirobie, HMTI was established as a response to the need for 
a student organisation which expresses the value of togetherness (kebersamaan); a 
value tested of late, which has led to the weakness of the integrity of the nation 
(Suara Pembaruan, 17 July 2000). He explains that for the 32 years of the New 
Order regime negative stereotypes of the ethnic Chinese were maintained. This 
was partly because Chinese Indonesian students were separated from other 
students and because they acted in an individualistic manner, according to 
Meirobie (Suara Pembaruan, 17 July 2000). 
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The aim of the organisation is to advance the creation of a new Indonesian culture 
based on science and technology, which encourages the development of a just and 
prosperous Indonesia (HMTI, 2000a: 4). HMTI also hopes to encourage an 
understanding of Chinese Indonesian culture, which had not been permitted up to 
1998. They have organised discussions and seminars with other student 
organisations and non-governmental organisations. HMTI campaign on issues 
relating to discrimination and democratisation. 
The important role which students have played in the establishment and 
development of the Indonesian nation is highlighted by HMTI. Students are 
considered an important moral and intellectual element in the nation, who can 
encourage the growth of cultural values which correspond with Pancasila, and 
who can ensure prosperity for the nation through their modern, scientific and 
technological education (HMTI, 2000b). Meirobie insists that although the word 
Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesian) is in the name of the organisation, it is open to any 
student, of any ethnic group, who wishes to join (Suara Pembaruan, 17 July 
2000). 
Unlike the social-cultural organisations mentioned previously, the four 
organisations explored in this section are all run by young people - people in 
their 20s and 30s. Also, unlike the social-cultural organisations they have 
developed networks with international human rights groups. Their main aim is not 
to re-introduce Chinese culture, rather, they are concerned that in the law, and in 
society in general, the Chinese are treated just as other ethnic groups are treated. 
To this end these groups campaign to change the citizenship law which 
discriminates against the Chinese, and they lobby the government to investigate 
the violence of May 1998, which was largely directed against the Chinese. They 
have also broadened their campaigns to include other ethnic and religious groups 
who have suffered discrimination. 
The anti-discrimination groups tend to have more non-Chinese involved with 
them. Of the ten people directly employed by GANDI, three of them are Chinese 
Indonesians - the chairman, Nico Chrisnanto, the General Secretary, Albertus 
Sugeng and the Deputy President, Wahyu Effendy (interview with Sugeng and 
Effendy, March 2001). The Deputy leader of HMTI was non-Chinese. SIMPATIK 
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was made up entirely of ethnic Chinese, however, at protests which they organised 
to commemorate the violence in May 1998, non-Chinese were involved. SNB also 
has non-Chinese members of staff. 
The offices of the anti-discrimination groups I visited also had a very different 
feel to those of the social-cultural groups. In the offices of PSNITI there were 
photos of Chinese Indonesians on the walls, and framed pictures of Chinese 
characters. This was not the case in the anti-discrimination groups' offices where 
there were no such outward expressions of Chineseness. 
Political Parties 
Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia 
Chinese Indonesian Reform Party (PARTI) 
Historically, political parties in Indonesia have tended not to be based around 
ethnicity or religion. After 1998, however, a number of Chinese Indonesians felt it 
necessary to establish political parties as a vehicle for Chinese participation in 
politics. Other than the ethnic Chinese no other group established a political party 
based on ethnicity. A number of political parties were established based on 
religion, however. Of the forty-eight parties eligible for the 1999 general election 
eleven considered themselves Muslim parties, two Catholic parties. 73 Two 
Christian parties, were also established but were not eligible for the election. 74 
Suryadinata argues that the Baperki approach to Chinese issues, which he calls an 
"ethnic approach" re-emerged after the violence of 1998. This approach 
manifested itself in ethnically Chinese based parties working for ethnic Chinese 
interests (Suryadinata, 1998a: 110). The first ethnic-based political party to 
emerge after 1998 was the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party (PARTI), which was 
established on 5 June 1998. The founder of the party is Lieus Sungkharisma, a 41 
year old ethnic Chinese businessman, whose small business in Glodok (Jakarta's 
73 The two Catholic parties were Partai Demokrat Katolik and Partai Katolik Demokrat. 
74 The Christian parties were Partai Reformasi Cinta Kasih Kristus Kebangssan Indonesia 
(The Nationalist Reformist Party which Loves Christ) and Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia 
(Indonesian National Christian Party). 
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Chinatown) was destroyed during the violence of May 1998. When I spoke to him 
he was trying to re-establish the business having had no insurance (because he did 
not expect such violence) and no help from the government (interview, June 
2001). 
The party was established to encourage Chinese Indonesians to take part in 
politics (interview, June 2001). He explained that: 
The aim of the party is to encourage Chinese into politics because the 
Chinese have mostly gone into business. We must be free to become 
politicians, military or whatever we want (interview, June 2001). 
During the launch of the political party one of the founders, Ponijan Law, director 
of a language school, said that the aim was "to defend our rights and create true 
harmony among Indonesian citizens" (Jakarta Post, 11 June 1998). Sungkharisma 
explained that the more mainstream parties, such as Golkar and PDI-P, do not 
have special policies for ending discrimination against the ethnic Chinese, 
therefore, he does not feel that the discrimination will end unless Chinese 
Indonesians fight for it themselves. Sungkharisma acknowledged that people like 
Kwik Kian Gie, former Co-ordinating Minister for the Economy, Finance and 
Industry and member of Megawati's PDI-P (Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle), have never struggled for Chinese Indonesians specifically. Kwik will 
not change his position, therefore, according to Sungkharisma, new people are 
needed who will take up the issues relating to the ethnic Chinese (interview, June 
2001). 
Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika 
Unity in Diversity Party (PBI) 
The other two political parties established by Chinese Indonesians after 1998 do 
not have the word Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesian) in the title. The only one of 
these parties to win a seat in the 1999 election was PBI. This party was officially 
declared by Nurdin Purnomo on 11 June 1998. Purnomo is totok. His mother was 
from China but grew up in Mauritius and his father was born in China. He came to 
Indonesia on business, met his wife, and settled there. Purnomo is the only totok I 
came across during my research. He owns a travel agent company with branches 
in Jakarta and Bali. He also owns the Chinese language newspaper He Ping Ri 
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Bao, which, according to Purnomo, is distributed in fifty cities across Indonesia 
(interview, March 2001). In addition, he is chairman of the Indonesian Hakka 
Association and the General Secretary of the Federation of ASEAN Hakka's 
Association. 
Purnomo's aim in establishing the party was to take part in building a societ}, 
which is just and prosperous, in which all groups, irrespective of ethnicity, 
religion, or other group identities, have equal rights. They lobby the government 
to change discriminatory laws, and suggest ways of improving the economic 
situation. (PBI, 1999: 13). 
Since winning the seat in Parliament, PBI has split in two in a very acrimonious 
fashion. The seat was won by the West Kalimantan branch of the party and a 
member of the West Kalimantan branch, Susanto, took up the seat in Parliament. 
Susanto claims that 19 of the 23 areas where PBI have branches support him, 
however, Purnomo tried to have Susanto barred from parliament. Both Purnomo 
and Susanto accuse each other of corrupt behaviour. 
Susanto was born in West Kalimantan and is the only non-Javanese person I 
interviewed. Like many ethnic Chinese in West Kalimantan and unlike most in 
Java, Susanto can speak Chinese. In fact, he can speak Mandarin, Hokkien, Hakka 
and Teoqiu (from East Kanton). Also typical of Chinese Indonesians, he can speak 
these dialects but cannot write or read them. 75 
During an interview with me, Susanto explained that he felt his job as an MP was 
to abolish all types of discriminatory laws and to ensure that the ethnic Chinese 
have equal opportunities to attend state universities, join the military or become 
public servants. Both Purnomo and Susanto stated that they do not only represent 
the Chinese. According to Susanto, more Dayak in his area are members of the 
party, rather than Chinese. He believes this is because the Chinese are still afraid 
of politics (interview, May 2001). 
75 Very interestingly, Susanto also told me during our interview that he still has family in 
China. His father also had a wife and family there. He came to Indonesia to do business and 
then after 1949 could not return to China. He never saw his family in China again. Susanto 
has visited his relations in China only once. 
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Partai Warga Bangsa Indonesia 
Indonesian Citizens Party (PWBI) 
This party was established on 18 August 1999 by Tan Suie Ling, who is also the 
editor of the magazine Sinergi (a post-1998 magazine aimed at Chinese 
Indonesians). He established the party because he was frustrated that broad based 
political parties were not addressing issues relating to the ethnic Chinese. He 
complained that even though after 1998 there were some Chinese Indonesians in 
Parliament, such as Alvin Lie (PAN), and Kwik Kian Gie (PDI-P) they were 
apprehensive about taking up issues relating to the ethnic Chinese for fear that 
they would be branded exclusive (interview, April 2001). Tan preferred to set up 
his own party rather than joining another already established Chinese Indonesian 
party because he felt they had no overall concept about the nation and no concepts 
about the Chinese problem in Indonesia in relation to the nation. (interview, April 
2001). The party has about 50 members and they are trying to extend support 
throughout the country because to take part in the general election in 2004 a 
political party must have branches in 66 percent of the provinces in Indonesia 
(interview, April 2001). In relation to the magazine which he established, Sinergi, 
he explained that he is trying to describe how Chinese culture is in Indonesia - 
how it has mixed with the local cultures. Chinese Indonesians are Chinese, Tan 
says, but Indonesian in the first place (interview, April 2001). 
Of all the groups established, Chinese Indonesians who have established political 
parties are perhaps looked on with the most suspicion by non-Chinese 
Indonesians. It is seen as another sign of their exclusivity that they do not join 
mainstream parties. The debate in the newspapers in 1998 outlined a fear among 
ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese that the formation of ethnic based political 
parties would be detrimental to the unity of Indonesia. With the word Tionghoa 
(Chinese Indonesian) in its title, PARTI seems particularly unlikely to succeed 
PBI and PWBI may have more success because they are trying to broaden their 
appeal and deal with issues which relate to all groups, not just the ethnic Chinese. 
Some ethnic Chinese are wary of what they deem to be race-based parties. K%ik 
Kian Gie was fearful that by establishing these political parties the ethnic Chinese 
would be open to even greater discrimination. He states that "on the one hand, 
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some are saying that they don't want to be discriminated against. But if they set 
up their own institutions, what do they expect? We have to assimilate. " (Solomon, 
8 June 1998). Kwik declared ethnic Chinese political parties to be "ahistorical" 
(ahistoris) and "going astray" (sesat) (Republika, 14 June 1998). 
Another Chinese Indonesian who was disturbed by the establishment of these 
parties was the prominent Chinese Indonesian Muslim, Yunus Yahya. Yahya has 
long been calling on Chinese Indonesians to assimilate fully into Indonesian 
society by becoming Muslim and forgetting their Chinese heritage. The foundation 
which he helped to establish in 1991, Yayasan H. Karim Oei (H. Karim Oei 
Foundation), criticised these parties. 76 They asserted that "[t]he foundation 
followed with deep concern the establishment of political organisations that are 
based on ethnicity and ancestry... [the establishment of such political parties is] 
not in line with the spirit of 1928's Youth Pledge [of] one motherland, one nation 
and one language: Indonesia... It's not right to fight for our aspirations in an 
exclusive manner" (Jakarta Post, 11 June 1998). " Lukas Sugeng Musianto, a 
doctoral candidate at Airlangga University, Surabaya, agreed that these communal 
based political parties were a step backwards in Indonesian politics, but that it 
was important to understand that they were also a spontaneous reaction by 
Chinese Indonesians to years of repression under the New Order (Suara 
Pembaruan, 22 June 1998). 
The people fearful that the establishment of these ethnic based parties would start 
a new trend in party politics in Indonesia have not had their fears realised so far. 
Of the three parties investigated in this section, only one, The Unity in Diversity 
Party (PBI) had enough financial backing and members to take part in the General 
Election in 1999, and they only won one seat in parliament, however, they also 
76 Abdulkarim Oei Tjeng Hien (1905-1988) was a close friend of Sukarno's who converted to 
Islam and encouraged other Chinese Indonesians to convert to Islam (Yahya, 2000: 5). 
" Yunus Yahya has for many years been very active in encouraging Chinese Indonesians to 
become Muslims. After 1998 Yahya, along with fellow Chinese Muslim, Jusuf Hamka, set up 
the organisation Parpindo (Partai Pembauran Indonesia, Indonesian Assimilationist Party). 
This was a political party which intended to promote assimilation, but the group was 
dissolved because the founders concluded that an organisation designed to try to assimilate 
one ethnic groups (ethnic Chinese) was actually hindering assimilation. They concluded that 
it was more acceptable to join one of the mainstream political parties (interview April 2001). 
136 
won seats in local and district parliaments. All these parties are still hoping to 
take part in the elections in 2004, but they do not seem to have the support they 
might have hoped for. Even members of the organisations such as PS%ITI and 
INTI, which are trying to promulgate Chinese culture, are adamant that Chinese 
Indonesians should vote for the mainstream political parties (speaking with 
members of PSMTI and INTI May 2001). 
Religious Organisations 
Finally in this chapter two religious organisations will be explored: PITI (Indonesian 
Association of Ethnic Chinese Muslims) and MATAKIN (The Supreme Council of the 
Confucian Religion in Indonesia). The two religious groups are the only organisations 
which were re-established from older organisations. As was the case with the political 
parties discussed above, it has been acceptable in Indonesia to distinguish between 
different religious groups in a way in which it has not been permitted to distinguish 
between ethnic groups because Pancasila permits people to chose from a variety of 
religions. 
The two religious organisations I have chosen are from either end of religious activity 
in Indonesia -a Chinese Muslim group and a Confucian groups. The Muslim group 
educates ethnic Chinese about Islam, while the Confucian groups has been 
campaigning to have Confucianism accepted as an official religion of Indonesia. 
Persatuan Islas: Tionghoa Indonesia 
Indonesian Association of Ethnic Chinese Muslims (PITT) 
PITI was established in Jakarta in 1961 and was initially linked to the organisation 
Muhammadiyah. 78 PITI was set up because there was no organisation at that time 
which proselytised the Muslim faith in ethnic Chinese communities (Effendy, 
2000a: 1). In the early 1970s the Attorney General urged the organisation to 
change its name so that the name of the ethnic group (Tionghoa) was not so 
prominent. The name was changed to Pembina Iman Tauhid Islam (Cultivator of 
Spritual Defenders of Islam PITI) in 1972 (Effendy, 1987: 26). 
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PITI is a social organisation, not political, according to one of its former leaders, 
Pandy Wijaya (Effendy, 1987: 27). Its main function has been to introduce Islam 
to ethnic Chinese who are interested in becoming Muslim. Since 1998 Usman 
Effendy, along with other Chinese Indonesian Muslims, has set about relaunching 
PITI as Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Ethnic 
Chinese Muslims) once again. They see their role as one of uniting the nation 
because Islam does not differentiate between different races and ethnicities. They 
also wish to show that once Chinese Indonesians become Muslim they are 
completely accepted by other Indonesian Muslims (Effendy 2000b). PITI meet 
regularly to hold discussions and introduce new members to the religion. They 
have worked with BKPM (Co-ordinating Body for Muslim Youth) to organise 
activities for young people, such as sports events and poetry readings (Effendy, 
1987: 30). PITI also tries to find places for people who wish to study at a 
pesantren (schools of Koranic studies for children and young people, most of 
whom are borders) (Effendy, 1987: 34). 
As well as being dedicated to encouraging Chinese Indonesians to follow Islam, 
Usman Effendy is also very proud of his Chinese heritage. He speaks fluent 
Chinese and does not see any contradiction between his Chinese ethnicity and his 
Muslim faith. Unlike fellow Muslim Chinese, Yunus Yahya, Effendy does not 
believe that Chinese Indonesians need to forget their heritage when they decide to 
become Muslim. Effendy criticises Yahya for forgetting about his heritage and 
believes that Chinese culture should be accepted just as other regional cultures are 
accepted in Indonesia (interview, June 2001). 
Majelis Tinggi Agafna Khonghucu Indonesia 
Supreme Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia (MATAKIN) 
According to Chandra Setiawan, chairman of MATAKIN, adherents of 
Confucianism, and the organisations which they established, have been in 
Indonesia for centuries, arriving on the archipelago with the Chinese traders and 
sojourners (MATAKIN 2001: 20). Religious practices varied between the 
78 Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad) was established in 1912 and is the second 
largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia after NU (Nahdlatul Ulama). 
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believers who arrived from different parts of China and one of the aims of 
MATAKIN throughout its history has been to homogenise the rituals and practices 
of Confucianism in Indonesia. 
Setiawan asserts that Confucianism in Indonesia has been officially organised 
since 1923 when Khong Kauw Tjong Hwee (Central Association of Confucian 
Religion) was established, with Bandung as its headquarters (Setiawan). 
According to Leo Suryadinata, the emergence of Confucianism as an organised 
religion is closely linked to Indonesian politics, particularly the state ideology of 
Pancasila (the first premise of which is belief in one God) (Suryadinata, 1997b: 
167). It is a Chinese Indonesian religion, not a wholly Chinese religion, however, 
the authorities during the New Order period refused to accept it as an "Indonesian 
religion" (Suryadinata, 1997b: 168). 79 
MATAKIN (The Supreme Council for Confucian Religion in Indonesia) was 
established on 16 April 1955. The organisation held a yearly congress up to 1979 
and continued to try to unite the rituals and practices of Confucianism across 
Indonesia. According to Chandra Setiawan, MATAKIN continued after 1979 but 
their activities were limited and not reported and they had to act surreptitiously. 
They were not permitted to build new temples or renovate old ones. In order to 
build a temple a licence to build a house was usually acquired and the building 
was then used as a ceremonial place, Setiawan explained (interview, April 2001). 
Things have become easier for MATAKIN since 1998. They have been included 
more in general meetings of religious groups and Setiawan is also Secretary 
General of the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP) which was 
established in 1999. In August 1998 MATAKIN were permitted, by the Minister 
for Religion, to hold their thirteenth national conference, which brought together 
members and leaders of the religion from all over the archipelago (MATAKIN 
2001: 21). In 2000 Confucianism was reinstated as an official religion in 
Indonesia. 
79 In the academic literature there are many questions about whether Confucianism is in fact 
a religion at all, in the strict sense of the word. Followers of Confucianism in Indonesia do 
not engage with this question. They have portrayed Confucianism as a religion because it is 
tied up with the Pancasila discourse which states that everybody must have a religion. 
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The mission of the organisation is to guide followers of Confucianism in order 
that they live a sincere and moral life. MATAKIN also hopes to encourage its 
members to put into practice the Four Books and the Five Classics of 
Confucianism80 and to make a positive contribution to all aspects of society in 
Indonesia (MATAKIN, 2001: 22-23). MATAKIN wishes to aid Confucian spiritual 
leaders in developing a basis for Confucianism in which there is a more intense 
"spiritual dialogue" between members of the Confucian community and God. The 
organisation also wishes to empower members of the Confucian religion so that 
they act as moral individuals who have the capability to make a real contribution 
to society, and create a "social dialogue" which is genuine and inclusive. Finally, 
MATAKIN intend to publish materials which explain Confucianism to a wider 
audience so that a "cultural dialogue" can take place and a deeper understanding 
of their beliefs can be developed (MATAKIN, 2001: 23). 
The Chinese Indonesian groups which developed after the fall of the Suharto 
regime did so for various reasons. On the one hand, they were shocked by the 
violence perpetrated against the ethnic Chinese during May 1998. When the 
Suharto government lost power, and calls for reformasi (reform) were voiced by 
many section of Indonesian society, some Chinese Indonesians set about ensuring 
that their voices were heard in a new, democratic Indonesia. Having introduced 
the eleven organisations here, I will move on in the next two chapters to analyse 
the interviews, manifestos and other materials in more detail. Chapter seven will 
explore the arguments which the groups make in order to illustrate that they are 
loyal to Indonesia. My analysis questions the usefulness of considering these 
ethnic Chinese to be part of a Chinese diaspora. Rather, they seem to be trying to 
find a genuine place for themselves in Indonesian society. This activity throws up 
questions about the kinds of national and ethnic identities they are promoting and 
chapter eight will discuss these themes. 
80 The Four Books are the Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects, and the Book of 
Meng-i. The Five Classics are the Book of Changes, the Book of Odes (also entitled the Book 
of Songs or the Book of Poetry), the Book of History (or Book of Documents), the Book of 
Rites and the Spring and Autumn Annals. See Xinzhong Yao (2000: 57-67). 
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Chapter 7 
Being Good Indonesians 
Michael Billig has said that "[t]o have a national identity is to possess ways of 
talking about nationhood" (Billig, 1995: 8). This chapter and chapter eight will 
discuss how the members of the Chinese Indonesian groups are articulating their 
national and their ethnic identities. The language and arguments which the groups 
use emphasise the ways in which they are trying to be "good Indonesians". This 
reinforces my hypothesis that Chinese Indonesians are very focused on being 
accepted as genuine Indonesians with the result that terms such as "overseas 
Chinese" and "Chinese diaspora" are not very helpful in describing the Chinese in 
Indonesia. Of course, the desire of the groups to promote good behaviour may be 
the result of violence perpetrated against Chinese Indonesians in 1998 and 
therefore fear that such acts could happen again, and not genuine feelings of love 
and loyalty for Indonesia. However, as chapters four and five have elaborated, 
there is a long history of Chinese Indonesian efforts to be accepted as genuine 
Indonesians rather than as Chinese people who happen to live in Indonesia. 
The efforts of the groups to articulate the desires of the ethnic Chinese are not 
straightforward. Chapter seven and eight will explore two of the paradoxes which 
have emerged out of the aims and activities of the organisations. The first paradox 
relates to the reasons the groups were established. On the one hand, they were 
established so that Chinese Indonesians could "look after themselves", since, after 
the violence of 1998 they did not believe they could trust other groups to protect 
them. On the other hand, one of the main aims of the organisations is to overcome 
stereotypes that they are exclusive in their attitudes and behaviour. These joint 
aims of "looking out for themselves" and overcoming anti-Chinese stereotypes 
create a paradox, in that it is not possible for Chinese Indonesians to concentrate 
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on themselves while also trying to overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes that the.., 
are only interested in themselves. This first paradox will be investigated in this 
chapter. 
This first paradox leads into a second, which will be investigated in chapter eight. 
Although the groups encourage Chinese Indonesians to behave in ways which 
overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes, they also insist that Chinese culture be 
accepted as a genuine culture of Indonesia. In making such a demand the groups 
use the discourses of Indonesian nationalism in ways that do not correspond with 
the understanding of many non-Chinese Indonesians, and perhaps ethnic Chinese 
also. Chinese Indonesians have been classed as outsiders to these nationalist 
discourses, therefore, as much as they might assure people that they are genuine 
Indonesians, the language and concepts of nationalism in Indonesia do not allow 
them to take up a position within the discourses. 
Coming Together 
One of the first sentiments expressed by these Chinese Indonesians during 
interviews was the desire to do something about their own fate. After the violence 
of 1998 many of these people had come to believe that they could not rely on 
others to guarantee their safety and that Chinese Indonesians had to look after 
themselves. In this sense the groups asserted themselves as the representatives of 
Chinese Indonesians. 
One reason why some Chinese Indonesians joined these organisations after May 
1998 was that well-known ethnic Chinese personalities began to write in 
newspapers and magazines about issues relating to Chinese Indonesians. The 
ethnic Chinese seemed to feel particularly hopeless after 1998. Sofyan Wanandi 
wrote that, attacks on Chinese-Indonesians and their property was not new but this 
time the situation was different. He stated that "[n]ever before have they felt so 
totally hopeless and unprotected. There is a widespread feeling that the 
Government has allowed this to happen and even that some sections of the 
Government were behind the campaigns targeting Chinese-Indonesians" (cited in 
Mann, 1999: 187). Other Chinese Indonesian personalities also spoke out. The 
lawyer Frans Winarta, and the badminton star Tan Joie Hok, began to write in 
142 
newspapers and magazines about issues relating to the ethnic Chinese. They wrote 
that, if Chinese faith in the government was to be restored, then discrimination 
against the Chinese would have to end (Mann, 1999: 182). Tan Joe Hok felt called 
by his conscience to speak out. He asked when people would come together under 
"unity in diversity" and why the Chinese in Indonesia were discriminated against 
(Sinergi, November-December 2000: 31). 
A number of my interviewees explained how they felt after May 1998. Ester Jusuf 
of SNB explained that she was not interested in Chinese culture or in her Chinese 
identity before 1998, but felt that she wanted to do something to change the 
discrimination against the Chinese after 1998 (interview, April 2001). Susanto of 
the political party PBI said that he became involved in politics because after 1998 
the Chinese had two choices - "leave the country or fight for your fate" 
(interview, May 2001). According to those who established the anti-discrimination 
group GANDI, there was so much concern about the tragedy of May 1998 that "a 
group of Indonesian Chinese businessmen and executives gathered and after much 
deliberation decided to form an institution to fight for our dignity and human 
rights" (GANDI, 1998). 
In explaining why he established PSMTI, Tedy Jusuf also directly linked his 
motivations to halting discrimination, stating that: 
The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia face discrimination so they must 
struggle together for their rights... Now in Indonesia there is a lot of 
conflict so this organisation [PSMTI] helps the Chinese to support each 
other (interview, April 2001). 
Focusing on identity, Chandra Setiawan of MATAKIN stated that: 
The May tragedy reminded the Chinese to have their own culture, no 
matter what their religion. The Chinese have been broken up by 
religion. The tragedy of May awakened them. We cannot lie that we are 
not Chinese anymore. Although our citizenship is Indonesian we 
cannot delete our roots of culture (interview, April 2001). 
Likewise, Tedy Jusuf of PSMTI explained that the reason they wanted the 
membership of the organisation to be solely ethnic Chinese was that "in Indonesia 
all ethnic groups have such organisations, so the Chinese should too" (interview, 
April 2001). Also discussing PSMTI, Ernawati Sugondo added: 
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It is important because before May 1998 there was no organisation for 
the Chinese to ask questions to, or to voice the aspirations of the ethnic 
Chinese. Now this organisation explains to people, such as, the 
government and other organisations, about the aspirations of the ethnic 
Chinese (interview, May 2001). 
Two further statements made by Tan Suie Ling of the political party PKB and 
Susanto of PBI emphasise the depth of the desire to take control of their own 
destiny. Tan told me that: 
The government has done nothing [to improve the situation for the 
ethnic Chinese] because there are no representatives of the Chinese 
community. The Chinese in parliament don't represent the interests of 
the ethnic Chinese. They represent their own party interests and are not 
given instruction from the party to take care of Chinese affairs 
(interview, April 2001). 
Susanto added: 
Before the Chinese always voted for Golkar, but got nothing in return. 
They made the Chinese afraid of politics. So, now I have the duty to 
encourage people to join politics, because they cannot rely on other 
people (interview, May 2001). 
A difficulty in the groups' intentions to look out for themselves and overcome 
anti-Chinese stereotypes is highlighted by PSMTI initiatives to raise money for 
victims of atrocities. PSMTI collected about one hundred million rupiah from its 
members at its Central Committee meeting in 2000. The chairman, Tedy Jusuf, 
urged journalists not to be suspicious. He explained that the money was not for 
PSMTI members, rather it was for humanitarian projects, particularly for people 
suffering from inter-ethnic conflict (Mandarin Pos, March-April 2001: 9). This 
emphasises ethnic Chinese interest in getting involved with social issues and 
giving money to needy causes. However, Jusuf also explained that priority would 
go to ethnic Chinese who were victims of violence. He states that, "this is 
rational. Who can be relied on to help a particular ethnic group in trouble, if not 
their own ethnic group". Jusuf was aware that this might be frowned upon and 
tried to explain that the connection between members of an ethnic groups is very 
strong, just like the connection between Batak, Javanese, Balinese or Bugis. The 
also stated that non-ethnic Chinese in need will also receive support (Mandarin 
Pos, March-April 2001: 9). 
144 
Although the groups have diagnosed a need for the ethnic Chinese to come 
together and take control of their own destinies, the groups are also very keen to 
show that they are loyal and genuine Indonesians. This creates a paradox because 
by gathering together in this manner the groups are falling into the stereotype of 
exclusive Chinese behaviour. By declaring that Chinese Indonesians have not 
behaved in the correct manner, there is an acknowledgement among the group 
members that one must act in a specific way in order to be a "good Indonesian". 
They are aware of what that particular behaviour should include, and they are 
willing to act on this. The groups have taken on a role in trying to educate ethnic 
Chinese about how to behave. This good behaviour was portrayed as taking part in 
the events of the local community, helping other people, taking up positions in 
sectors other than the economic sector and not socialising exclusively with other 
Chinese Indonesians. 
The ways in which the groups illustrate their Indonesianness, by seeking to 
overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes, depict the ways in which the groups members 
have internalised these discourses. Michael Billig's notion of "enhabitation" 
captures this process well. It is a process whereby "[p]atterns of social life 
become habitual or routine, and in so doing embody the past... thoughts, reactions 
and symbols become turned into routine habits and, thus, they become enhabited" 
(Billig, 1995: 42). Billig cites Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "habitus" as a useful 
way of approaching this enhabitation. The habitus is a "set of dispositions which 
incline agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, 
perceptions and attitudes which are `regular' without being consciously co- 
ordinated or governed by any `rule"' (Thompson, 1991: 12). 
Overcoming Stereotypes 
Group Symbols 
One of the ways in which the groups try to overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes is 
to show how nationalistic they are. Most of the groups have a symbol which 
represents them and which appears on all their publications. These logos tend to 
incorporate elements of recognisable nationalist symbols and highlight the 
nationalist credentials of the organisation. Having a group logo is typical of an 
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Indonesian organisation. Symbolism is very important in Indonesia as a way of 
inculcating a sense of national identity. This is evident in the Indonesian national 
symbol which many of the groups base their own symbols on. The Indonesian 
national symbol is the Pancasila eagle (garuuda Pancasila) (figure 1), which was 
agreed upon by members of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of 
Indonesian Independence in 1945. The image of an eagle was chosen because it 
moves with ease from one place to another and so symbolises Indonesia's move 
from a developing to a developed country. ' The number of eagle feathers 
symbolises the date of Indonesian independence on the 17 August 1945. It has 
seventeen wing feathers, eight tail feathers, and 45 body feathers. The symbols on 
its shield include a banyan tree and a buffalo which are wildlife of Indonesia, a 
stem of rice and cotton which are crops of the archipelago, and a chain which 
symbolises "union and unity" (persatuan dan kesatuan). The star in the centre has 
five points which symbolises the five principles of Pancasila. 
Figure 1: National Symbol of Indonesia 
The PSMTI symbol (figure 2) is a stem of rice and a stem of cotton encircling the 
Indonesian flag all placed within a blue flower. The open blue flower stands for 
safety (sejahtera), peace (damai), and calm (aman). The rice and cotton symbolise 
justice and prosperity (keadilan dan makmur). Blue is the symbol of sincerity 
(ketulusan dan keikhlasan). Yellow symbolises noble character (budi yang luhw-). 
"I am grateful to my friend Samto for this piece of information. 
The flag is the national flag of Indonesia. Furthermore, the five petals of the blue 
flower symbolise the five principles of Pancasila. The 17 grains of rice and eight 
pieces of cotton symbolise the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 
and mirror the symbols of the Pancasila eagle. (PSMTI, 2000b: 26). Of all the 
groups PSMTI are the most ostentatious in their national symbolism. It is ironic 
that the only organisation which does not permit non-Chinese to be full members 
is the most virulently nationalist in their symbolism. 
PAGUYUBAN SOSIAL 
MARGA TIONGHOA INDONESIA 
Figure 2: PSMTI symbol 
The social-cultural group INTI uses the symbol of a white fan on a red 
background and adopts the red and white of the national flag in all their literature 
(figure 3). 
The student groups HMTI incorporate the star symbol from the eagle and includes 
the phrase kebersamaan dalam keberagaman (unity in diversity) (figure 4). 
Figure 4: HMTI logo 
The political party Partei Bhinneka Tunggal 1ka Indonesia also uses part of the 
national symbol of the eagle and a ribbon matching the ribbon of the eagle 
contains the name of the party (figure 5). The Partai Bhinneka Tun egal Ike 
literature also includes a photograph of the leader, Nurdin Purnomo, on the first 
page, wearing the black hat, known as a pwci or a songkok, which is usually worn 
by Muslim men, but has also been used as a sign of Indonesian nationalism. 
Figure 5: PBI logo 
Nurdin Purnorno also established the Indonesian Hakka Association and although 
I have not looked in detail at this group their symbol is also very interesting 
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(figure 6). The Hakka Association logo includes the national emblems of rice and 
cotton surrounding a map of Indonesia 
Figure 6: Indonesian Hakka Association symbol 
The PARTI emblem is less elaborate than the previous two. The party uses the 
chain symbolising "union and unity" as their emblem (fi(Iure 7). 
cý ýJ 
PARTI 
Figure 7: PARTI logo 
Appropriate Behaviour 
As well as using national symbolism, the groups also illustrate how they have 
internalised the anti-Chinese discourses by urging Chinese Indonesians to behave 
in an appropriate manner. The declaration paper of PSMTI states that the 
organisation wants sirkur Tionghoa to take part in all areas of society in a new 
Indonesia which is democratic, integrated and in which there is ethnic harmony 
(PSMTI, 2000a: 14). They say that it is the duty of all citizens of Indonesia to care 
for the country and improve it. Chinese Indonesians must also have an awareness 
of loyalty to the nation and the state and act to improve justice and prosperity for 
all. PSMTI was established to facilitate this increased activity (PSMTI, 2000b: 
15). 
In Mandarin Pos, the leader of the Jakarta branch of PSMTI calls on ethnic 
Chinese to "stop individual ambition" (Mandarin Pos, May-June 2001: 14). He 
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argues that the ethnic Chinese are still individualistic and exclusive 
(individualistik dan eksklusij) and some ethnic Chinese still put money above all 
else (mengutamakan uang di atas segala-galan-va). After anti-Chinese violence in 
Riau, which was sparked by suspicion that Chinese Indonesians were running a 
gambling den, PSMTI issued a statement asking that "Chinese Indonesians no 
longer undertake activities which clash with the law and which provoke strong 
emotions among a mass of people" (Mandarin Pos, February-March 2001: 9). An 
article in Sinergi emphasises that Chinese Indonesians should avoid KKN 
(Collusion, Corruption and Nepotism). The importance of getting involved in 
politics is highlighted, and a photograph is included of the Chinese Indonesian 
politician, Nurdin Purnomo, shaking hands with Abdurrachman Wahid. However, 
there is a warning that closeness to powerful politicians should not lead to 
corruption (Sinergi, March-April 2001). 82 INTI make the point that they are not 
associated with government officials and other powerful elites (Kontan: April 
1999). 
The Chinese Indonesian politician and member of PAN, Alvin Lie, urges the 
ethnic Chinese not to disparage others (jangan berkecil Kati). Instead he says, 
ethnic Chinese should choose to become citizens of Indonesia and no longer think 
of themselves as Chinese Indonesian (Tionghoa) (Mandarin Pos, September 2000: 
29). As is clear from these examples, the Chinese Indonesian press addresses the 
issue of how it is best for Chinese Indonesians to behave and appropriate 
behaviour is behaviour which moves furthest from the anti-Chinese stereotypes. 
During interviews with members of the groups there was also a clear 
acknowledgement that Chinese Indonesians should act in ways which overcome 
anti-Chinese stereotypes. Eddy Sadeli of PSMTI stated that: 
Business and jealousy cause most of the problems [between the ethnic 
Chinese and non-Chinese] and also, the Chinese are always arrogant 
and conceited. They don't care about the circumstances or situation of 
others. PSMTI teaches Chinese that they are Indonesian. They must 
82 I carried out my interview with Nurdin Purnomo just after he had held a meeting with the 
journalist who wrote the article. Purnomo was furious at being besmirched by the KKN stain 
and had summoned the journalist to his office and threatened him with legal action. He did 
not follow through with this threat, however. The journalist was himself ethnic Chinese, and 
as well as writing for Sinergi he also Purnomo's own paper He Ping Ri Bao. 
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help the poor and give some of their profit to the poor (interview. May 
2001). 
Ernawati, who is also a member of PSMTI, explained that, in trying to set up 
Forum Komunikasi Wanita Tionghoa Indonesia (The Communication Forum of 
Chinese Indonesian Women), they wanted to encourage Chinese Indonesian 
women involved in social activities 
We want to get ethnic Chinese women involved in solving social 
problems between pribumi and non-pribuini. We want to discuss with 
local government, the problems of women and also the problems of pri 
and non-pri. We don't just want to solve social problems by giving 
money to the poor but we also want to get involved in decision making 
and discussions of how to solve the problems (interview, May 2001). 83 
This is significant because before 1998 it had been pointed out that the Chinese 
tended to give money for such activities, but did not become personally involved. 
For example, Thung Julan explains how people she interviewed complained that if 
they offered to accompany non-Chinese Indonesians on the ronda (walks around 
the neighbourhood at night to prevent crime), they were often expected to provide 
cigarettes, drinks and snacks. As a result, they tended to just pay money and 
avoided offering their services (Thung, 1999: 221). 
Eddie Lembong of INTI also explained his group's attempts to try to encourage 
the ethnic Chinese to become more involved in society. 
In the past people (Chinese-Indonesians) only thought about 
themselves. For many reasons they closed themselves off, but now 
people are opening up more. The mission of INTI is to unite all the 
Chinese-Indonesians and to harness their potential and dedicate this 
potential to the development of the nation, to rebuild Indonesia... We 
want to unite the Chinese and then they can communicate with and 
educate each other about how to bring the Chinese to join mainstream 
Indonesian life as a whole (interview, April 2001). 
Lembong has taken part in television interviews and seminars to explain to non- 
Chinese Indonesians "that the Chinese are five percent of the population and the 
purpose of INTI is to unite them to work for 100 percent of the population. The 
83 The Communication Forum of Chinese Indonesian Women and an organisation for young 
people, The Communication Forum of Young Chinese Indonesians, were attempts by PSh4TI 
to create more specialised groups which would focus on particular issues. These groups had 
not been established when I carried out my interviews. 
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indigenous people worry that the Chinese are only working for themselves" 
(interview, April 2001). 
Tedy Jusuf of PSMTI explained to a journalist: "I convey to ethnic Chinese that I 
speak to that they must deal with people in their locality in an appropriate and 
well behaved manner, not exclusively" (Mandarin Pos, March-April 2001: 12). 
Tan Suie Ling also emphasises the importance of working alongside other groups 
in order to improve all aspects of Indonesian society. The magazine he founded is 
called Sinergi which he explains means "working together with other people and 
organisations with the result that the achievements are greater than if each person 
and group worked individually" (Tan Suie Ling, November-December 2000: 5). 
MATAKIN also aims to ensure that followers of Confucius in Indonesia are 
always respectful to the elderly, good role-models for the young, and always 
behave as model citizens with a sense of nationalism (MATAKIN, 2001: 22-23). 
All the groups except for PSMTI are keen to explain that they are open to all, not 
just ethnic Chinese and that they would prefer if non-Chinese joined them. A 
number of groups also emphasised that they are not just focused on issues relating 
to Chinese Indonesians. For example, despite the emphasis on ending 
discrimination towards the ethnic Chinese, GANDI do not want to be portrayed as 
an organisation which only deals with issues relating to that group. During 
discussions with Albertus Sugeng (General Secretary) and Wahyu Effendy (Deputy 
President) they repeatedly explained that GANDI work to prevent laws which 
discriminated against all groups in the country (interview, March 2001). Although 
this is the case, non-Chinese Indonesians tend not to join. They perceive these 
organisations as exclusive, Chinese organisations. 
Surya Chandra of SIMPATIK explained that it was very important that these 
groups do not just concentrate on issues relating to the ethnic Chinese. 
It is really important that we don't [concentrate solely on Chinese 
Indonesian issues]. We also work on labour issues and lobby on behalf 
of people whose land has been taken by the government (interview, 
March 2001). 
These Chinese-Indonesians are aware that the non-Chinese are suspicious if they 
deal with issues relating solely to themselves. This was a problem which Baperki 
faced in the 1960s. An article in the magazine Sinergi highlighted very clearly the 
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problem which the organisations face. The article suggested that there was a 
suspicion among non-Chinese that the ethnic Chinese were trying to take over 
politics as they took over the economy. This suspicion ensures that non-Chinese 
Indonesians are not interested in getting involved with the ethnic Chinese in the 
struggle against discrimination. Therefore, most members of the organisations are 
ethnic Chinese, which leads to more suspicion by non-Chinese Indonesians and 
which fulfils the stereotype that they are exclusive and just concerned with their 
own affairs (Sinergi, July 2001: 4). 
Indonesian First, Chinese Second 
As well as suggesting how Chinese Indonesians should behave, the groups also 
emphasise their credentials as loyal citizens of Indonesia by insisting that their 
most important identity is their Indonesian one. This reinforces my argument that 
Chinese Indonesians wish to be accepted first and foremost as Indonesians rather 
than as "overseas Chinese". It also undermines the extent to which they are part of 
a Chinese diaspora. For example, as mentioned in chapter three, len Ang 
suggested that according to the people involved in producing huaren. org Chinese- 
American's or Chinese-Canadians, should assert their Chinese identities first, and 
only secondly declare themselves to be American or Canadian (Ang, 2001: 80). 
When I interviewed Brig. Gen (Ret. ) Tedy Jusuf, chairperson of PSMTI, he told 
me that his Indonesian identity was more important to him, even though he is 
interested in his Chinese heritage. Eddy Sadeli, also of PSMTI, explained that 
both identities are important to him but his first identity is Indonesian. 
To be a good citizen is to obey the law, pay tax, and have good 
relations in society. My first identity is Indonesian, then I am Chinese, 
then I am a Jakartan (interview, May 2001). 
Chandra Setiawan, chairman of MATAKIN, explained that he never says that he is 
Chinese, but Indonesian. "This [Indonesia] is my country -I live here and try to 
work to progress the nation" (interview, April 2001). 
Martani Wiranata, of the magazine Sinergi and the political party PWBI, explains 
to young people that Chinese culture in Indonesia has mixed with local cultures. 
He suggested to me that young ethnic Chinese "are Chinese, yes, but Indonesian 
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in the first place" (interview, April 2001). Nurdin Purnomo of the political party 
PBI, explained that "even though my parents were from China, my nationality is 
Indonesian now" (interview, March 2001). Susanto, also of PBI, explained that "I 
feel Chinese, but, a more important identity is Indonesian" (interview, N1av 2001). 
Lieus Sungkharisma, chairman of PARTI, differs from the others, however he still 
emphasises that he is Indonesian. He explains that: 
Before 1998 1 always said "I am Indonesian" but since May 1998 1 
think this was wrong. I must say "I am Chinese" (Tionghoa), but, one 
who has been `Indonesianised' (Keindonesiaanm'a) and ethnic Chinese 
cannot be shaken from this and must have courage (interview, June 
2001). 
However, home for Lieus is Indonesia, as he felt when he visited China: 
I didn't feel like I was going home when I was going to China. Home is 
Java and I must stay to build Indonesia and improve the system 
(interview, June 2001). 
Sugeng of the organisation GANDI told me that: 
I'm Indonesian, my perception is Indonesian because I studied, work, 
make communications with all of [my] indigenous friends, but 
sometimes I must face reality. My eyes, my skin is different from my 
colleagues and friends. Physically I am Chinese but in perception I'm 
Indonesian (interview, June 2001). 
In an interview with the Mandarin Pos the Chinese Indonesian politician and 
member of PAN, Alvin Lie, stated that as a Chinese Indonesian he wishes to give 
top priority to Indonesia (menomorsatukan Indonesia). He explains that "this is 
not because I am ethnic Chinese and interested only in promoting the interests of 
the ethnic Chinese. Rather it is because first and foremost I am Indonesian" (sava, 
nomor satu adalah Indonesia) (Mandarin Pos, September 2000: 29). 
In response to media reports that there was an "exodus" of Chinese Indonesians 
leaving the country because they feared riots in the run-up to the election of 1999, 
the leader of INTI, Eddie Lembong, stated that "we can't ask people to stop 
worrying as nobody can guarantee their safety now, but all we can do is ask them 
to think that the country's problems are also ours" (Jakarta Post, 27 May 1999). 
At another level the groups present themselves as Indonesian first and Chinese 
second by emphasing the Indonesia-focused qualities of the organistions. INTI 
is 
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declared to be a social organisation with nationalist qualities (organisasi 
kemasyarakatan yang bersifat kebangsaan) (INTI, 1999c: 3). Its members feel 
called upon (terpanggil) and determined (bertekad) to take part in all activities of 
the nation and the state (seluruh kegiatan berbangsa dan bernegara) (INTL. 
1999c: 3). Eddie Lembong of INTI explained that his organisation was not just for 
the benefit of the ethnic Chinese, but it was for the service (pengabdian) of the 
whole nation (Suara Karya, 12 April 1999). PSMTI wishes to serve the state and 
the nation of Indonesia (mengabdi kepada negara dan bangsa Indonesia) (PSMTI, 
2000a: 13). The charter which was signed by those who established PSMTI also 
emphasises their nationalist credentials. They hoped that God would bless them in 
their service to the nation and the state (PSMTI, 2000a: 13). " 
The anti-discrimination groups also emphasise their nationalist credentials. HMTI 
wishes to help bring into existence a new, more democratic, more prosperous 
Indonesia (HMTI, July 2000b). HMTI emphasises the importance of upholding 
"human values" (nilai-nilai kemanusiaan) (HMTI, July 2000b). 85 GANDI have 
incorporated their aim to end discrimination against the ethnic Chinese, into a 
nationalistic framework. In a leaflet produced by the organisation they explain 
that "[o]ur mission is to support national unity, and promote harmony in social 
and communal relations, in respect to equality in human dignity and human 
rights" (GANDI, 1998). They argue that the violence of 1998, which was directed 
at a certain ethnic and religious group (kelompok etnis dan agama tertentu) along 
with poor people, "reflects the life of us together as a nation" (refleksi kehidupan 
bersama kita sebagai bangsa) (GANDI, 2001: 2). They go on to say that as a 
complex nation (sebagai bangsa yang majemuk) there needs to be the 
development of genuine fellowship (persaudaraan sejati) and an end to 
discrimination in all areas between citizens of the nation (diantara sesama 'varga 
negara bangsa) (GANDI, 2001: 2). SNB also situate their activities within a 
nationalist framework. They are an organisation "which is concerned with the 
84 Seetoga Tuhan Yang Maha Esa memberkati kita sekalian dalam mengabdi kepada negara 
dan bangsa Indonesia 
85 According to a non-Chinese Indonesian friend, these values are honesty, friendliness and 
politeness. He added that they are values "usually ignored by Chinese people". 
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creation of a nation which respects values of friendship, unity and `human 
values"' (SNB, 2000: back cover). 
The political party PBI sees part of its function as helping to encourage all the 
people of Indonesia to have high morals (mnembina nias- arakat Indonesia menjadi 
warga negara yang bermoral tinggi) (Mustaib and Basumin, 1999: 13). The leader 
of PBI, Nurdin Purnomo stated that for many years the ethnic Chinese have been 
limited and put in a box. It is now the right time, he suggests, for the ethnic 
Chinese to work with other members of the nation, to develop a "nation-focused 
life" (sebuah kehidupan berbangsa) which is more prosperous, healthy, strong and 
harmonious (Mandarin Pos, August 2000: 5). 
Tan Suie Ling of PWBI told me that his party was established because "the 
Chinese problem in Indonesia is the problem of nationality (kebangsaan)... [it is] a 
problem not just of the Chinese but of the whole nation... This party is not just for 
the ethnic Chinese, it's for the whole nation" (interview, April 2001). In their 
declaration, PARTI state that the party was established to "struggle to achieve 
community, national togetherness which is harmonious, just and full of thanks 
within the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia". 
The desire of these groups to be fully involved in Indonesian society is often tied 
up with the concept of "development" (pembangunan). This echoes the New 
Order discourse of peinbangunan which urged Indonesians "to work together to 
develop the nation and bring about economic takeoff' (Berger, 1997: 344). The 
anti-Chinese stereotypes purport that ethnic Chinese selfishly dominate the 
economy, however, these groups insist that they are encouraging Chinese 
Indonesians to use their business skills to develop the whole nation. PSMTI argue 
that their purpose is to embrace the aspirations of the ethnic Chinese so that their 
role in the development of the nation can be increased (merangkum aspirasi, agar 
supava kualitas dan partisipasi suku Tionghoa dalam pembangunan dapat lebih 
ditingkatkan dan terarah) (PSMTI, 2000a: 15). INTI want to become involved in 
activities which correspond with the development (pembangunan) of a new 
Indonesia which is more unified (lebih bersatu), more advanced (maju), stronger 
(kuat), more prosperous (makmur) and with a modern culture (peradaban modern) 
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equal to other advanced nations (setara dengan bangsa-bangsa maju lainnva) 
(INTI, 1999c: 3). 
INTI met with Chinese Malaysian Chamber of Commerce to encourage 
investment in Indonesia. This is an early sign of INTI's desire to facilitate the 
economic development of the nation, according to Eddie Lembong (Suara Karma, 
26 July 1999). Lembong also encouraged Chinese to return their money to 
Indonesia (The Jakarta Post, 26 October 1999). HMTI see part of their role as 
criticising injustices in order to unite and improve the wealth of the nation 
(Mandarin Pos, August 2000: 5). 
Another way in which the groups show that they are Indonesian first and Chinese 
second is by using terminology which emphasises their Indonesian-ness and 
distances them from China. All the articles I read referred to Indonesia as home. 
This is usually construed by the use of the phrase tanah air (homeland) for 
Indonesia. 86 Even those Chinese Indonesians who now live in China are said to 
miss their tanah air (Indonesia) and wish to return (Mandarin Pos, August 2000: 
16). China and Chinese people are referred to as "they" and "we" is used to 
describe Indonesian people and culture. When celebrating the work of a Chinese 
Indonesian film-maker his work is said to be part of Indonesian "national film" 
(Mandarin Pos, August 2000: 18). Chinese Indonesian are described as "anak 
bangsa asal Tionghoa" (children of the nation who are ethnic Chinese) (Mandarin 
Pos, August 2000: 3-4). People who originally came from China to Indonesia 
have changed from Chinese people (Orang China) to Chinese Indonesian (orang 
Tionghoa) (Sinergi, November-December 2000: 12). 
Positive Role of Ethnic Chinese in Past Struggles 
By highlighting the role of Chinese Indonesians in the independence struggle the 
groups are trying to show that they do genuinely care about Indonesia. Part of the 
anti-Chinese stereotype is that they are not loyal to Indonesia and tended to be 
colonial sympathisers during the struggle for independence. By highlighting the 
86 Tanah Air literally means "water and air" and it is the affectionate name given to 
Indonesia. The English-Indonesian dictionary edited by John M. Echols and Hassan Shadily 
translates it as "fatherland". 
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role played by Chinese Indonesians in the liberation struggle the groups are 
placing their loyalty firmly with the Indonesian republic and undermining the 
discourse that they are only pretending to be loyal to Indonesia for opportunistic 
reasons, rather than from a true sense of identification with the country. 
Nurdin Purnomo of PBI stated that "no colony in the world belongs to the 
Chinese. They have spread out all over the world and helped to build nations 
where they settle" (interview, March 2001). He also said that in 1740 the Chinese 
were the first group in Indonesia to rise up against the Dutch, but that this is not 
recognised (interview, March 2001). 
The ethnic Chinese media is used to highlight the positive role of the ethnic 
Chinese in past struggles. The magazine Sinergi included an editorial in one 
edition of the magazine explaining that they wish to highlight the social activities 
of Chinese Indonesians in the past (Tan Suie Ling, November-December 2000: 2). 
They ask whether this social spirit is still alive today, and conclude that it is. The 
magazine's cover story introduces hospitals which were established by the ethnic 
Chinese during the 1920s. These were run by Chinese Indonesian (Tionghoa) 
doctors who returned from training in the Netherlands and whose hearts were 
moved (hatinya tergerak) by the poverty in Indonesia. The article explains that the 
hospitals were primarily established for poor ethnic Chinese (kalangan Tionghoa 
yang kurang mampu), however, the hospitals, which were financially supported by 
the organisation THHK, helped enormously during the independence struggle 
(banyak membantu para pejuang Republik) (Sinergi, November-December 2000: 
6-7). In the article, one doctor in particular was praised for his idealistic and 
altruistic behaviour (idealis dan altruistik). Patients normally paid the doctor, 
however, Dr. Kwa Tjoan Sioe often did not accept payment, and was even known 
to give money to patients who were very poor. This story also undermines the 
common stereotypical understanding of ethnic Chinese that they are only 
interested in money. 
Paguyuban INTI argues that "the independence of the Republic of Indonesia is the 
result of the struggles and efforts both of the leaders of the nation and all the 
people of Indonesia, including many of the Chinese community. Therefore the 
opportunity is for all Chinese to be a community within the republic of Indonesia 
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based on Pancasila and the 1945 constitution" (INTI, 1999c: 2). An article in 
Mandarin Pos entitled "The Struggle of Ethnic Chinese Citizens in the 
Independence of Indonesia" (Perjuangan Warga Keturunan Tionghoa dalam 
Kemerdekaan Indonesia) discusses Chinese Indonesians who played a role in the 
independence struggle, not just through providing funds, but by being involved in 
active combat also. They suggest that although Chinese Indonesians did play a 
role in the struggle for independence, young people are not aware of the role 
(Mandarin Pos, August 2000: 19). 
Genuineness 
As well as emphasising that they are trying to overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes, 
another way in which these organisations promote their credentials as "good" 
Indonesians is to emphasise the length of time their families have been in 
Indonesia and therefore, their genuineness as real Indonesians. Again they are 
using the discourses which they are familiar with. As I have outlined in previous 
chapters, the Chinese in Indonesia tend to be considered outsiders because they 
are perceived to have come originally from outside the archipelago. The groups 
argue that because they have been in Indonesia such a long time, they should be 
considered genuine Indonesians. 
Articles in the magazine Sinergi discuss the history of ethnic Chinese leaders in 
different parts of Indonesia (tokoh tokoh keturunan dalam sejarah di... ). In Java, 
in the sixteenth century, a famous ethnic Chinese sculptor, Chi Hui Gwan, is said 
to have carved the artefacts which became the speciality of Jepara. The objects are 
still displayed in the local mosque and local people believe that they provide 
blessings (berkah) to people who visit them. He was made a governor by the local 
ruler and taught the local crafts people of the region (Sinergi, April-May 2001). 
Another article mentions the arrival of Zheng He, who is said to have arrived in 
Indonesia in the fifteenth century bringing a particular sect of Islam called Hanafi. 
Even earlier than Zheng He and Chi Hui Gwan was Hwui Ning, a Buddhist monk 
who arrived in Java in the seventh century (Sinergi, March-April 2001). 
A photographic exhibition in Jakarta is used to give examples of how long the 
ethnic Chinese have been in Indonesia, and therefore, how genuinely Indonesian 
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they are. The photos depict everyday life for people in Jakarta from 1857 to 1950, 
including images of Chinese Indonesians. According to the article, the exhibition 
shows that Chinese people (orang China) who are now Chinese Indonesians 
(Tionghoa) have been in Indonesia for centuries. During the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries the ethnic Chinese were the largest ethnic group in Jakarta 
and they married Sundanese, Javanese and Balinese women. This indicates, 
according to the article, "that we should throw away the idea that Chinese 
Indonesians are citizens of foreign descent (warga negara asing). The cultural and 
social activities which are shown in the photographs include Confucian temples, 
Chinese burials and Chinese Indonesian traders. It is also stated in the article that 
the ethnic Chinese were used by the Dutch to help build the old city of Batavia 
(Jakarta), with the result that the city has a mixture of styles, some Dutch and 
some Chinese (Sinergi, November-December 2000: 12). 
Some articles emphasise the similarities between Chinese Indonesian and 
Indonesian traditions, which reinforces the important ways that ethnic Chinese 
and Indonesian cultures have mixed together. For example, a kind of Chinese 
exorcism called ruwatan ciswakis is said to be very similar to traditional 
Indonesian practices (Sinergi, November-December 2000: 19). In another article, 
an ethnic Chinese landowner in the eighteenth century is said to have practised the 
Indonesian method of community co-operation gotong roi'ong (Mandarin Pos, 
September 2000: 26). 
It is clear from what I have outlined so far that the groups are working within the 
Indonesian discourses already available to them. To a certain extent they are 
somewhat restricted in how they can show themselves to be loyal Indonesians. 
Their way of showing that they are "good" citizens is to argue against stereotypes. 
By emphasising in their literature and in interviews their desire to change their 
behaviour and change that of other ethnic Chinese, they accept that Chinese 
Indonesian behaviour in the past has been regarded as unnationalistic, and they 
also accept that the onus is on Chinese Indonesians to change their 
behaviour in 
order for them to be accepted as Indonesians. The indigenous people 
do not need 
to emphasise their loyalty to the nation; it is taken for granted. Therefore, 
by 
accepting the social discourses on Chineseness in Indonesia, and urging 
Chinese 
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Indonesians to change their behaviour, these groups are also maintaining the 
distinctions between Chinese and non-Chinese Indonesians. 
In this chapter I have outlined a number of ways in which the groups are 
emphasising their Indonesian-ness, however, as I will move on to discuss in the 
next chapter, this has not led them to feel that they must completely lose their 
Chinese heritage. On the contrary, after 1998 these groups have a new found 
interest in exploring their Chinese heritage and want it to be included as one of 
the ethnic identities of Indonesia. This introduces another difficulty for the ethnic 
Chinese. During the New Order period in order to show that one was Indonesian, 
one had to forego ones Chinese heritage. As I have illustrated here, these groups 
insist that they are loyal Indonesians, however, they also insist that they have the 
right to express their Chinese culture. This desire to express their Chinese 
heritage as well as find a place for themselves within Indonesian society will be 
explored in chapter eight. 
Chapter 8 
Being Chinese and Indonesian 
In an article in the newspaper Republika, Thung Julan divides the ethnic Chinese 
in Indonesia into three groups based on how they identify themselves. Firstly, 
those who see themselves as ethnic Chinese and who will always be Chinese 
(mereka adalah etnis Cina dan akan selalu inenjadi Cina). This group, according 
to Thung, wishes to maintain a Chinese cultural heritage. The second group 
consists of those who feel assimilated. This group considers their Chinese heritage 
to be a curse (kutukan) which prevents them from being fully accepted in the 
places where they live. The final group contains those ethnic Chinese who feel 
global. This group of people identify themselves with their work and avoid 
associating themselves with culture or politics (Republika, 27 October 1998). The 
Chinese Indonesians in the groups investigated in this research do not fit into any 
of these categories. They are ethnic Chinese who are proud of their Chinese 
heritage, but also feel Indonesian and assert that their Chineseness is part of 
Indonesian national identity. 
As discussed in chapter seven, the groups emphasise the need for the ethnic 
Chinese to become better Indonesians. The language of the anti-Chinese 
stereotypes is used and Chinese Indonesians are urged to act in ways which 
overcome them. One way in which it has been possible for the ethnic Chinese to 
become more Indonesian has been to forego any signs of Chineseness. This was 
particularly the case during the New Order period when the official government 
policy required Chinese Indonesians to "assimilate". However, this appeal from 
the post-1998 groups, that Chinese Indonesians overcome the stereotypes, does 
not lead them to dismiss their Chinese heritage as un-Indonesian. Rather, they 
consider this heritage to be a genuine part of Indonesian identity. 
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The difficulties which the ethnic Chinese face in this regard develop from the way 
that Indonesian national identity has developed. According to Virginia Matheson 
Hooker, the national culture in Indonesia would ideally be "a combination of the 
high points (puncak-puncak) of all the regional cultures of Indonesia, a hybrid 
mix of the best of existing cultures in the nation" (cited in Thung, 1998: 35). 
Although there was this desire to develop a strong national culture at the time of 
independence, Hooker points out that such a culture is still in the making, and that 
the process of building it might be undermined by a lack of "depth of tradition 
that nourishes many of the regional cultures" (Thung, 1998: 35-36). Pancasila 
was promoted as the basic philosophy of the nation, however, within Pancasila 
there is an acceptance of diversity. Although the national education system and the 
mass media promoted co-operation and respect for different ethnic groups, as 
Hans Antlöv argues, there are no values which are shared by all Indonesians other 
than perhaps the "imagined political community" (Antlöv, 2000: 220-221). I argue 
here that, as a result of the lack of discourses of Indonesian cultural identity the 
Chinese Indonesian groups investigated in this research realise that if they want to 
find a place for themselves in Indonesia, and to be treated in the same way as 
other ethnic groups, then their Chinese Indonesian cultural heritage must be 
accepted. Either that, or all ethnic groups will need to lose their ethnic identity 
and assimilate into an Indonesian cultural identity which is still in the making. 
Integration or Assimilation? 
As I have shown throughout this thesis, the ethnic Chinese have been treated 
differently to other ethnic groups in Indonesia. An indigenist national discourse, 
which accepts diversity among indigenous groups, but not those perceived as 
coming from outside the archipelago, has ensured that different rules have applied 
to Chinese Indonesians. The debate about the place of Chinese Indonesians within 
Indonesian society has been discussed in terms of assimilasi (assimilation) and 
integrasi (integration) since Baperki and LPKD were established during the 1950s 
and 1960s. Central to my argument about the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is the 
point that other ethnic groups, those considered to be pribumi (indigenous), do not 
have to assimilate. This highlights the problem for the ethnic Chinese. A strong 
national cultural identity has not developed because non-Chinese ethnic groups 
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have been permitted to maintain their ethnic identity as a cultural identity. 
Indonesian identity is not a cultural identity, rather, it is a political identity. 
The debate over "assimilation" or "integration" has returned to post-Suharto 
Indonesia. According to Jemma Purdey there are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is 
a result of the issue having been cut short in 1965 and subsequently appropriated 
by the New Order government. Secondly it points to the desire among Chinese 
Indonesians to find a place for themselves in the new, democratic Indonesia 
(Purdey, forthcoming October 2003). 
As I discussed in chapter three, minority groups tend to demand a voice in a 
society as a result of the failure of the promise that immigrants who assimilated 
would become the same as, and be treated equally with non-immigrant citizens 
Indeed, Zygmunt Bauman (cited in Ang 2001: 9) argues that assimilation can 
never be fully successful because being in a position of having to assimilate and 
not acquiring the desired traits naturally, means that the person assimilating will 
always be inferior to those who did not have to assimilate but who naturally 
inherited the desired attributes. This idea could also be applied to post-1998 
Indonesia. Out of the failure of assimilationist policies, the ethnic Chinese are 
now asserting their ethnic identity and seeking to have it accepted and recognised 
by other Indonesians. Ten Ang asserts that "the politics of identity relies 
quintessentially on the recognition and mobilization of difference once the ideal 
of sameness has proved unreachable" (Ang, 2001: 11). 
Many of my interviewees blamed Suharto for the problems of ethnic Chinese, 
which indicates that they wish to move away from his assimilationist policies. 
They stated that the political structure established during the colonial era 
continued during the Suharto era and, therefore, did not allow for ethnic Chinese 
to be accepted as authentic Indonesians. The ethnic Chinese groups tend to 
dismiss Suharto's attempts at assimilation and revert to what they see as 
Sukarno's more "multicultural", integrationist vision. In an article in the 
Mandarin Pos Sukarno is declared to be "the symbol of the unity of the nation" 
(Mandarin Pos, May-June 2001: 11). Eddy Lembong of INTI praised the vision of 
the founding fathers of Indonesia very highly when I interviewed him. He stated 
that in the speech "The Birth of Pancasila" Sukarno "elegantly and convincingly" 
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described what kind of nation he wanted to develop. Sukarno appealed that 
Indonesia not be based on any one ethnicity, religion or culture, because there 
were so many ethnic groups. According to Lembong, "[t]his vision of the 
founding fathers was neglected totally by Suharto for thirty-t«wo years. so, ethnic 
conflict now is the fruit of the denial and misconduct against these principles" 
(interview, April 2001). Sukarno's integrationist vision for the nation is compared 
to the enforced (paksaan) assimilation of Suharto (Oei, May-June 2001: 9). 
As mentioned in chapter five, the post-1998 discussion of assimilation and 
integration is more complex and confusing than might be immediately obvious. 
Siauw Tiong Djin points to a difficulty which arises when discussing this issue in 
relation to Indonesia because there is a difference in meaning between the words 
pembauran and assimilasi, both of which are often translated into English as 
"assimilation". According to Siauw, pembauran means a less rigid form of 
assimilation than assimilasi. Pembauran does not ensure that an ethnic group 
must "loose the characteristics of its ethnicity", rather, it urges "association with 
the people in a society" rather than intermarriage in order to disappear into the 
people (Siauw, 1998: 27). As I touched on in chapter five, although the groups 
appear to be promoting an integrationist vision, many of them still use the 
language of assimilation. Also, although Suharto was encouraging the ethnic 
Chinese to lose all knowledge of their ethnic heritage, both pembauran and 
assimilasi were used to describe this process during his tenure also. 
In their manifesto INTI argue that: 
In this era of reform, Indonesians of Chinese descent feel called upon 
and determined to support all potential as part of the national assets. 
We wish to fully integrate (pembauran total) into all activities of the 
nation in order to develop a new Indonesia which is more united, more 
prosperous, stronger, and happier in one modern culture which is equal 
with all other progressive nations (INTI, 1999c: 3). 
INTI also use the term "assimilasi". A newspaper article declares that INTI wish 
to "struggle for total assimilation" [perjuangkan asimilasi total] (Suara 
Pembaruan, 12 April 1999). It is evident, however, from the aims of the group 
that they do not mean that the Chinese Indonesians should lose all their ethnic 
identity and disappear into the Indonesian population. 
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PSMTI use the terms integrasi (integration) and assimilasi in their literature. They 
assert that integration is an older concept in Indonesian national discourses than 
assimilation. According to PSMTI, integration developed out of the Youth Oath 
(Sumpah Pernuda) of 1928. Tedy Jusuf states that at this time ethnic groups. 
including Young Chienesen agreed to unite to form a nation, "without eliminating 
each groups ethnic and cultural identity". This is not the usual understanding of 
Sumpah Pemuda. As I explained in chapter two, this oath is usually associated 
with developing a united, Indonesian identity at the expense of ethnic identities. 
Jusuf argues that assimilation only developed as an idea in 1961 with an 
Assimilation Charter which stated that "unity occured when groups which had 
different mental attitudes, customs and cultures, came together as one sociological 
unity" (Jusuf, 2000: 105-106). Confusingly, those who wrote the Assimilation 
Charter also referred to the Youth Oath of 1928 (see chapter four above). 
As was evident in my discussion of newspaper articles in chapter five, 
assimilation also tends to be associated with poverty and physical features. 
Ernawati Sugondo of PSMTI mentions the ethnic Chinese of Tanggerang87 who are 
assimilated because they have similar professions to the local population, even 
though they still maintain Chinese cultural practices. She states that, 
The ethnic Chinese [there] have dark coloured skin, the same jobs as 
the indigenous; they have already assimilated (mernbaur), but, if 
someone in their family dies, they still pray like the Chinese. They 
haven't lost their identity even though they are assimilated. Most of 
them are Buddhist and a very small amount are Muslims (interview, 
May 2001). 
Leus Sungkharisma said that "the Tionghoa are already assimilated (membaur) in 
Java. They speak Javanese and have lost their ties with China" (interview June 
2001). 
There seems to be a complex re-negotiation of the terms of the "assimilation" 
debate. On the one hand the groups argue that Chinese Indonesians should no 
longer be forced to lose their Chinese cultural identity, however, on the other hand 
they still use the language of assimilation and argue that they have already 
87 Tanggerang is a town west of Jakarta with a large population of Chinese who do the same 
jobs as the indigenous people there, such as farming and fishing. 
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assimilated into Indonesian society or that they want to assimilate more fully. 
They seem to be changing the meaning of "assimilation" in subtle ways which 
allows them to argue that once the government and the population at large accepts 
their Chinese heritage then they will have assimilated because they will be treated 
just like an "indigenous" ethnic group in Indonesia. 
The groups are quite explicit about wanting their Chinese identities accepted as 
one of Indonesia's suku identities. As well as using national symbolism to show 
that they are loyal, national, organisations, which I discussed in the previous 
chapter, the groups also use Chinese symbolism, which I illustrate below. On 
another level in interviews and in the Chinese Indonesian media they also ask that 
Chinese culture be accepted in Indonesia. I argue that these demands from the 
groups fit with the discourses of Indonesian national identity. In a way, if the 
ethnic Chinese wish to be accepted as genuine Indonesians then they have no 
choice but to argue that their ethnic identities also be accepted. 
Calls That Chinese Culture be Accepted 
Chinese Symbolism 
The manifestos and booklets produced by the organisations, as well as the Chinese 
Indonesian media, all use Chinese symbolism. Despite their lack of proficiency in 
Chinese languages all the organisations have both Chinese and Indonesian names. 
The symbolism shows a desire to express their Chinese heritage as well as find a 
place for themselves within Indonesian society. For example, the booklets 
published by PSMTI include Chinese symbolism on their covers. The booklet 
Daftar Marga Tionghoa di Jakarta [List of Chinese Family Names in Jakarta] 
includes pictures of a dragon and a bird, which are Chinese symbols for the 
representing the masculine and the feminine (figure 8). 88 This cover also includes 
the title of the booklet in Chinese characters. 
88 These symbols are explained in Tedy Jusuf (2000). 
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Figure 8: Chinese Dragon and Bird 
Another PSMTI booklet, Sekilas Butlavu Tionghoa di Indonesia [A Glance at 
Chinese Culture in Indonesia] (figure 9), includes red Chinese lanterns on its 
cover with the Chinese blessings "good fortune" (fu) and "double happiness" 
(shuang xi). 
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Figure 9: Chinese Lanterns 
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INTI produce a booklet in Chinese (figure 10). 
Figure 10: INTI Manifesto in Chinese 
HMTI include Chinese characters in their logo (figure 4) as do the Indonesian 
Hakka Association (figure 6). 
Chinese symbolism is also heavily used in the Chinese Indonesian press. 
Mandarin Pus translates all its articles into Chinese, therefore. on its cover the 
Indonesian headlines are also given in Chinese. The example I use here has Gus 
Dur (in the centre) dressed in traditional Chinese clothing attending Chinese New 
Year celebrations in Jakarta in 2001 (figure I1). 
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Figure 1 1: Cover of Mandarin Polmagazine Sinergi 
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magazine Sinergi is almost entirely written in Indonesian, however, the cover 
always includes some Chinese characters. The cover below contains the headline 
"Chinese Indonesians: Shrewd Business Methods" (figure 12). It also states just 
below the title that it is a monthly magazine for haaren (ethnic Chinese). 
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Explicit Demands 
JFigurc 12: Cover of Sirnergi 
As well as using Chinese symbolism and characters in their publications, the 
Chinese Indonesian groups were also adamant in the interviews I carried out that 
they want their Chinese culture accepted as an Indonesian culture. PSMTI wants 
the government to: 
Allow Chinese culture, permit Chinese language printing and books, 
make Chinese New Year a holiday, the Chinese must have citizenship, 
the process of birth certification for the Chinese, as well as the form, is 
different than for other Indonesians so we want this changed too. We 
want the ethnic Chinese to be a suku like the indigenous ethnic groups 
in Indonesia (interview, April 2001). 
Martani Wiranata of the magazine Sinergi and the political party PWBI, also 
asserts that Chinese identity should be treated equally with other identities 
in 
Indonesia. He says that young people do not know what they are. They do not 
understand that they are Chinese and what that is. The people at the magazine 
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Sinergi wish to illustrate to Chinese Indonesians that they have a Chinese 
heritage, however, they do not want people to become chauvinistic. The magazine 
tries to describe how Chinese culture has already mixed with the "local culture" 
(interview, April 2001). On the one hand, Wiranata seems to argue that there are 
people in Indonesia who do not realise that they are Chinese and it is the job of 
his magazine to point out to them who they are. On the other hand, he still seems 
retiscent or confused about how to deal with this. Wiranata seems to be saying 
that as well as a distinct group of Chinese in Indonesia, their culture has also 
mixed with other cultures. Also, the other cultures are "local" cultures, which 
highlights the arrival of Chinese culture from outside the archipelago. Celebrating 
two years of the magazine, the editor of Sinergi, Tan Suie Ling, reiterates that all 
citizens of the nation must be treated equally with no discrimination towards any 
citizens of Indonesia (Tan Suie Ling, November-December 2000: 5). 
In response to my question about why he supported these organisations when he 
was a Chinese Muslim, Usman Effendy of PITI stated that: 
I support organisations because we cannot forget. [Yunus Yahya]89 has 
forgotten his ancestors, but, this is not good... Chinese culture is the 
oldest culture in Asia. Chinese culture is the same as Javanese, Batak 
it is a culture of Indonesia (interview, June 2001). 
Eddie Lembong of INTI states that: 
The vision of the organisation is that all Chinese Indonesians should be 
allowed to participate in all areas of life in Indonesia. This implies that 
we suggest and demand that everybody must perceive that the Chinese- 
Indonesians are a component of the nation, and, as such, they have to 
be treated equally (interview, April 2001). 
The preamble to INTI's manifesto explains that: 
According to historical records, the Chinese community has existed in 
the motherland for centuries, sharing to enrich the religious, cultural, 
trading and economic treasures of the archipelago... The independence 
of the Republic of Indonesia is the result of the struggles and efforts 
both of the leaders of the nation and all the people of Indonesia, 
including many of the Chinese community. Therefore, the opportunit1v 
is for all Chinese to be a community within the Republic of Indonesia, 
89 Yunus Yahya is another well know Chinese Indonesian Muslim who does not support these 
groups and calls on all Chinese to become Muslim and 
lose their Chinese identities 
altogether (See footnote 73). 
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based on Pancasila and the 1945 constitution (INTI, 1999d, my italics). 
Lieus Sungkharisma of PARTI says that: 
Because for thirty-two years the ethnic Chinese were discriminated 
against, now they must be brave and step forward (menampilkan) to 
Chineseness (Tionghoaan). But, we can still be Indonesian, like 
Javanese, Batak, they are still Indonesian (interview, June 2001). 
A letter to the newspaper Bisnis Indonesia illustrated how the ethnic Chinese just 
wish to be treated in the same manner as other ethnic groups. The writer was 
responding to comments made by a journalist that ethnic Chinese should not use 
Mandarin or English in public places. He asks why are Javanese, Madurese or 
other people permitted to speak their local language but not the ethnic Chinese 
(Bisnis Indonesia, 9 June 1998). 
Susanto of PBI explained that: 
The government says the Chinese are greedy and only want to be in the 
economy, but they don't give them the opportunity for other jobs. So, 
PBI fights for equal opportunity, equal treatment (interview, May 
2001). 
Ernawati Sugondo of PSMTI suggests that: 
Indonesian identity is like gado gado (Indonesian salad); all the 
ingredients are together in the bowl but all distinctive and not mixed 
up together like tea and sugar which mixes and dissolves together. 
Indonesian identity is not like that. Now Chinese identity is included in 
this so ethnic Chinese cannot lose their Chinese identity (interview, 
May 2001). 
Sugondo sums up very succinctly her understanding of Indonesian identity and 
where the ethnic Chinese fit into this. It is the characteristic of each ethnic group 
having their own distinct identity and therefore, a lack of clarity about what 
Indonesian identity then amounts to, which I am attempting to capture in this 
chapter. This lack of clarity about Indonesian identity makes it very difficult for 
the ethnic Chinese to consider themselves truly Indonesian without a strong ethnic 
identity. Charles Coppel criticised the assimilationists during the 1960s because 
they insisted that the ethnic Chinese assimilate, without being clear about how 
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this might be done in a new nation which lacked national integration. 90 This is still 
the case for the ethnic Chinese today. During the Nev,, Order they were forced to 
assimilate, but they were not successful. This was partly because they were still 
discriminated against by the state and within their local communities. however, it 
was also partly because without an ethnic identity they had nothing to assimilate 
into. 
Their Chinese Culture 
Although the ethnic Chinese in these groups are adamant that they wish to express 
their Chinese heritage, after 32 years during which the expression of Chinese 
culture in public was forbidden, most of the people I interviewed have had limited 
access to Chinese cultural practices. For example, most of them do not speak any 
Chinese dialects, do not eat Chinese food and do not celebrate Chinese cultural 
traditions. On the other hand, none of them question the fact that they are 
Chinese. As Ariel Heryanto has pointed out, those thirty two years of New Order 
rule were years of "erasure" of Chinese identity, but never its total removal 
(Heryanto, 1998: 104). 
Many of my interviewees say that they are Chinese because of their Chinese 
ancestry, rather than any cultural practices. For example, Ester Jusuf feels Chinese 
even though she does not speak Chinese or celebrate any Chinese festivals. On 
Ester's mother's side of the family her grandmother came from Taiwan and her 
grandfather came from China. Ester's father is also ethnic Chinese, although she 
does not know when his ancestors arrived in Indonesia. Ester travels a lot with her 
job as an NGO activist, speaking at conferences all over the world. She explains 
that outside Indonesia she is Indonesian, while, inside the country she is Chinese. 
Susanto believes that you do not have to speak Chinese or celebrate Chinese New 
Year to be Chinese. Now that his mother has passed away his family does not 
celebrate Chinese New Year. He explained to me that "just because of my blood I 
am Chinese", although he is not pure Chinese as he believes he has some Dayak 
ancestors on his mother's side (interview, May 2001). 
90 See chapter four. 
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Nurdin Purnomo is the only totok in my sample. Therefore, he has had more 
access to Chinese culture than my other interviewees. Both of his parents were 
born in China. For Nurdin Purnomo an ability to speak Chinese is very important 
for those who consider themselves to be Chinese, however, it is not necessary. He 
told me that, "[e]ven if a long long time ago you had an ancestor who was 
Chinese, you are still Chinese" (interview, March 2001). 
Leus Sungkharsima still celebrates Chinese festivals, which he links to his 
religion. He states that: 
I am a Buddhist and Imlek (Chinese New Year) is mixed up with my 
religion. I go to the temple to pray. You can't stop citizens from 
expressing their culture (interview June 2001). 
Erna Sugondo explained to me that, 
The Chinese in lots of different countries in the world have traditions 
and culture which are basically the same. But, also their traditions have 
been mixed up with the culture of the country they live in. For 
example, at a Chinese celebration in Indonesia they will eat Indonesian 
food as well as Chinese food (interview, May 2001). 
Erna is saying that Chinese identity changes but there is an element of 
Chineseness which always remains. 
Eddy Sadeli and Keng Joe Hok of PSMTI are hoping that young people will 
become interested in Chinese culture. According to Sadeli, "if you have no culture 
then you have no identity, if no identity then no dignity. But, the young people are 
not interested, they are global. " By "Chinese culture" Sadeli explained that he 
meant language, changing of name back to the Chinese way, and following 
Chinese customs for marriage and funerals (interview, May 2001). He does not 
then think it is enough to have an Indonesian identity. 
The Chinese Indonesian media contains information about many different Chinese 
cultural activities. All the magazines provide guidance in learning Mandarin, 
however, Sinergi provides no tones with the romanised words so it is not possible 
to practice speaking the words. One edition of Sinergi included an article about a 
Mandarin speaking competition held at the University of Indonesia. The article 
included an interesting disclaimer stating that "we rarely hold special Mandarin 
language competitions. In future we will also hold English and Arab language 
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competitions" (Sinergi, May-June 2001: 68). This highlights the radical nature of 
this kind of activity. Chinese Indonesians do not vet feel comfortable in 
celebrating their Chinese heritage without ensuring that it is portrayed as non- 
exclusive behaviour. 
The magazines also provide articles on cooking traditional Chinese dishes such 
as, roast chicken Peking style (Sinergi, June-July 2001: 31), a cold salad called 
Lang Pun (Sinergi, May-June 2001: 55), and dimsum (Sinergi, . April-NIay 2001: 
55). Sinergi provides instructions on the Chinese martial art 11 isshu and explains 
how Chinese horoscopes work. Sinergi also advertises Chinese medicines and 
acupuncture specialists. Mandarin Pos contains articles about feng shui, 
concentrating on a particular aspect of feng shui in each edition, stemming from 
the house and garden, to the layout of cities. The final page of Mandarin Pos 
celebrates film and music stars. Each of the stars profiled are non-Indonesian 
Chinese. For example, one edition celebrates a Chinese Malaysian singing star, 
another profiles Taiwanese music stars, another discusses Hong Kong made films. 
More than any other part of the magazines or newspapers, this section seems to 
tap into a feeling of pride in being part of this vibrant, successful, Chinese 
culture. However, as the next section of the thesis illustrates, although it is clear 
that the groups wish to celebrate their Chinese heritage, and feel themselves to be 
Chinese, they distance themselves from China. 
This distancing from China itself may be a result of Indonesian discourses which 
after 1965 ensured that links with China were taboo. Few of the group members 
have any actual links with China, however, even those who visited China 
emphasise that they feel different from the people there. The groups' arguments 
are a complex mix of asserting their Chineseness, while also making their ethnic 
identity as Indonesian as possible which means undermining any links with the 
place where their culture originally came from. 
For example, the group members I spoke to who visited China all said that they 
felt different to the people there. Eddy Sadeli has visited China and feels that he is 
different to the Chinese in China (interview, May 2001). Chandra Setia\t an, 
chairman of MATAKIN stated in an interview that "[w]e cannot lie that we are not 
Chinese anymore. Although our citizenship is Indonesian we cannot delete our 
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roots of culture" (interview, April 2001). However, this sense of Chineseness has 
been dislocated from China, the place where his ancestors came from. He has 
visited China but said that he "feels a connection with Confucian places but not 
with China anymore" (interview, April 2001). Ester Jusuf emphasises that inside 
Indonesia she is Chinese, but outside she is Indonesian (interview April 2001). 
None of the groups manifestos mention China at all. 
In the Chinese Indonesian media China is referred to as Republik Rakvat Tiongkok 
(People's Republic of China) or Tiongkok (China). Indonesia is referred to as 
"tanah air" (homeland). When China is discussed a distinction tends to be made 
between "us" (Indonesians) and "them" (Chinese). For example, in an article 
about a trip made to China in 1963, the Chinese Indonesian wrote that in the town 
of Xixuangbanna in Yunnan Province, he came across a Chinese minority who 
resembled "us" (kita). From what followed it is clear that "us" means Indonesians. 
This Chinese minority wore sarongs, they wore black head-dresses, and they 
chewed betel. They reminded the author of the people of Aceh (Aidit, 2001: 21). 
Another article discussing China's problems with Portugal over Macau also 
distinguishes between "us" Indonesians and "them" Chinese (Sinergi, November- 
December 2000: 4). A Chinese Indonesian man writing about his experiences of 
living in China for thirty years writies that he still wants to return to his "native 
village" (kampung halainan) in Java (Sobron, November-December 2000: 20-21). 
In an article discussing the re-emergence of business links between Beijing and 
Jakarta in the post-Suharto era Chinese Indonesians are described as "ethnic 
Chinese children of the [Indonesian] nation" (anak bangsa etnic Tionghoa) 
(Mandarin Pos, March 2001: 7). Another article about Hong Kong's return to 
Chinese rule reiterated Jiang Zemin's assurances that Chinese Indonesians 
(Tionghoa Indonesia) would not be actively encouraged to help in the economic 
development of China, which was described as a "foreign country" (luar negeri 
RRT) (Mandarin Pos, July 2001: 6). Another article, discussing a trade fair in 
Jakarta, explains how the contingent from China, selling goods at the fair, are part 
of the "foreign" (asing) section (Mandarin Pos, July 2001: 10). 
As I mentioned in chapter three, the terms used by the ethnic Chinese to describe 
themselves tends to emphasise the affinity they feel with the countries they have 
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settled in. These terms distance them from China and emphasise their nationalist 
credentials. Again I would argue that this undermines their links to the discourses 
of diaspora if one takes a definition of diaspora which emphasises links with the 
ancestral country, and links between members of the diaspora. During interviews 
most people voiced their dislike of the term Cina, which was the name given to 
Chinese Indonesians during the New Order period. They dislike the term because 
it associates them with China and is considered derogatory. According to the Tedy, 
Jusuf "orang Cina" (Chinese people) are those who have citizenship of the 
People's Republic of China (Jusuf, 2000: 108). They prefer the term Tionghoa 
because it is associated more closely with Indonesia. Again Jusuf clearly sets out 
that Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent are "orang Tionghoa". Indonesian 
citizens of Chinese descent, therefore, can be equated with Javanese, Sundanese, 
Madurese, Minahasanese, and others (Jusuf, 2000: 109). Lieus Sungkharisma said 
that the use of the word Cina for China is no problem, but he does not want it 
used to describe Chinese Indonesians. This sums up their attitude towards China. 
It is outside the discourse of their Chineseness. Their Chineseness is tied up with 
Indonesia. Leus Sungkharisma stated that "older people feel Chinese but not 
people who were born here [Indonesia]". In other words, people who were born in 
Indonesia do not have cultural links with China any longer. 
The Chinese identity is a particular type of Indonesian-Chinese identity which is 
not found anywhere else and does not have much to do with China, as such. The 
term Tionghoa (the word Chinese-Indonesians use to describe themselves) is a 
word used to describe the Chinese in Indonesia only. So these people are talking 
about a particular type of Chinese identity which has been Indonesianised and as a 
result is part of Indonesian identity. Another example of the Indonesian nature of 
their Chinese identity was evident in an interview with Ikhsan Tanggok, a lecturer 
in Confucian studies at Institut Agama Islam Negeri (Government Institute for 
Islamic Studies, IAIN). Tanggok pointed out that in order to study Confucianism, 
one must also study Chinese Indonesian culture. However, he warned that 
"Chinese Indonesian culture is very different to the culture of the country of our 
forefathers (budaya leluhur negerinia). Traditions such as marriage and burial 
ceremonies, have mixed with the cultures of Indonesia, v., hich leads to different 
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types of Chinese Indonesian ceremonies in different regions of Indonesia" 
(Sinergi, November-December 2000: 14). 
According to Ma Mung's definition of diaspora the Chinese Indonesians who are 
members of the groups investigated for this research could not be considered part 
of a Chinese diaspora. Some members of the groups are starting to become 
interested in developing links with ethnic Chinese in other countries, however 
many of them seem to be more interested in trying to ensure that their particular 
Chinese-Indonesian identities are accepted as genuine Indonesian identities. As a 
result of policies during the thirty-two years of the New Order government most 
of the members do not speak Chinese and have not maintained any links with the 
country of their ancestors. 
Jacobsen writes specifically about the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and this less 
coherent meaning of the term "diaspora", allows him to consider them part of the 
Chinese diaspora. His definition "allows people to move in and out of a given 
diaspora depending on their current social and political situation" (Jacobsen, 
2003: 1). It is possible that at some time in their future, Chinese Indonesians will 
wish to become active in the Chinese diaspora. This I do not dispute. What I do 
dispute is that they are necessarily part of the Chinese diaspora now, just because 
they are ethnic Chinese, without having to actively engage with it. So far in their 
activities the ethnic Chinese groups are more concerned with finding a place for 
themselves within Indonesian society, rather than focusing on being part of a 
diaspora. This may be the result of years of discrimination towards Chinese 
Indonesians who displayed any sign of their Chinese heritage. It may also be fear 
of violent reprisals if they do not show loyalty to Indonesia. However, based on 
the evidence of my research I believe that there is a genuine desire on the part of 
the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia to stay focused on defining a place for themselves 
within Indonesia without feeling the need to reach out to other ethnic Chinese. 
Also, if they do in the future desire to make links with China and with other 
ethnic Chinese, this does not necessarily mean that their loyalty to Indonesia 
would be undermined. As Tan Chee Beng stresses, a distinction should be made 
between an identification with Chinese culture and genuinely felt identification 
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among ethnic Chinese with the nations they have settled in (Tan, 1998: 44). The 
two need not be mutually exclusive. 
Part of the anti-Chinese stereotype in Indonesia, up to now, as set out by Charles 
Coppel, is a belief that the ethnic Chinese "cling to the culture of their ancestral 
homeland". It is the case that the members of these groups encourage ethnic 
Chinese to re-discover Chinese cultural practices. However, they promote their 
Chinese heritage as a genuinely Indonesian one. I argue that this desire to still 
celebrate Chinese culture, even though the Chinese language and the ties with 
China have been lost, is linked to the fact that all the other ethnic groups in 
Indonesia still maintain their individual cultures. There is no cultural 
"Indonesian" identity, so for the ethnic Chinese to feel Indonesian their ethnic 
identity must be made equal to other ethnic identities in the country. 
Their Indonesian Identity 
The sentiments expressed by the groups asking that their Chinese heritage be 
accepted as an Indonesian identity, fits with the discourses of Indonesian 
nationhood in the sense that all other ethnic groups are permitted to express their 
ethnic identities. When the groups spoke to me about their national identity and 
when they wrote about it in the media, they found it difficult to explain what it 
meant to have Indonesian identity other than through an acknowledgement of 
diversity. 
Acknowledgement of Diversity 
Susanto says of Indonesian identity that: 
It is better for each ethnic group to have their own identity. Indonesian 
identity is related to citizenship and language [but] there has also been 
a mixing of culture, like for me - my father is from China but I am 
now Indonesian (interview, May 2001). 
Members of GANDI also believe that Indonesians should keep their ethnic 
identities. Sugeng and Wahyu Effendy from GANDI said that "it is important that 
each ethnic group have its own identity". They could not explain what they meant 
by Indonesian identity, but said that it was built out of the different ethnic groups. 
Wahyu said that "reconciliation is needed" [and that] justice, the poor and 
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democracy are all things that people can come together to improve" (interview, 
March 2001). 
Tan Suie Ling of the political party PWBI has developed a framework for 
improving ethnic relations and including everybody in some kind of national 
identity. He explains that the "duty of the nation's history" (tugas sejarah bangsa) 
is "to develop a people who are just and prosperous" (membangun suatu 
masyarakat yang adil dan makmur). Tan asserts that justice was sidelined during 
the New Order period and attention was only given to the prosperity of the people. 
He argues that both justice and prosperity must go hand-in-hand and believes that 
the fulfilment of these duties should be based on the concept sinergi Varga 
bangsa (synergy of the citizens of the nation). This is possible if three conditions 
are met: no violence (anti kekerasan), empathy (kenal mengenal secara empati) 
and healthy communication (koinunikasi sehat). Tan warns that violence causes 
the growth of discrimination, and also oppression, in the sense that its aim is to 
make uniform anything which is considered to be different. The second principle 
of "empathy" is based on the principle that people should learn to look at 
situations not just based on their assumptions about other people. Finally, Tan 
asserts that it is important for a healthy society that people from different groups 
can communicate with each other in a way which helps them to understand what 
other groups are thinking (Tan, 2000). 
Ester Jusuf argues that: 
Indonesian identity should not be based on race. There are so many 
ethnic groups living here. People should be considered Indonesian 
when they want to become Indonesian - live here and follow the law 
here (interview, April 2001). 
All of these ideas about Indonesian identity are civic concepts of the nation in the 
sense that the emphasis is on accepting people as Indonesian if they are willing to 
follow the laws and become citizens of the nation. However, there is also a fear 
that ethnic nationalism is prevalent in Indonesia. 
Eddie Lembong argues that an ethnic form of nationalism threatens to exclude the 
ethnic Chinese, but that this was not the vision of the founding fathers. This 
ethnic nationalism seems to refer to an "indigenist" type of nationalism. Lembong 
explains that: 
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A big problem that the Chinese have to overcome is a strong ethno- 
nationalism. This is a big problem for the Chinese trying to integrate 
smoothly into society. We must educate people that ethno-nationalism 
is wrong. Sukarno did not want ethno-nationalism. but, Suharto 
exercised it.... Ethno-nationalism, either consciously or unconsciously, 
is in the minds of many Indonesians (interview. April 2001). 
Eddie Lembong also stated that: 
Now people talk about `pluralism' and `multiculturalism', but, INTI 
offers a more dynamic and constructive vision which we call `cross 
cultural fertilisation'. `Pluralism' is static. We are plural, but, where 
are we going? Also with `multiculturalism'. They only describe the 
present situation. `Cross cultural fertilisation' implies mutual respect 
of different cultures, including the Chinese culture, which is part of 
Indonesian culture. All cultures are equal so let's blend together 
(interview, April 2001). 
This idea of "cross-cultural fertilisation" seems to have an element of identity not 
staying fixed, but changing as people mix together. This is perhaps a 
acknowledgement Indonesian ethnic identities are hybrid identities. However, as I 
will outline below, the groups also argue that their ethnic identity is natural and 
God-given. Therefore, the extent to which an acknowledgement of a blending of 
cultures will lead to a discourse of hybridity is not clear. 
The richness and diversity of Indonesian culture is always praised in the Chinese 
Indonesian press, and ethnic Chinese culture is then included in this as an integral 
part of Indonesian culture. For example, in an article about a cultural festival at 
Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, the writer says that "the cultures of Indonesia 
constitute a richness which is not valued enough by Indonesians]. There are a 
variety of arts and cultures, traditions, languages, religions and ethnic groups 
which have been part of the Indonesian nation up to now" (Sinergi, November- 
December 2000: 15). At the end of this article the writer suggests that Chinese 
involvement in the cultural festival shows that "there is an acknowledgement that 
Chinese Indonesian culture is one of the cultures of Indonesia" (Sinergi, 
November-December 2000: 15). The national unity seems to be reached through 
each groups celebrating another group's culture, including Chinese Indonesian 
culture. In an article in Sinergi it was said that a week of cultural events is held at 
Taman Mini Indonesia Indah each year "in order to unite everybody" (Sinergi, 
November-December 2000: 15). This event has been held there since 1992 in 
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order to celebrate national days, such as Armed Forces Day, Stumpah Pemuda, and 
Heroes Day, which fall during the festival. 
The Naturalness of Ethnic Groups 
All the groups are asking for equality with other ethnic groups in Indonesia. The 
groups' attitudes towards ethnicity seems to be based on a belief that to have an 
ethnic group is to have a natural, God-given identity. The declaration which was 
presented at the first general meeting of PSMTI in 2000 summarises their beliefs 
very clearly. PSMTI state that ethnic groups are in existence because it is the will 
of God and the traditions and cultures of each ethnic group (suku) should be able 
to be expressed and developed by them. Suku Tionghoa are a component of the 
nation who should be equal before the law and actively participate in the 
development of all aspects of the nation, to make a new Indonesia which is more 
democratic, more integrated, and more harmonious (PSMTI, 2000b: 14). PSMT1 
also state that the diversity is a gift (anugerah) from God (PSMTI, 2000b: 15). 
INTI also emphasise the naturalness of ethnicity by suggesting that ethnicity is a 
gift from God (anugerah darf Tuhan Yang Maha Esa) (INTI, 1999c: 2). Likewise, 
HMTI state that the diversity in Indonesia is a gift from God which is "beautiful 
and priceless" (indah dan tak ternilai) (HMTI, July 2000a: 1). Since God is 
believed to have divided people into ethnic groups, these statements imply that it 
is not possible to change or lose one's ethnicity; everybody is a member of an 
ethnic group. This leads to the premise that ethnic Chinese should not be 
discriminated against because it was not their choice to be Chinese, God made 
them that way. 
This attitude towards ethnicity is understandable within the context of discourses 
of Indonesian national identity. All "indigenous" Indonesians have a suku bangsa 
of which they are a member. Although there is obviously intermixing of the suku 
(through marriage for example) everyone is a member of just one suku bangsa. 
Professor Parsudi Suparlan describes Indonesian ethnic groups (suku bangsa) as 
"special kinds of social groups which are ascriptive in the same way as ones age 
or sex" (Suparlan, 1999: 153). 
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Conclusion 
As is clear from the discussion above, the Chinese and Indonesian identities of the 
people studied here are very closely intertwined. In their manifestos the groups 
use the language of Indonesian nationalism in order to place themselves within the 
these discourses. All the organisations are based on the principles of Pancasila. 
Many of them also refer to the Youth Oath of 1928 (Sumpah Pemzida) and the 
motto "plurality but unity" (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). I would argue that, on the one 
hand, this is a strategic use of language on the part of the groups in order to show 
that they are loyal. On the other hand, like the attempts to overcome anti-Chinese 
stereotypes, they have no other language in which to frame their arguments and 
show that they are genuinely loyal to Indonesia. 
Their demands are also nationalistic in orientation. PSMTI called for Imlek to be 
a holiday (Suara Pembaruan, 6 December 2000), want to be called Tionghoa and 
be an official suku (Suara Pembaruan, 5 July 2000; Raltyat Mc'rdeka, 1 August 
2000). They also asked that the Constitution be amended so that non-indigenous 
could become President (Rakyat Merdeka, 4 March 2000). These demands are 
nationalist in their orientation. This echoes what Will Kymlicka suggested, that if 
ethnic minorities ask for changes it tends to be so that they can integrate more 
fully into the nation. In the case of Indonesia they are asking to be treated in the 
same way other Indonesians are treated. 
The nationalist orientation of the organisations seems to be contradicted, however, 
by their desire that their Chinese heritage be accepted as a genuinely Indonesian 
culture. Despite their encouragement to Chinese Indonesians to 
behave in ways 
which illustrate their loyalty to Indonesia, the groups also insist that their 
Chinese 
culture be accepted. In a sense perhaps, due to the 
discourses of Indonesian 
nationalism and the lack of a credible alternative to the 
deeply-felt ethnic 
identities of the archipelago, the Chinese in Indonesia had little choice 
but to see 
themselves as Chinese. They have been discriminated against 
for thirty-two years. 
Even if they manage to portray themselves as indigenous in their local area, 
bureaucratically their Chinese origins are known. Since they have not managed to 
assimilate, and since they wish to be considered to be genuine 
Indonesians, they 
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need an ethnic identity and so are asking that their Chineseness be considered an 
Indonesian identity. They seem to want to have an ethnic culture which is equal to 
the other traditional cultures in Indonesia. 
The Chinese groups investigated in this thesis seem to be in a catch-22 situation. 
On the one hand they are urging their supporters to be "good Indonesians", on the 
other hand, they encourage the expression of their Chinese heritage. The national 
discourses up to now have made it impossible to do both. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis has investigated the articulations of ethnic and national identities made 
by eleven Chinese-Indonesian organisations which were established after the 
violence of 1998. On the one hand I have shown that the groups are adamant that 
Chinese Indonesians must overcome anti-Chinese stereotypes and show loyalty to 
Indonesia. On the other hand, the groups were established in order that Chinese 
Indonesians look out for each other, which seems to fall into the stereotype of 
exclusive behaviour. This creates a paradox because it is not possible, within the 
anti-Chinese discourses, both to overcome the stereotypes and act together as 
ethnic Chinese. Another paradox is created by their celebration of their Chinese 
heritage. The declarations of loyalty made by the groups do not lead them to 
abandon their Chinese heritage. On the contrary, their interviews with me, their 
manifestos and the Chinese Indonesian media show that they have reacted to the 
lifting of the ban on Chinese cultural expression with enthusiasm. 
I have argued that Indonesia has struggled to establish a deeply-felt national 
identity which matches the regional, ethnic identities which are so important to 
the population. Sukarno introduced the concept of Pancasila in order to inculcate 
a sense of national identity. Suharto also used the Pancasila discourse and he 
banned discussion of issues relating to SARA which might cause conflict between 
the many different ethnic groups in Indonesia. Despite these attempts, the ethnic 
identities of Indonesians have remained very important identities for people in 
Indonesia. However, the ethnic Chinese have a unique position within Indonesian 
national discourses. Since independence they have never been fully accepted as 
Indonesians and have been portrayed as "outsiders" who must make every effort to 
assimilate into the Indonesian nation. 
Following the arguments of scholars such as Ernest Geliner and Benedict 
Anderson I argue that nationalism is a modern concept which emerged during a 
185 
period of industrial and communicative revolution during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Scholars argue that two distinct types of nationalism - civic 
and ethnic - developed at this time. The civic type of nationalism encourages 
loyalty to the territory and to the public institutions of the state. The ethnic form 
of nationalism celebrates the ethnic characteristics of the members of a nation. 
This has led scholars to argue that civic types of nations are more open to ethnic 
diversity than ethnic nations. Since Indonesia is such an ethnically diverse 
country, this has led scholars to argue that Indonesia is a civic nation. I argue that 
the literature has not taken account of the extent to which the ethnic Chinese have 
not been accepted as genuine Indonesians. Therefore, I consider Indonesia to be an 
indigenist nation, where indigenous groups are accepted as Indonesian, but non- 
indigenous groups are not. 
Writers on nationalism have argued that the discourse of nationalism is a 
culturally homogenising discourse. That is, in order for a nation to function, an 
homogenous culture must develop. In chapter three I discussed a number of 
discourses which question the homogenous nature of the nation. The discourses I 
chose have particular relevance to the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. The literature 
on "multiculturalism" questions to what extent minority groups should lose their 
ethnic identities, and to what extent the state should make allowances for their 
particular traditions. Questions raised within this literature touch on issues which 
the Chinese Indonesian groups are grappling with, such as, whether an ethnic 
group should be permitted to use its language, whether ethnic group members are 
needed to represent their own communities and to what extent minority groups 
should integrate. However, this literature is not entirely satisfactory because 
Indonesia is unlike many of the countries - mainly Western countries - which 
scholars of multiculturalism study. Unlike those countries, which have long 
histories of independence, Indonesia has struggled to develop a strong national 
identity into which ethnic groups might assimilate. Therefore, the Chinese 
Indonesian groups discussed in this research are not looking for special treatment 
as such, rather they are asking to be treated in the same way as indigenous ethnic 
groups in Indonesia. 
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Another kind of identity, which undermines the cultural homogeneity of the nation 
is that of "diaspora". From the establishment of the website hziaren. org, which 
was established after the violence of 1998 in Indonesia, it is clear that ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia are included as part of the Chinese diaspora both by other 
ethnic Chinese, and by scholars writing in the field. I question whether this should 
be the case. Elaine Tay writes that the difference between an "ethnic groups" and a 
"diaspora" is that the diaspora maintains links with the original homeland. 
Emmanuel Ma Mung highlights the importance of active engagement with other 
members of the diaspora. Among the groups I interviewed this active engagement 
with the Chinese diaspora and with China was not evident. 
Although the groups studied in this thesis are interested in their Chinese heritage, 
I argue that they are mainly trying to find a place for themselves within the 
Indonesian nation. Chapter four and five of this thesis discussed the ways the 
ethnic Chinese have been treated since independence and the organisations which 
they established. All of the organisations were focused on ensuring that Chinese 
Indonesians were included in nationalist discourses. This is even the case for 
Baperki, an organisation which insisted that Chinese Indonesians should be 
permitted to express their Chinese heritage, but which was also dedicated to 
Indonesia, working closely with Sukarno and establishing educational facilities 
teaching the Indonesian curriculum. 
After the alleged coup attempt of 1965, Suharto came to power and instigated a 
policy of assimilation for the ethnic Chinese. The outward expression of Chinese 
culture was banned and Chinese Indonesians were strongly encouraged to change 
their names to Indonesian sounding ones. However, the ethnic Chinese were also 
prevented from fully assimilating because their identity cards included a code 
which allowed the authorities to know who was ethnic Chinese. Intermarriage was 
also encouraged, however, the children of an ethnic Chinese father are up to this 
day still considered non-pribumi even if their mother is indigenous. Despite these 
difficulties it seems from the small amount of empirical research carried out 
during the New Order that the ethnic Chinese felt themselves to be Indonesians, 
and felt no real connection with China, the land of their ancestors. 
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The violence in 1998 and the fall of the Suharto regime has allowtiwed the ethnic 
Chinese to explore their cultural heritage in an open «way for the first time in 
thirty-two years. It is not just the ethnic Chinese who have grievances they wish to 
voice. In post-Suharto Indonesia there are feelings among many non-Javanese that 
they have not had the access to power that they deserve. Groups other than the 
Chinese were discriminated against, under-represented in elite positions, and felt 
aggrieved after 1998. This does not just refer to those in Aceh, and West Papua 
who are fighting for independence, but also people in Kalimantan and Sumatra 
who are also underrepresented in elite positions. These are discourses with which 
the Chinese are now also engaging and demanding a voice in the running of the 
nation. 
However, Chinese Indonesians have a very unique position in Indonesian society. 
It is very difficult to over-emphasise how radical the activities of the ethnic 
Chinese groups are. The position of Chinese Indonesians has improved 
enormously after 1998. Chinese Indonesians have become more vocal in their 
demands for action by the government to bring people to account for the 
persecution the Chinese have suffered. On May 11 2000, for example, about 25 
young ethnic Chinese held a demonstration outside the Presidential Palace in 
Jakarta. This demonstration was co-ordinated by members of SIMPATIK. They 
were demanding that the former President, Suharto, and various police and 
military commanders be put on trial for the attacks on Chinese homes and 
businesses, as well as the rape of ethnic Chinese women, in the riots of May 1998. 
This was the first public demonstration by the Chinese-Indonesian community 
for 
over thirty years (Wagner, 11 May 2000). It is now possible 
for Chinese 
Indonesians to learn Chinese, display Chinese characters, celebrate Chinese New 
Year and declare on their identification cards that they are Confucian. 
Despite the more open environment which developed after 1998, 
by coming 
together and organising themselves into groups, the Chinese 
Indonesians 
discussed in this thesis seem to be falling into the stereotype of exclusive 
behaviour. However, as I discussed in chapters seven and eight. the groups are 
adamant that Chinese Indonesians should behave appropriately and show 
loyalty 
to Indonesia. The symbolism the groups use illustrates the efforts they 
have made 
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to show that they are Indonesia-focused. They also highlight the length of time 
ethnic Chinese have been in Indonesia and the role they played in the struggle for 
independence. However, they are also enthusiastically encouraging people to learn 
about their Chinese heritage. Many of the groups also include Chinese symbolism 
on their documentation and they reject the New Order policy of assimilation. 
However, the ways they discuss China in their media and in interviews with me 
has led me to the conclusion that although they relish the opportunity to celebrate 
their Chinese heritage, they understand this heritage to be an Indonesian heritage, 
and they delight in being included in Indonesian cultural activities. In fact, the 
celebration of their Chinese heritage by the groups in the post-1998 environment 
is not very surprising. since all "indigenous" ethnic groups in Indonesia are 
permitted to celebrate their ethnic identities and Chinese Indonesian groups are 
asking that they be treated the same way as all other ethnic groups in Indonesia. 
However, as a result of the anti-Chinese stereotypes, which do not include them 
within the discourse on Indonesian nationalism, it may not he possible for the 
groups to achieve their joint aims of overcoming anti-Chinese stereotypes and 
having their Chinese heritage accepted within Indonesia. 
The image below highlights the extent to which ethnic Chinese have still not been 
accepted as genuine Indonesians. It appeared in January 2001 in Indonesia's most 
respected political magazine, Tempo. 
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figure 13: "Ethnic Chinese Still Out in the Cold" 
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After having argued in this thesis that Chinese Indonesians are trying to find a 
genuine place for themselves within Indonesian society. the picture is incredibly 
depressing. Although both figures are obviously being friendly to each other, the 
exaggerated Chinese features and clothing of the person on the right portrays him 
as very different to the Indonesian person on the left. The image was used to 
illustrate a survey-article entitled "Ethnic Chinese Still Out in the Cold". In this 
article 511 people were asked a number of questions relating to the position of 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. 58 percent replied "yes" in response to the question, 
"would you mind if a close relative married a member of the Chinese 
community". In response to another question - Do you agree with ethnic Chinese 
using their own languages in everyday communication'? - 78 percent replied 
"no". Another question asking whether Imlek (Chinese New Year) should be a 
national holiday, did elicit a positive response with 59 percent of respondents 
replied "yes" while 41 percent said "no". 
This article highlights how the negative attitudes towards Chinese Indonesians, 
which were evident in the newspaper articles in 1998, and which I discussed in 
chapter five, still seem to be evident in 2001. The article also highlights how 
positive changes which the government introduced (see below) in relation to the 
ethnic Chinese after 1998 have not been accompanied by changes in social 
attitudes towards Chinese Indonesians. 
According to GANDI, at the end of the New Order regime there were 62 pieces of 
legislation which discriminated against the ethnic Chinese. The new government 
did set about changing some of these discriminatory laws after the fall of the 
Suharto regime. On 13 November 1998 the People's Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) revoked the 1978 decree on the implementation of the rules of Pancasila 
(Decision No. 2/MPR/1978). During the New Order regime the government were 
the only official interpreters of Pancasila. The press, at this time, were constantly 
reminded to avoid writing "tendentiously or sensationally" about 
issues relating to 
suku (ethnic group), agama (religion), ras (race), and antar-golongan 
(inter-group 
affairs) (Idris and Gunaratne, 2000: 272). In 1998 in its place a decree requiring 
that all state institutions enforce all the United Nations conventions on 
human 
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rights was endorsed (Decision No. 17/MPR/1998) (Idris and Gunaratne, 2000: 
271). Habibie's government ratified the UN convention against discrimination 
which was meant to ensure that all citizens had equal rights under the law (Anwar, 
2001: 10). They also banned the use of pribumi and non pribumi in government 
documents and issued a presidential instruction allowing the teaching of Chinese 
(Allen, 2001). 
After the elections of 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid, of PKB (The National 
Awakening Party) became President, with Megawati Sukarnoputri of PDI-P 
(Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) as his vice-President. Decree No. 41 
1967 which banned activities relating to Chinese culture was revoked by \Vahid 
with Decree No. 6 2000. This meant that in 2000, for the first time since 1967, 
Chinese-Indonesians were permitted to celebrate Chinese New Year (FEER, 2000: 
15). However, in a move which showed the volatility of the situation, the 
government called for modest celebrations to be held that year. Home Minister 
Surjadi Sudirja urged that "celebratory activities should also respect the national 
cohesion and unity context, not be exclusive and if necessary also invite 
neighbours [to the celebrations]" (The Straits Times, 20 January 2000). The ban on 
the display of Chinese characters was overturned by Abdurrachman Wahid in law 
no. 62 2001. 
Abdurrahman Wahid visited Beijing in December 1999, and during a speech at 
Beijing University he declared that his daughter was studying Mandarin, and he 
hoped that "one day she will be here, learning Chinese more fully from you, 
because I come from Chinese stock". He told the audience that his ancestors went 
to Indonesia from Xinjiang Autonomous Region 500 years previously (Lawrence, 
16 December 1999). During Chinese New Year celebrations in 2000, Wahid also 
stated that he had Chinese blood. This was reported in the Chinese Indonesian 
press (see Mandarin Pos, February 2001: 11 and Mandarin Pos, April 2001: 11). 
After a protracted struggle during 2001 Wahid was removed from office and 
Megawati took over the Presidency. In 2001 Megawati revoked the use of Cilia 
and reinstated the formal use of Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesian) and Tiongkok 
(China) for the first time since 1966 (Allen, 2001). In 2002 she announced that 
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from the following year Chinese New Year would be an official holiday in 
Indonesia. 
Despite these advances there are fundamental changes which Chinese Indonesians 
have been calling for, but which have still not been tackled by the government. 
One of the problems which remains for Chinese Indonesians relates to the issues 
of "assimilation" and "integration". It seems from the actions of governments 
since 1998 that they have given up their policy of assimilation, however, whether 
this indicates that there is now room for the ethnic Chinese in the national identity 
of the country, is still not clear. Certainly the views expressed in the Tempo article 
above, suggest that changes in social attitudes towards the ethnic Chinese have 
not yet occurred. 
As well as the confusion over the issue of assimilation in the post-Suharto era, the 
other main issue for the ethnic Chinese is that of citizenship. As was the case 
during the New Order period, each new generation of ethnic Chinese must make a 
choice about their Indonesian citizenship. They do not automatically get 
Indonesian citizenship when they are born. Until they are eighteen years old they 
are placed on their father's citizenship papers, after this age they must apply to the 
government for a citizenship document of their own. Non-Chinese Indonesians 
automatically receive Indonesian citizenship when they are born. There have been 
calls to repeal Law No. 3/1946 and Law No. 62/1958 which deal with this issue 
(Jakarta Post, 25 March 2000). This is a more fundamental issue than allowing 
the ethnic Chinese to celebrate Chinese New Year. Providing Chinese Indonesians 
with automatic citizenship would send a clear message that they were accepted as 
genuine Indonesians. The groups discussed in this thesis campaign for changes in 
this law, however, they have not yet been successful. 
A wide range of scholars, writing on post-Suharto Indonesia, have emphasised the 
importance of the government engaging in new ways with the discourses of 
national identity, not just to improve relations with the ethnic Chinese, but also 
with many other groups in Indonesia. Benedict Anderson argues that if Indonesia 
is serious about resuming the nation-building project, then, an overhaul of the 
complete governmental system is needed. In a public lecture, in Jakarta. on 4 
March 1999, Anderson argued that nationalism is a project which "is never finally 
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complete. It must be struggled for in every generation". Anderson argued that too 
many Indonesian people think of Indonesia as an "inheritance" rather than a 
challenge for the future (Anderson, 1999: 8). He uses the example of a baby born 
in Madura. She may already be considered Indonesian, but the baby is not aware 
of this. "The process whereby she will become for herself an Indonesian, with an 
Indonesian spirit, an Indonesian commitment, and an Indonesian culture, is a long 
one, with no guarantee of success". In order to succeed Indonesia needs to be 
"large-hearted and broadminded enough to accept the real variety and complexity 
of the national society" (Anderson, 1999: 7). 
A. Malik Gismar questions the continued usefulness of the concept of Pancasila 
in post-Suharto Indonesia (2002). In his article, "Missing: Homo Pancasilaensis" 
Gismar discusses how Sukarno and Suharto tried to inculcate the idea of 
Pancasila and create homo pancasilaensis in order to overcome feelings of 
inferiority among post-colonial Indonesians. They tried to ensure that Pancasila 
became an important source of national and personal identity for the people. 
Gismar concludes from his research that this is not the case post-1998, if it ever 
was the case. Gismar asked 100 university students in Jakarta to answer two 
questions: when you think of Indonesia, what comes to mind and when you think 
of yourself, what comes to mind? None of his respondents mentioned Pancasila. 
Donald Emmerson also carried out some empirical research on this topic. He 
discusses a survey of 182 first-year students from Atma Jaya University in 
Yogyakarta which was carried out in 2001. They were asked: "When you hear the 
word `Indonesia', what first occurs to you? What do you associate it with? ". In 
their answers Pancasila was not mentioned and only twelve percent mentioned the 
national motto "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" or the national flag (Emmerson, 2002). 
This research seems to correspond with the difficulties my interviewees had in 
articulating their Indonesian identities. The group members know that they want 
to be considered Indonesian but they find it difficult to say what it means to be 
Indonesian other than to accept diversity. 
Another aspect of Indonesian national history which has been opened up by the 
fall of the Suharto regime, and an investigation of which could have positive 
repercussions for the ethnic Chinese, is a potential revisiting of the events of 
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1965. Robert Cribb suggests that censorship and self-censorship which was 
dominant during the New Order regime, were considered by mans' scholars to be 
the main reason why Indonesians were reticent about exploring the reasons for the 
killings. It was expected that with the fall of Suharto Indonesians would be keen 
to explore this period of their history (Cribb, 2002: 559). A number of 
organisations have started investigating the events of 1965 and demanding that the 
government establish an investigating commission. These organisations include 
the Institute for Research into the Victims of the 1965-1966 Killings (YPKP, 
Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965-66), Solidarity for Motherland and 
Nation (SNB, Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa) and Volunteer Team for Humanity 
(TRUK, Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan). However, Cribb suggests that the 
demands for an official investigation are not as widespread as was first expected. 
This may be because Indonesians have faced so many more practical, more 
immediate problems in the post-Suharto period. There also seems to be an 
unwillingness on the part of those in power to delve into the past, perhaps because 
many of them may were involved in the violence themselves (Cribb, 2002: 560- 
561). 
Another prominent Indonesian writer, Goenawan Mohamad, argues that "what we 
need now is a different notion of `Indonesia'. Not as wide geography. Not as an 
impenetrable fort. But as unfinished historical project: a nation will never be 
finished once and for all, for it must always answer to `determining 
circumstances' that will keep on changing" (Mohamad, 2001). Goenawan 
Mohamad sums up the essence of Indonesian national identity rather succinctly. 
He states that "a nation is finally indeed a project. `Indonesia' is an endeavour of 
millions of people who differ from one another, to try living together in one 
community... But it must be said this is not merely an experiment to bring about 
something practical and useful. For there is something touching, something 
meaningful, something that rouses both enthusiasm and anxious hopes in that 
project. 
From what these writers are observing it seems the government in post-Suharto 
Indonesia are not grappling with the issues of what it means to be Indonesian to 
the extent that many thought they would after the end of the New Order. So, where 
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does this ongoing need for an engagement on the part of the government. with 
discourses of national identity, leave the ethnic Chinese' Actually, the situation is 
rather worrying. The government permits Chinese Indonesians to express their 
Chinese heritage, but, this heritage is still perceived as foreign. Their behaviour 
has not yet been accepted as Indonesian. This still leave Chinese Indonesians in a 
very precarious position and could be quite dangerous in the future. Daniel Lev 
suggests that what is needed in order to end discrimination is education in schools 
about the history of the Chinese in Indonesia: education which is open and honest 
and accurate (Lev, 2000: 24). This has not happened so far. Although the 
government has begun to allow Chinese culture to be openly displayed, they have 
not begun the process of representing the ethnic Chinese as genuine Indonesians 
within Indonesian national discourses. As long as this does not happen, the ethnic 
Chinese will remain outside the discourses of Indonesian national identity. 
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Appendix 
Interview Questions 
Information About the Organisations 
Why did you establish the organisation? 
Why did you join this organisation? 
When was the organisation established? 
How many members does the organisation have? 
How many non-Chinese members? 
How many women are there in the organisation? 
What are the aims of the organisation? 
What does the organisation want to achieve? 
What activities have the organisation organised? 
Do you work with non-Chinese organisations? 
Where does the organisation get its money from? 
Are Chinese Indonesian organisations needed to represent the ethnic Chinese? 
Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian Identities 
What part of Indonesia do you come from? 
Where do your parents come from? 
Are your parents ethnic Chinese? 
What profession do they have? 
Do they maintain any links with China? 
Have you even visited China? 
Would they like you to marry/have you married an ethnic Chinese person or non- 
Chinese? 
Would you like your children to marry an ethnic Chinese? 
Have you ever visited China? 
Do you speak Chinese? 
Do y, ou read Chinese? 
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If you read or speak the language where did you learn it? 
Do you know Chinese stories? 
What kind of area were you brought up in? (an ethnic Chinese or a mixed area) 
What kind of area do you live in now? (an ethnic Chinese or a mixed area) 
What religion do you practice? What religion did your parents practice'' 
Do you have problems in your area because you are ethnic Chinese? 
Do you mix with non-Chinese through your work? 
Do you find you are/have been treated differently because you are ethnically 
Chinese? 
Are you interested in Chinese culture? 
In your family do you/did you celebrate Chinese culture? 
Do you send your children to state or private school? 
Do you feel part of a transnational Chinese community? 
Do you have links with ethnic Chinese in other countries? 
Do you feel in any way Chinese or is it just a label placed on you by others? 
Do you have a good relationship with bureaucrats? 
Do you pay extra for services? 
Future Prospects for Chinese Indonesians. 
How has your life changed, if at all, since the end of the Suharto government? 
Do you think that the ethnic Chinese people should be allowed to speak Chinese 
in public? 
Do you think that ethnic Chinese should be allowed to celebrate Chinese New 
Year? 
What do you think can be done to improve relations between the ethnic Chinese 
and non-Chinese in Indonesia? 
Can something be done in the education system to improve relations between the 
Chinese and non-Chinese? 
Do you fear what will happen if Gus Dur lost his job? 
What should the government do to improve relations between Chinese and non- 
Chinese? 
What are your opinions about government activity in relation ethnic Chinese since 
1998? 
Do you want the ethnic Chinese to be accepted as a suku? 
Do you think that ethnic Chinese politicians are needed to represent the interests 
of Chinese Indonesians? 
Is it important to you that Chinese Indonesians become more involved in politics? 
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Are the ethnic Chinese already Indonesian? If not, what should they do to become 
Indonesian? 
What term do you want used to describe your ethnic group? Is Chia acceptable? 
Are you hopeful for the future? 
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